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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis has been to investigate the market structure, profitability, competitiveness 
and productivity of commercial banks operating in the MENA economies for the period 1999-2012. 
The study first measures whether the banking industry in MENA economies has been concentrated or 
not, and aims to investigate the relationship between market structure and banks’ profitability; then 
examines whether a bank’s performance can be better explained by the Structure-Conduct-
Performance (SCP) hypothesis, that claims that a highly concentrated market leads to collusive 
behaviour among larger banks, resulting in superior performance hypothesis or by the efficient 
hypothesis (EH) that claims that the positive association of market share of a bank and higher 
performance is caused by the bank’s superior efficiency. Empirically, I apply the Panzar-Rosse model 
to investigate which can be beneficial to policy makers, by illustrating how to shape policies which 
positively affect the market competition and safeguard stability of the financial sector. Finally, the 
study assesses changes in banking productivity by employing Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), and 
the findings will be able to show bank managers, market participants and policy makers the sources of 
productivity of commercial banks and to assist them for optimum resource allocation strategies. This 
study examines markets that were found to have different degree of market concentration, and 
assesses the relevance of SCP and EH paradigm. The results of panel analysis and GMM estimators, 
provide evidence that the SCP hypothesis is not rejected, emphasising that increased market power 
yields monopoly profits. The fact that the impact of market concentration is positive in MENA 
economies is vital evidence, at least to a certain extent. On the other hand, Market share (MS) is found 
in most regressions using fixed effects to be positive and highly significantly different from zero, 
whilst market concentration is equal to zero, supporting the argument that if a bank enjoys a higher 
degree of efficiency in respect to good management and technology than its competitors, it can easily 
gain a larger market share by lowering its prices and earning economic profits However, also the 
thesis finds a positive and significant relationship between net interest margins, profitability and 
capital adequacy, suggesting that commercial banks in the MENA economies still need to be highly 
capitalised so as to be viable and to operate profitably. Spending on technology and fixed assets is 
found to contribute in making banks more profitable, but banks’ size not, indicating that 
policymakers, regulators and managers of banks in the MENA region should encourage mergers that 
lead to significant investments, instead of simply increasing the size of the new scheme. Poor cost 
management is one of the largest contributors to poor performance for commercial banks in the 
examined period. Overall, the thesis finds evidence of structural reforms and uncovers measures that 
have led to the improvement of regulation, and the implementation of frameworks which should 
continue to improve competitiveness within MENA banking sectors. In addition, future policy on the 
banking sector should take account of differences in the factors that affect bank productivity in these 
countries which are distinctively different.   
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction  
The growing role of developing economies on a global scale1 and the significance of a well-
functioning banking sector for the growth and welfare of a country have been highlighted by 
Levine (1997), Claessens (2009), Abuzayed et al. (2012), Ben Naceur et al. (2014). For these 
authors, the examination of profitability, productivity, and the drivers of competition is 
important to the growth and development of an economy. MENA economies differ from 
developed economies, due to the presence and dominant role of state banks. Although MENA 
state banks have lost market share since the 1990s, in much the same way as banks in Eastern 
European and Central Asian economies, they continue to play a vital role in the domestic 
economy.  
Over time the banking sector of MENA countries has undergone a profound transformation, 
which has been achieved through the process of privatization, and from the entry of foreign 
banks during the last thirty years. Much of this development has contributed to increased 
foreign direct investments, which has encouraged the reform and restructuring of inefficient 
parts of the banking sector. The real GDP per-capita averaged only half per cent growth 
between 1980 and 2010, compared to three per cent for emerging and developing economies, 
so the region was not able to match population growth so as to create sufficient jobs2 or raise 
the standard of living of the average citizen. Consequently, MENA has not reaped the full 
                                                                 
1
 Current developing and emerging countries are expected to account for nearly 57% of world GDP by 2030 
(OECD, 2010). 
2
 population growth was around 2½ per cent 
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benefits of globalization and many MENA countries suffer from some of the highest 
unemployment rates in the world. Besides, these countries will need external support to meet 
their financing requirements3. Due to the large amounts of inflows, the inability of capital 
markets to provide a big bulk of these funds, and the fact that timely financing will be 
critical, safeguarding a profitable and competitive banking sector is cornerstone for these 
countries not only to grow, or to catch up to other emerging countries, but also to survive, a 
need that becomes increasingly critical4. For such reason, commercial banks play a leading 
role in these economies by providing funds to private and public investment projects and by 
financing government budget deficits.  
The degree of development in the banking industry in MENA is varied. Some countries, such 
as the Gulf countries, Lebanon and Jordan, can be considered to have developed banking 
systems, whilst others, including Egypt are still undeveloped and dominated by state banks, 
and are consequently affected significantly by government interventions in credit policy and 
related high non-performing loans and liquidity issues (Omran, 2007). At the same time, 
small commercial and industrial companies in the MENA market still face obstacles in 
accessing long term finance because banks are reluctant to provide long term funds to small 
corporations, instead tunnelling these funds mainly to large corporations. However, the need 
to measure risks and benefits from the change of banking market structure had been 
extensively examined in various studies which investigated a broad spectrum of markets over 
a period time. A number of studies examining bank performance, competition and efficiency 
have been carried out in the United States and in Europe (Nathan and Neave,1989; Molyneux 
et al.,1994; Molyneux et al. 1996; De Rozas, 2007) as well as in large emerging economies 
                                                                 
3
 The external financing needs of the areas oil  importing countries and fiscal financial needs were projected to 
exceed US$50 bill ion to US$100 bill ion per annum. Capital markets are l ikely to provide only part of these 
funds, and timely official financing will be critical. 
4
 Lower commodity prices and turmoil in the area of Middle East coupled by expectations of globally rising 
interest rates from the end of 2015 onwards, has significantly slowed Greenfield capital  flows to these 
developing countries. 
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such as China and Brazil, but there is a lack of adequate systematic evidence regarding bank 
performance, competition and efficiency for banks operating in the MENA economies. For 
the above mentioned reasons, the analysis of market structure, profitability, competition and 
productivity of the commercial banks in the MENA region and interrelation of those factors 
is extremely useful because it provides empirical evidence that helps to identify the optimum 
mix of policy which facilitates the development of the banks and economies in this region 
and elsewhere.  
1.2 Rationale and Importance of the Study 
Banking industry is a main driver of economic welfare, stability and growth among countries 
(Abuzayed et al. 2012; Awdeh et al. 2013; Claessens, 2009) and the significance of well-
functioning financial system for the economic growth of these countries is widely accepted 
both in theoretical and empirical studies (Levine, 1997; Ben Naceur et al. 2014). The 
examination of the banking system of developed countries, however, is not very helpful to 
derive conclusions for developing countries, due to differences between developed and 
developing countries. Whereas the banking industry of developed countries has been 
extensively examined, there is lack of studies that examine thoroughly the profit, 
productivity, competitiveness drivers of banks in developing countries and whether bank 
profitability in these countries is a result of lack of competition, despite the increasing 
significance of developing countries for global GDP by year 2030 and the differences in the 
structure of financial sector in these countries compared to that of developed countries. 
Developing countries have weak institutional environment, less developed, so their financial 
system is based almost solely on banks (Abuzayed et al. 2012; Awdeh et al. 2013; Claessens, 
2009;  Ben Naceur et al. 2014)  and are unable to follow sophisticated approaches intended 
for advanced economies due to structural weaknesses, in the form of low quality of 
accounting data, lack of auditing companies, lack of auditing practices and problems in 
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implementing sophisticated risk measurement systems. Consequently, MENA banking sector 
is among the deepest in developing economies, not systematically examined. The importance 
of this thesis is threefold. 
Firstly, investigating the interrelations between productivity, market structure, profitability 
and competitive conditions of MENA banks is crucial not only in terms of policy 
implications to optimally structure the banking system of these countries, but, most 
importantly, for the efficient allocation of funds and sustainable development of these 
regional economies in the long run. In particular, MENA region economies have been 
witnessing an unprecedented transformation from being solely petroleum producers to having 
diversified economies. To succeed, this transformation requires an efficient allocation of 
funds, something which, in other economies, is traditionally performed by both capital 
markets and banking institutions. But, capital markets in the MENA economies are neither 
efficient nor well-developed, so banking institutions almost monopolise the role of financial 
intermediation. Thus, the existence of a well-functioned banking sector is crucial, not only for 
the development of the financial sector in these countries, and the optimal allocation of funds, 
but for the future of these economies as a whole.  
Second, research on competitiveness of the banking industry in MENA countries is not as 
common as research from Europe, United States and Canada. It is believed this study is the 
first of this kind to cover a large sample of 11 MENA countries for an extended and recent 
period (14 years) filling a significant gap in research. Additionally, these data will enable this 
study to draw, for the first time, reliable conclusions for the political instability in 2011 and, 
more importantly, provide the ability to examine a whole economic area (MENA region) 
after the liberalisation and related transformation of the economies of the MENA which 
aimed to improve efficiency, productivity, profitability and promote competition.  
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Third, this thesis will be able to examine if the foreign ownership and the policy that 
eliminates the role of state banks benefits the sector, leading to significant policy implications 
for international organisation  and the regulators in similar economies, such as oil or mineral-
rich African and Asian countries which aim to open their banking system to foreign investors.  
1.3 Contribution of the thesis 
This thesis, to the best of my knowledge, is the first to investigate the interrelations between 
productivity, market structure, profitability and competitive conditions in MENA economies 
and to evaluate the impact of foreign ownership and financial deregulation on the whole 
performance of MENA commercial banks. MENA region banking sector is among the 
deepest in developing economies, not systematically investigated. By examining the effect of 
these factors to bank profitability of eleven MENA countries, in an extended time period that 
includes also data after the 2008 global crisis and Arab uprising for the first time. 
Furthermore, prospective investors seeking to invest in MENA banks will benefit from the 
empirical findings, as the findings indicate the banks that are revealed to be more profitable 
and productive. Three chapters, namely chapter three, chapter four and chapter five, 
empirically examine these issues. 
Chapter three is concerned with assessing the impact of market structure and determinants of 
profitability of MENA banks, including bank-specific variables and macroeconomic 
variables, in the context of the Structure-Conduct-Performance Hypothesis (SCP) and 
Efficiency Structure Hypothesis (EH). It investigates whether the profitability of MENA 
banks is due to the market concentration; if bank profitability is function of the industry’s 
structure, then regulatory policy should intervene to change market structure to enhance 
competition so as to safeguard the soundness of the banking sector. If, on the contrary, 
profitability is matter of other factors such as efficiency, capital adequacy and others, then 
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policy implications are different. The commercial banks play a crucial role in the service-
based economy of MENA. It is well known that commercial banks contribute to the 
economic development of a country and that an efficient and profitable banking sector is 
necessary condition for economic growth (Alper and Anbar, 2011; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 
2014). Profitability is linked to the ability to earn profit; it is the key measure of the entire 
success of business reflecting the final result of business operation. The profit of a bank is 
necessary for survival in the market leading to expand its activities and to maximise the 
shareholders’ returns and safeguarding stability of the whole economy. In an attempt to fill 
this gap, the first objective of this thesis consists of examining whether commercial bank 
profitability, measured in terms of ROA, ROE and NIM is solely a function of market 
structure (SCP) as measured by Herfindahl index (HHI) or efficient structure hypothesis (EH) 
measured by market share.  
Chapter four will measure the degree of MENA banking competition over the period 1999-
2012, using Panzar and Rosse model to investigate whether deregulation and economic 
reforms have transformed the MENA banking sector into a more competitive market. In an 
attempt to fill this gap, examining initially whether the revenues of MENA banks is due to 
monopolistic competition helps to derive significant policy implications for the viability of 
the banking system of these developing economies. Therefore, testing degrees of competition 
is important for relaxing enforcement standards to support economic recovery. The empirical 
findings of this chapter will allow policymakers to have better understand how economic 
reforms and deregulation impact the structure and competition of the banking market in 
MENA, and to review and revise their policies in respect to recent data in market structure in 
order to improve competition and quality of banking services.  
Finally, chapter five examines the productivity and efficiency of MENA commercial banks. 
The chapter applies Malmquist index DEA to estimate total factor productivity (TFP), 
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technological and technical efficiency, and scale efficiency change. The estimates of 
productivity are used, in turn, as input in Tobit models that are used in the study to 
investigate whether the macroeconomic and firm-specific variables affect productivity. The 
productivity and source of productivity of commercial banks is highly important, since the 
existence of productive and efficient commercial banks contributes in lowering operational 
costs, enhancing profitability which in turns will be reflected on the stability of the financial 
system and improve the overall economy and growth. Furthermore, findings of this 
methodology are expecting to be beneficial for regulators, policymakers, market participants 
and other stakeholders in optimising managerial, human and capital resources and to enhance 
the viability and confidence in the financial system. Moreover, results of the Tobit model 
contribute by evaluating the impact of bank ownership on productivity of MENA banks. This 
information can be helpful in forming government policies intended to facilitate optimum 
foreign participation in a way which contributes to the competitive environment in MENA 
economies.  
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The objective of the thesis is to investigate how changes in the banking industry over the 
period 1999-2012 influenced market structure, profitability, competitiveness and productivity 
of commercial banks operating in MENA economies. In doing so, the thesis provides a 
comprehensive review of the financial and banking reforms, which have occurred in the 
MENA economies. Second, this thesis describes the main features of the MENA banking 
sector. Third, it estimates market concentration in each country and employing the Structure-
Conduct-Performance (SCP) and Efficient Structure Hypothesis (EH) to investigate 
determinants of banks’ profitability, and considers whether banks that operate in concentrated 
markets are more profitable. Forth; it evaluates competitive conditions within the banking 
sectors using Panzar-Rosse model. Sixth, it estimates the productivity changes and efficiency 
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for the period 1999-2012 and it also examines the determinants of productivity of banks. 
Finally, the study makes recommendations and considers policy implications. Policy makers 
and regulators can use these findings to outline measures aimed at improving competition, 
profitability, and productivity as well as offering thought as to how they may wish to further 
encourage financial liberalisation, decreasing state control and eliminating barriers to foreign 
bank entry.  
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The Thesis is divided into six chapters. First, chapter one introduces the main issues to be 
investigated, and discusses the importance of the thesis, its objectives, the methodology 
employed, the overall contribution and thesis design. Chapter two provides a general review 
of the main characteristics of the MENA economies, presenting their primary economic 
characteristics, their development, their financial reforms and the challenges they face. Then 
it describes recent developments in the banking sector structure and regulations in each 
country. Whilst, chapter three assess the impact of market structure and other determinants on 
profitability of commercial banks in the context of on Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
and Efficiency Hypothesis (EH). This chapter is supported by literature on (SCP) and (EH) to 
carry out unbalanced panel analysis of the MENA banking industry, and identify the 
determinants of banks profitability.  
In chapter four, I investigate banking competition in MENA economies aiming to estimate 
the competitive condition using the Panzar-Rosse model and to examine under which 
conditions MENA banks earn their revenues. This chapter is also supported by literature on 
the Panzar-Rosse model and its variables. Chapter five aims to estimate the total productivity 
of MENA banks and its determinants. This chapter measures and analyses the productivity of 
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commercial banks using the Malmquist Index (MPI) Analysis. Then, in the second stage, the 
Tobit model is employed to investigate what factors affect the total factor productivity. 
Finally, chapter six provides a summary of the main findings, policy implications, and 
recommendation and presents the limitations of this study and proposes area for future 
researches. 
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Chapter Two 
Financial and Banking System in MENA Economies 
2.1 Background to MENA economies 
MENA has been considered as one of the world’s most troubled regions especially since 
1945 and consists of 17 countries (see map 2.1), mainly with Muslim population, with the 
exception of Lebanon (Lowe, 2013). A number of MENA economies (Egypt, Tunisia, 
Morocco and Jordan among others witnessed the liberalisation of the financial system and 
other economic reforms during the last 35 years (Turk-Ariss, 2008; Ben Naceur, 2011) as the 
barriers of capital flow and state ownership were eliminated. Although these reforms lead to 
liberalisation of the economy, the financial system in MENA economies is still dominated by 
the banking sector, frequently state-owned bank dominated, due to the fact that capital 
markets are neither well-developed nor efficient (Cherif and Dreger, 2014).  
 
Map 2.1 the Middle East and North Africa 
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MENA region plays a crucial role to meet the world demand for hydrocarbon consumption 
and MENA countries exhibit a number of similarities as a result of social and geographical 
proximities, but these countries present several differences in terms of economic and 
institutional environment, including the banking industry as well as this region vary in size, 
GDP per capita and financial development. 
In the late 2010, the public uprisings and demonstrations against the existing political regime 
known as the Arab uprising took place in a number of MENA countries, disrupting the 
recovery from the financial crisis and resulting in declining profitability of financial sector 
(Lowe, 2013; Ghosh, 2016). In particular, in December 2010 and January 2011, a series of 
anti-government protests and demonstrations took place in Tunisia and Egypt respectively, 
leading to the overthrow of the existing political regime, increasing labour unrest, 
deterioration in mining and oil production, decreasing in credit growth, impacting bank 
profitability (Lowe, 2013; Ghosh, 2016), whilst coupled by an uneven effect on other, oil rich 
countries (Chau et al., 2014, Hassan et al., 2014). However, the Arab uprising is still 
debatable in terms of how it affects the banking and financial sector in this region. In early 
studies to investigate the impact of this event on the financial and economic condition, 
Mahboub and Abdou (2012) suggested that the Arab uprising uprisings are mainly caused by 
difficult economic conditions. Whilst, Khandelwal and Roitman (2013) confirmed that output 
losses are mainly due to political instability in a number of these countries. In this respect, 
using daily stock returns for six economies namely Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Bahrain 
and Kuwait for the period 2009-2012, Chau et al. (2014) indicated that a major volatility of 
Islamic indices resulting from the Arab uprising. Moreover, in Egypt, Hassan et al. (2014) 
applied event study and found that the protests have dropped the valuation of firms operating 
within the mandatory regime. However, extended sample of MENA banks for the period 
2000-2012 to investigate the impact of the political transition on banking sector behaviour in 
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MENA economies is carried out by Ghosh (2016) suggesting the adverse impact of political 
uncertainty on bank behaviour.  
2.2 The main characteristics and data descriptive in the MENA economies  
The existence of well-functioning financial system and economic growth is broadly known 
both in theoretical and empirical literatures (Levine, 1997; Ben Naceur et al. 2014). 
Development of the financial system is a foundation of economic development. Certainly the 
stage of development and depth of financial sector are key elements that differentiate 
developing and developed economies. In this respect, the relationship between financial 
development and growth is still debatable among researchers and policymakers. For many 
decades, financial repression or government intervention created boundaries for the financial 
system as they misrepresented prices, which in turn impeded the economic growth. Given 
this fact, the reforming program in MENA economies comprised plans to refresh capital 
markets in a number of countries, as well as establishing capital markets in a few others, and 
enacted new capital regulation in order to stimulate private investments and to enhance their 
overall economic performance (Ben Naceur et al. 2011). Additionally, monetary authorities 
enforce high reserve requirements, banking credit ceiling, and selective credit allocation 
leading to a non-competitive financial business. Stability of the macroeconomic is considered 
a major factor for the growth of the financial services sector (Ben Naceur et al. 2011). In 
response to this matter, suitable macroeconomic policies, which promote competition within 
the financial business and create transparent procedures, should be adopted by policymakers. 
More specifically, the financial system needs to espouse practical regulations and supervision 
rules, creditor rights as well as contract enforcement. This substance requires policymakers 
and decision makers to eliminate financial repression and work to deregulate the financial 
system as these steps can promote and sustain economic development (Chalk et al. 1996; 
Abiad and Mody 2003; Olson and Zoubi, 2011; Ben Naceur et al. 2011). These studies 
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suggested that financial reforms have been associated with progress in the early stages, as it is 
stated by Chalk et al. (1996) who found that 13 MENA countries have experienced 
significant progress in the financial development, and also found that financial reforms in 
most MENA countries achieved major progress during the examined period. In this context, 
Abiad and Mody (2003) who examined the liberalisation policy in 1973-1996 have confirmed 
such incident.  
The importance of financial reforms has been understood by countries in the MENA region. 
They believe such reforms will help in allocating investments, and will improve productivity 
by classifying promising investments and corporations, organising savings channels, 
upgrading good corporate governance, open doors for international trading, and diversifying 
of risk, as well as enabling the exchange of goods and services (Naceur et al. 2011). These 
developments also help to ensure protection of investors, and enhance the banks’ duty to 
motivate capital markets by establishing mutual funds (Olson and Zoubi, 2011; Ben Naceur 
et al. 2011). 
However, the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in this thesis is reported in the 
table 2.1. This chapter reports mean and the standard deviation (in brackets) for the full 
sample in MENA economies during the study period (1999-2012).  Additionally, this study 
checked whether there exist any significant differences among variables of different 
countries. For such purpose, means and standard deviation of every variable for every 
country are reported. Concerning, profitability and revenues variables, I observed that on 
average commercial banks in UAE and Qatar are the highest in profitability. It is evident that 
UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman are above the MENA economies average 
confirming that commercial banks in higher income MENA economies tend to perform better 
and be more profitable than other low income MENA economies such as Egypt, Tunisia, 
Lebanon and Morocco. Differences in profitability can be justified by regulatory differences 
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and level of development. Regarding the rely on interest income, table 2.1 shows that Omani 
commercial banks relies heavily on interest income as observed by net interest margin NIM 
and II/TA following by UAE as they revealed average above MENA.  
Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics for bank’s profitability and revenues variables  
Variable 
/Country   
ROA ROE NIM TR/TA II/TA 
Bahrain  1.04 
(1.15) 
9.39 
(11.11)      
1.99 
(0.631)        
0.031 
(0.023)    
0.023 
(0.022)        
Oman  1.89 
(1.28) 
14.05 
(10.11)    
3.78 
(0.648)      
0.077 
(0.046) 
0.064 
(0.046)   
Qatar  2.46 
(1.13) 
17.89 
(9.62) 
2.85 
(0.538)        
0.030 
(0.023)   
 0.017 
(0.021) 
Saudi Arabia 2.23 
(1.58) 
18.63 
(13.84) 
2.90 
(0.480)    
0.045 
(0.016) 
0.032 
(0.008) 
UAE 2.48 
(1.55) 
14.84 
(7.26) 
3.04 
(0.788) 
.075 
(0.051) 
.060 
(0.050) 
Kuwait  1.86 
(1.52) 
13.90 
(20.99) 
2.63 
(0.461) 
0.055 
(0.025) 
0.043 
(0.024) 
Egypt  0.89 
(1.72) 
10.75 
(25.64) 
2.11 
(1.13) 
0.068 
(0.029) 
0.051 
(0.024) 
Jordan  1.23 
(1.06) 
11.79 
(16.51) 
2.96 
(0.671) 
0.031 
(0.011) 
0.016 
(0.010) 
Lebanon  0.76 
(0.846) 
12.58 
(35.12)    
2.23 
(0.809)        
0.068 
(0.035) 
0.059 
(0.030) 
Morocco  0.79 
(1.18) 
9.43 
(36.07) 
2.69 
(1.21) 
0.215 
(1.28) 
0.206 
(1.28) 
Tunisia  0.30 
(4.51) 
6.31 
(34.68) 
2.60 
(2.58) 
0.044 
(0.024) 
0.026 
(0.022) 
MENA Average 1.45 12.69 2.71 0.07 0.05 
 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate the development of return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE) during the examined period (1999-2012) in the examined countries. It is shown that 
profitability of Commercial banks in GCC started to be increased since 2000 reflecting that 
banking sector in those countries has benefited from the economic reforms and the new 
investments spent on improving performance and productivity of GCC banks. These banks 
tend to perform better and be more profitable than other low income MENA economies such 
as Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon and Morocco. The justification for such matter is the banking 
sector in GCC has a stable source of income from the traditional banking activities and higher 
level of income has helped them to spend more on investments in technology to diversify 
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banking services and to achieve cost efficiency. On the other hand, it is obvious that the 
banking sector in GCC was influenced by the global financial crisis (2007-08) and 
profitability has dropped. Bahraini, Kuwaiti and Saudi commercial banks are generally 
affected by Losses in investments. Furthermore, the banking sector in Bahrain was negatively 
influenced by political instability which was related to Arab uprising in 2010 and 
consequences of such incident also led to have low profitability in 2011. However, in Oman, 
the banking sector has been slightly affected by the global financial crisis. In respect to Qatari 
banks, recently the economy in Qatar has become more open, but banks have least been 
affected by the global crisis as result of considerable support from the government which 
helped to reduce losses. Additionally, we need to know that the banking sector in Qatar is the 
most diversified income within GCC as net interest margin contributing by %50 for bank’s 
income (Al-Hassan et al. 2010).   
Table 2.2 Average Return on Assets (ROA), in MENA countries (average, in percentage 
terms) 
Year Bahrain Egypt Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
Tunisia UAE 
1999 1.02 1.79 0.39 1.85 1.26 1.43 1.76 2.11 0.63 1.85 1.79 
2000 1.10 1.41 0.71 2.22 0.85 1.18 1.62 1.15 1.85 1.23 2.40 
2001 1.14 0.99 0.70 2.33 0.68 1.19 0.81 1.48 2.06 1.57 2.34 
2002 1.05 0.59 0.16 2.24 0.16 0.47 1.81 2.56 2.15 0.15 2.46 
2003 2.84 0.60 0.92 2.41 0.68 0.75 0.50 2.70 2.25 0.41 2.50 
2004 6.24 0.88 1.60 2.99 0.57 0.87 1.89 2.77 2.65 0.16 3.04 
2005 6.98 -0.37 2.59 3.63 0.63 0.82 2.70 3.83 3.45 -0.17 5.31 
2006 2.90 0.83 2.01 3.26 0.55 1.15 2.97 3.17 3.87 0.54 2.85 
2007 4.56 1.31 1.78 2.89 0.82 1.17 2.32 3.02 2.83 0.32 3.22 
2008 1.42 1.11 1.64 -0.01 0.85 1.23 2.07 2.32 1.98 1.38 1.93 
2009 -0.78 1.09 1.22 0.68 1.42 1.19 1.65 1.95 1.60 0.97 1.88 
2010 -4.53 1.23 1.25 1.21 1.58 1.27 1.73 2.40 1.69 -2.30 2.01 
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2011 1.63 0.71 1.11 1.19 1.01 1.17 1.51 2.43 1.95 -0.04 1.78 
2012 0.12 1.15 1.26 0.98 0.83 1.11 1.53 2.26 1.98 0.88 2.40 
 
However, in other parts in MENA, in Egypt, the profitability of banks was reasonable, but in 
2005 the profitability ratio is appeared to be negative and this incident is justified by a 
number of state banks have been observed poor performance and they were targeted for 
acquisition by foreign banks (Ben Naceur and Kandial, 2013). Also, Tunisian banking sector 
revealed a negative profitability in 2010 justified by the Arab uprising took place at that time 
and consequences continued to negatively influence the profitability in 2011 which was 
negative as well.  
Whilst, in Jordan, the banking sector had been positively influenced by the overall economic 
boom before 2008 as the average bank profitability started to increase since 2004, then the 
trend has reverse since 2009, probably due to the consequences of 2008 global financial 
crisis. In Lebanon, Both tables show the ability of Lebanese commercial banks to withstand 
the global financial crisis of 2008. One of the reasons to justify such success is the 
commercial banks in Lebanon were subject to maintain high reserve requirements imposed 
by Banque Du Liban (BDL), which led Lebanese banks to enjoy high liquidity. As a result, 
Lebanese banks have long embraced conservative banking policies and they have rich 
experience to operate in an unstable and risky political environment. 
Table 2.3 Average Return on Equity (ROE), in MENA countries (average, in percentage 
terms) 
Year Bahrain Egypt Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
Tunisia UAE 
1999 10.15 15.90 4.10 17.50 11.61 14.02 13.87 18.73 1.82 8.86 11.70 
2000 11.25 13.10 7.26 20.43 9.95 10.84 13.11 11.51 19.34 8.72 14.97 
2001 11.02 9.49 5.21 21.59 9.05 11.16 6.54 13.05 19.98 9.22 14.86 
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2002 9.58 5.10 25.15 20.71 36.80        5.14 15.15 22.33 19.74 0.84 15.48 
2003 14.54 2.49 9.76   21.37 19.96 8.31 3.28 21.53 20.27 3.05 15.11 
2004 23.62 9.19 22.65 24.76 10.93 9.83 15.03 17.60 23.86 1.36 17.84 
2005 22.03 -8.14 18.86 27.84 9.81 9.10 19.31 21.38 31.86 -5.51 27.87 
2006 15.54 25.69 14.13 25.94 7.66 13.27 20.91 19.83 34.56 0.68 16.15 
2007 13.22 15.91 12.24 24.16 7.98 15.10 16.41 22.67 21.67 -10.19 20.02 
2008 3.47 11.80 11.71 -15.22 10.26 16.79 14.67 18.40 16.75 16.40 13.75 
2009 2.89 6.53 9.02 4.05 12.53 16.65 11.95 16.86 13.30 7.24 11.98 
2010 -5.79 11.09 9.22 8.96 13.70 13.02 12.66 16.94 13.11 -11.70 11.80 
2011 8.79 5.65 8.00 8.33      11.32      15.72 11.78 16.53 14.34   8.19     11.06 
2012 4.40 11.71 8.75 7.83 9.32 14.83 12.99 15.67 14.32    6.49 12.80 
 
As shown in table 2.4, the overall assets of MENA banks have increased during the study 
period, for instance in GCC region, the total assets of banks have grown over the examined 
period 1999-2012. One of the factors could explain such growth is the wave of financial 
reforms conducted by the financial authorities in these economies contributed in growing the 
assets size of MENA banking sector. During the last three decades, the banking sector in 
MENA economies has witnessed major developments in terms of  liberalisation of financial 
markets, elimination of either capital or ownership barriers, transferring the control of 
ownership of large shares of the banking sector from government to private, and from 
domestic to foreign (Turk-Ariss, 2009; Farazi et al. 2011; Hassan et al. 2012). However, the 
growth of total assets in Commercial banks in GCC countries during the period of 2005 -
2007 particularly in Kuwait could be attributed to the rise in oil prices, which in turn enables 
banks to expand their business through an increase in the number of bank branches and size 
of their investments. Additionally, deregulation has enabled foreign banks to enter into the 
market, which led to increase total assets of MENA banking sector (Lee-Jong, 2002; Unite 
and Sullivan, 2003) reflecting the growth of commercial banks in MENA commercial banks. 
In Lebanon, According to Lebanon’s commercial banks’ balance sheet, the increase in total 
assets can be mainly justified by the increases in reserves and claims on the resident private 
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sector. This development indicates the importance of banking sector in the economic 
development. However, it is believed that profitability and size are correlated, but MENA 
banks should take into account that increasing profitability can be achieved by allowing 
banks to realise economies of scale, and such issue is examined in next chapters of this thesis. 
 Table 2.4 MENA banking sector (Total Assets) in US Million $ 
Year Bahrain Egypt Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia  
Tunisia UAE 
1999 973732 3464914 5383348 761846 1034618 4738604 1792562 238522 1220166 83789 244135 
2000 1017537 3684342 5896882 795515 1181348 4786390 1789129 259760 1320974 143822 276486 
2001 1033519 3720341 6212295 873709 1654830 4908436 1886294 237709 1349862 136353 278255 
2002 1129099 3727743 6304922 1014980 1753055 6144404 1968375 263190 1443004 348491 291748 
2003 1012030 3332130 6672715 1146146 2027579 7744503 2010090 310494 1556791 1419846 323750 
2004   839985 3574538 7456883 1095396 2610486 1018381 2237035   383111 1810059 1672163     422984 
2005 834898 4418762 6378891 1272968 2652549 932831 2439012 540181 2051516 1497084 632924 
2006 864445 5063554 7320179 1495811 2990856 1199837 3220806 769073 2323524 1626091 1015624 
2007 936909 6257153 8508776 1957531 3198742 1249076 3815431 1187709 2916968 1926926 1690625 
2008 871888 6732692 9626340 2044377 3691878 1316815 5191461 1394660 3514036 2045983 2188378 
2009 821183 6932437 9703256 1974497 3601417 1493862 5236628 1563880 3621117 2286300 2209304 
2010 872711 7678634 9418576 2011254 4400165 1525687 5499957 1803841 3711146 2207503 2189015 
2011 884662 7237929 9660099 2136295 5239013 1310400 6473559 2027897 3935714 2425084 2175780 
2012 925712 7578208 9765930 2414872 5196655 1291248 7874166 2377551 4377685 2917818 2085809 
 
In regards to market structure and competition, table 2.5 presents the HHI trends of 
commercial banks operating in the MENA economies during the period of 1999 to 2012. A 
total asset has been selected as the measure of bank size. My findings revealed that some 
MENA economies can be described as less concentrated, while others have a high degree of 
bank market concentration. In two Gulf countries, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, banking sector 
operates under a medium degree of concentration, whilst the banking sector of other Gulf 
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countries, namely Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait is very concentred. Such an outcome 
can be explained by the fact that the size of the banking industry in GCC countries, in 
absolute terms, is relatively small compared to that of other developed economies. Also, the 
political systems in those countries are dominated by royal families and the GCC are 
considered to be oil rich producers and their banking sector is relatively young with most 
banks only being established since the 1970s. In more details, starting with commercial banks 
in Bahrain, the HHI value reveals a concentrated market as it started at 3646 points in the 
1999. However, the HHI had declined to 2259 points. Therefore, Bahraini commercial market 
can be described as a very concentrated market and is moving toward a lower concentrated 
market because the index declined by 1387 over 14 years. In the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), the results of HHI indicate that the banking sector was under concentrated condition 
as it was 1813 points in 1999 and by 2012, the concentration of the banking sector in the 
UAE fell to a record of 1677 points. The banking market in the UAE can be considered as 
somewhat concentrated as it ranges between 1000 and 1800 points, reflecting the set policies 
to make the market moving to un-concentrated market. Turning to Saudi Arabia, estimations 
show that HHI standing at 1594 points in the 1999 and over the 14 years the HHI decreased 
by 122 points to arrive at 1472 points in 2012. According to current screening guidelines in 
the USA, the banking market in Saudi Arabia could be categorised as a somewhat 
concentrated market moving toward a competitive market. 
In Qatar, the HHI shows that the banking sector is a heavily concentrated over the period 
1999-2012. The HHI standing at 4594 points at 1999 and during the study period the HHI is 
still in the concentration range as it recorded 3909 points in 2012.  It revealed some declines 
in the concentration in the 2009, but it went up during 2010, 2011 and 2012. With respect to 
Oman, similar to the Qatari case, estimating the HHI of banking concentration shows that 
HHI started at 2611 points in the 1999 and during the study period it has shown slightly 
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increase and decrease in the index until it recorded 2562 point in the 2012. Since the HHI 
over the period 1999-2012 was more than 1800 points; therefore, the banking sector in Oman 
could be considered as a very concentrated market. In Kuwait, the value of HHI measure is 
3286 points in 1999 and it decreased to 2686 points in the 2012. In general, the HHI for the 
period 1999-2012 was more than 1800 points, and then the Kuwaiti banking market could be 
described as a very concentrated market. 
Table 2.5 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) Market structure of Commercial Banks 
in the MENA Economies  
Year Bahrain  UAE Saudi 
Arabia 
Qatar Oman Kuwait  Jordan  Lebanon Egypt Tunisia Morocco 
1999 3646 1813 1594 4594 2611 3286 3834 891 1949 2966 2257 
2000 3740 1828 1579 4678 2661 3311 3800 883 2005 2831 2239 
2001 3633 1705 1545 4707 2574 3310 3753 1056 2076 2624 2246 
2002 3593 1657 1510 4633 2680 3353 3782 968 2079 4904 2286 
2003 3433 1631 1499 4314 2590 3176 3834 1001 2024 1451 2281 
2004 2682 1634 1454 3854 2767 3263 3744 1124 1936 1272 2304 
2005 2488 1626 1422 3403 2687 3274 3321 1157 2029 1228 1956 
2006 2554 1439 1401 3401 3005 2622 3320 1137 1787 1069 1985 
2007 2401 1725 1445 3510 2923 2376 3350 1094 1562 1072 1290 
2008 2222 1665 1384 3512 3094 2332 3445 1085 1643 1058 1304 
2009 2337 1634 1457 3279 2919 2490 3273 1070 1564 1038 1319 
2010 2391 1594 1491 3528 2738 2472 3034 973 1643 1021 1310 
2011 2318 1629 1485 3777 2927 2474 2973 928 1687 1052 1514 
2012 2259 1677 1472 3909 2562 2686 2955 922 1672 1100 1799 
  Source: Calculated by the researcher from data obtained by Bank scope . 
Finally, the banking industry in other countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, is shown to be a 
moderately concentrated, and the banking market in Lebanon could be described as a 
competitive market. In Jordan, the estimation of HHI for the period 1999-2012 was above 
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1800 points. In 1999 the HHI was at 3834 points, decreasing to 2955 points in 2012. Thus, 
the banking sector in Jordan is still described as a very concentrated market. Unlike in Jordan 
and other gulf countries, the banking market in Lebanon revealed encouraging results. The 
HHI stood at 891 points in the 1999 and increases and decreases were recorded over the 
period of study until it obtained 922 points in 2012. In this case, the Lebanon’s market could 
be described as a competitive market since it is less than 1000 points. However, the 
substantial market structure in the MENA banking market raised the essential concern that 
banks which operate in concentrated markets are more profitable and gain market power. 
Therefore, they will be able to charge higher than competitive prices for their banking 
products, which in turn affect customer’s wealth. 
In respect to investment in ATMs, as shown in table 2.6, Egypt and Tunisia reported as the 
lowest in ATMs networks. Whilst, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE are the highest reflecting that 
the increase in the number of ATMs network are associated with continuing investment in 
technological banking items. The purpose of this rapid adoption of new technology by 
commercial banks in GCC economies has been to improve the efficiency of banks.  
Table 2.6 ATMs per 100,000 adults in MENA 
economies 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Bahrain N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Egypt 2.72 3.45 4.59 5.62 6.73 8.01 9.02 9.65 10.81 
Jordan N/A N/A N/A 22.47 25.05 26.44 28.51 29.61 30.37 
Kuwait 30.02 34.55 39.69 46.40 50.89 52.43 51.49 52.87 58.50 
Lebanon 31.86 32.74 33.94 35.26 36.67 37.76 38.80 39.12 41.33 
Morocco 8.43 15.03 13.00 14.45 16.50 18.52 19.98 21.74 23.34 
Oman N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Qatar 55.99 58.28 56.49 53.93 47.43 49.25 52.53 51.82 59.67 
Saudi Arabia 26.52 28.28 36.05 43.29 49.63 54.09 57.64 60.70 63.91 
Tunisia 8.48 9.77 10.98 14.11 15.56 17.93 20.68 21.72 22.66 
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 UAE 21.04 47.51 42.27 42.34 42.39 54.30 51.68 54.35 57.01 
 
Although MENA countries exhibit a number of similarities as a result of social and 
geographical proximities, these countries present several differences in terms of economic 
and institutional environment, including the banking industry.  Countries in this region are 
various in size, per capita GDP and financial development. The total number considers 149 
commercial banks from 11 countries namely Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. Table 2.7 lists a number 
of banks and ownership in the sample by country. 
Table 2.7 Number of banks  
Country  Number of total banks Domestic banks  Foreign banks 
Bahrain  10 7 3 
Kuwait  5 5 0 
Oman  6 2 4 
Qatar  7 6 1 
Saudi Arabia 8 8 0 
United Arab Emirates  18 15 3 
Egypt 23 11 12 
Jordan  11 9 2 
Lebanon 35 30 5 
Morocco 13 9 4 
Tunisia  13 7 6 
Total  149 109 40 
 
In fact, banking industry in MENA economies have a number of similarities to some context, 
but they are also quite different from each other. According to the World Bank database for 
regulation and supervision in the Arab World, the banking system in MENA economies still 
applies stricter ownership regulations. Table 2.8 shows number of commercial banks in 
MENA economies is growing, but if we pay attention to GCC countries, the growing in 
banks number is not that significant especially for Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, 
and this fact can be justified by the size of the banking industry in GCC countries, in absolute 
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terms, is relatively small compared to that of other developed economies and high 
concentrated. Moreover, the political systems in those countries are dominated by royal 
families and the GCC are considered to be oil rich producers and their banking sector is 
relatively young with most banks only being established since the 1970s. 
Whist, in non-GCC countries, over the period 2005-2012, the Egyptian banking sector 
witnessed a decline in banks number due to the a major wave of consolidation. Small banks 
and poor performance were targeted to acquisition and foreign banks involved to have a stake 
in the Egyptian banking sector.    
Table 2.8 Number of commercial banks in MENA (1999-2012) 
year Bahrain  Egypt Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
Tunisia UAE 
1999 5 39 8 3 26 4 5 4 8 4 12 
2000 5 39 8 3 25 4 5 4 8 5 12 
2001 5 39 8 3 18 4 5 5 8 5 12 
2002 5 39 8 3 20 4 5 5 8 6 13 
2003 6 39 8 3 20 4 5 5 8 11 13 
2004 6 39 8 3 18 4 5 5 8 12 13 
2005 8 38 10 3 19 6 5 5 8 13 13 
2006 10 33 10 4 20 6 5 5 9 15 13 
2007 12 31  ` 10 5 23 10 6 5 9 15 13 
2008 12 30 10 5 23 11 6 6 9 15 12 
2009 10 30 11 5 30 11 6 6 9 15 13 
2010 10 30 11 5 33 11 6 6 9 16 14 
2011 10 30 11 5 31 12 6 7 9 15 15 
2012 10 30 11 5 35 12 6 7 9 13 17 
Source: Bankscope Database 
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2.3 Banking industry developments and regulations 
This section presents an overview of key highlights about developments of the banking sector 
in MENA economies under examination. 
2.3.1 Banking developments and regulations in Egypt   
The financial sector in Egypt is not as developed as in other developed economies, but it is 
relatively promising (Omran, 2007). Historically, the banking law in Egypt was enacted in 
1975 (Law120/1975) describing the nature and mode of banking operations (Central Bank of 
Egypt, 2008). Prior to banking sector reforms in the 1990s, the banking sector in Egypt is 
dominated by the state which resulted in creating uncompetitive banking sector and provided 
a low level of financial services and it has been suffering from a lack of innovation and a 
poor quality of governance. Dominating the banking sector by state also led to have 
inefficient management which in turn cause to the building up a large volume of non-
performing loans and poor asset quality (Poshakwale and Qian, 2011). Given the fact, the 
banking industry is considered to be a main component of the Egyptian financial sector, the 
Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) has been viewed the soundness of the banking sector to be of 
chief importance in ensuring efficient utilisation of sector’s resources and in order to 
stimulating economic activity and sustaining high level of growth (Abuzayed et al. 2012). 
The government developed restructuring programs to improve competition, raise capital 
adequacy and reduce non-performing loans. In 1990s, the authorities undertook major 
economic and financial reforms which are encouraged by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank with aims to eliminate the states sector’s monopoly. Such 
development includes deregulating deposits, lending rates, strengthening of bank supervision 
and regulations on the basis of internationally accepted standards to deal with risk inherent in 
the new policy business. Banks were allowed to freely set their own services fee and 
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commission policy. In February 1991, the foreign exchange market announced reforms and 
exchange rates were liberalised by the CBE. Such developments were followed by 
liberalising the ceiling of loans and deposits in January 1991 as well as by eliminating 
ceilings regarding bank loans to the private business in October 1992. 
However, in 1994, the Egyptian government embarked on a privatisation programme with a 
purpose to decrease concentration and stimulate competition as a consequence (Abuzayed et 
al. 2012). Although a number of joint-venture bank (JVB) privatisations showed some 
successes, to date there have been no successful state owned banks. Nevertheless, no progress 
occurred until early 1996 when the monetary authority permitted revisions to (the banking 
and credit law, 1996) as well as eliminating the 49% ceiling on foreign ownership of 
Egyptian banks. These measures, along with the fact that the ownership rate had been 
allowed to increase over time, encouraged foreign banks to open their business in the 
Egyptian banking sector. In early 1997, the Egyptian government agreed with the IMF in 
order to privatise one of the four state-owned banks before the end of the year (Abuzayed et 
al. 2012).  
The CBE has made significant progress in enhancing its supervisory structure and staff, using 
material, procedures and techniques obtained from other similar economies. Based on IMF’s 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) report of 2002, the Basel Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision were compiled by the CBE. Accordingly, since the end of the 
first FSAP in June 2002, a number of legislation aimed additional reforms. By the end of 
March 2003, most of commercial banks had complied with the new minimum capital 
adequacy ratio 10% and an additional capital injection to all state-owned banks had been 
employed (Poshakwale and Qian, 2011). However, the unified banking law of 2003 increased 
the minimum required paid-up capital for domestic banks from LE 100 million to LE 500 
million. The CBE and the Egyptian government have launched a new law in July 2003 to 
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create the independence of the CBE. According to recommendations of the FSAP report, 
revisions and adjustments of the CBE rules and regulations have been presented (Ben Naceur 
and Kandil, 2013).         
Since 2005, the restructuring programme has contributed to reducing non-performing loans of 
Egyptian commercial banks. During the period 2005-2007, As a result, over that period, the 
Egyptian banking sector observed a significant wave of consolidations, 14 banks including a 
number of state banks have been observed poor performance and they were targeted for 
acquisition by foreign banks. In this matter, foreign banks were involved in this stage in order 
to open their banking activities in the Egyptian market, particularly after the government 
started to provide new banking licences. Foreign banks were illustrated by acquiring stakes in 
Egyptian banks. Those banks are BNP Paribas, Barclays, Piraeus, Credit Agricole, Societe 
Generale, BLOM and Audi. However, at January 25th, a series of anti-government protests 
and demonstrations took place in Egypt and in less than a month and the protests led to 
overthrow of the existing political regimes and the effect of such matter led to labour unrest, 
deterioration in mining and in oil production, decreasing in credit growth, impacting bank 
profitability (Lowe, 2013; Faria and McAdam, 2015; Ghosh, 2016). Egypt relies heavily on 
tourism, this industry is harmed as well and real GDP growth witnessed a major drop after 
increasing in the previous year. The capital market was also assaulted in terms of market 
capitalisation. 
2.3.2 Banking developments and regulations in Lebanon        
In Lebanon, which gained its independence in 1943, an estimated GDP of 44 billion USD in 
2013 established a services-oriented laissez-faire economy that coupled open foreign 
exchange policies to permit free convertibility of reserves and endorsed a bank law.  
Historically, Lebanon has experienced instability whether it came from its neighbours or 
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from its citizens themselves which caused Lebanon to have a major ratio of Lebanese citizens 
living abroad in a number of different countries (Salloum and Al Sayah, 2015).  
The Banking structure in Lebanon was considerably transformed since the end of the civil 
war in 1990. Major developments consist of a wave of financial integration and increase in 
competition between domestic and foreign banks. Lebanese banks have managed to re-
capitalise, consolidate and re-invest themselves as the main and effective sector in the 
economy. In this respect, the banking sector dominates the financial services because of the 
absence of a secondary market. So that, the financial sector is dynamically regulated and 
monitored by Banque Du Liban (BDL), as it can certify reliability of the banking system and 
enhance the financial transparency of the sector. In March 1995, requirements regarding 
liquidity and capital adequacy are set in line with Bank for International Settlements (BIS). In 
this respect, commercial banks are required to meet a minimum adequacy ratio of 8% in line 
with Basel I. Accordingly, bank’s capital has risen significantly by the end of 2001, and the 
average capital adequacy ratio of commercial banks was approximately 16.8% (Ben Naceur 
and Kandil, 2013). Another development after the end of civil war, Lebanon witnessed major 
investments in information technology. The evolution of technological innovations and 
telecommunications played a significant role in encouraging the financial and banking 
industry to adopt new strategies to create a wider array of products and new financial 
instruments. Additionally, the monetary authority had to restructure the banking system by 
stimulating financial integration and encourage competition between domestic and foreign 
banks. Those developments were approved and implemented in order to face growing 
competition in the financial and banking sector on regional and international levels. Further, 
Lebanon sought to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as well as being determined to 
join the Arab Free Trade Area by 2007; hence, these purposes have given justifications to 
generate a stronger, competitive and well-developed banking system (Abuzayed et al. 2012). 
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The other vital improvement for Lebanese banking sector is investment in human resources, 
as the employment level in the banking industry raised by 12% over decade. Turk-Ariss 
(2008) highlighted that in the last two decades a wave of banking reforms has been observed 
by the monetary authority as (BDL) stimulated reorganisation of the banking sector by 
implementing a wave of mergers, acquisitions, and consolidations among banking 
institutions. Restructuring the banking sector in Lebanon aimed to create better channels for 
savings and investments, and increase productivity and competition, which results in 
obtaining a major share in the geographical region with Syria and Iraq. 
2.3.3 Banking developments and regulations in Tunisia        
In respect to Tunisia, the Tunisian financial system is characterised as a bank-based system. 
During the 1960s, socialist-driven economic policies adopted by Tunisia generated a number 
of economic issues. These policies created distortion of financial resources, lack of saving 
allocations regarding private business, a decline in saving rates and increase in of external 
debt to Gross domestic Product for the period of 1961-1967 (Mensi, 2010).  In 1970, the 
socialist inspiration is over and the repressive practices of financial system continued until 
1987. From the late 1980s, major reforms have been carried out in order to increase the 
financial ability of the financial system to mobilise saving and to finance successful projects. 
The key measures were intended to remove credit restrictions and establish a new policy of 
interest rates deregulation. 
The financial liberalisation and restructuring of the banking system that started in 1987 was 
presented in order to improve competition among Tunisian banks and to allow them to 
become more responsible and capable of making their own credit decisions (Kammoun and 
Ammar, 2012). In this matter, a plan of modernisation of Tunisian banking has been in effect 
since 1987.  Its aim was to restructure the banking sector, introduce new financial instruments 
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and modernise payment systems, while strengthening the security of the banking system, 
enhancing the quality of bank loans and their repayments, and improving the quality of the 
human resources and management (Ben Abdelkader and Mansouri, 2013). The decision of 
financial services deregulation taken by the economic and monetary authorities was 
encouraged by concern about intensifying investment and diversifying the economy, and such 
development was a strategy to enhance the capacity of the banking system. The compliance 
with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and Euro-Mediterranean partnership agreement 
with the European Union in July 1995 affected the Tunisian banking industry to make it as a 
part of the deregulation and liberalisation plan. In order to implement financial liberalisation 
and transformation of the banking industry, the regulators and policy makers had to reinforce 
the financial security. Hence, since 1997, the central bank in Tunisia has launched a massive 
programme of declaration of the banking law. As the commercial banks are considered as 
credit firms, the Tunisian Central Bank has promulgated 2001-65 law that was supplemented 
by 2006-19 law. Consequences of such laws were evident on the profitability and the banking 
operations (Bejaoui and Bouzgarrou, 2014). 
In July 2001, the banking law associated with credit institutions was promulgated as this law 
made it possible to set up a more liberal environment for the banking activities and 
eliminated the legal division between the development and deposit banks. The May 2006 law 
was propagated in order to reinforce the Tunisian banking landscape. This legislation grants 
the central bank with new choices in the field of the transparency, the consulting, the control, 
the follow up and the publication of financial and economic information. In addition, the new 
amendment requires the central bank to prohibit granting the treasury credit facilities in the 
form of overdrafts, and obliging banks to provide it with a list of the customers granted loans 
during the month concerned while at the same time publishing their monthly accounts 
(Bejaoui and Bouzgarrou, 2014). But, in December 2010 a series of anti-government protests 
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and demonstrations took place in Tunisia and in less than a month and the protests led to 
overthrow of the existing political regime and the consequences of such incident led to labour 
unrest, decreasing in credit growth, impacting bank profitability (Lowe, 2013; Faria and 
McAdam, 2015; Ghosh, 2016). Given the fact that Tunisia heavily dependents on tourism, 
this industry is negatively influenced as well and real GDP growth witnessed a major 
decrease after increasing in the previous year. Also, the capital market was also battered in 
terms of market capitalisation. 
2.3.4 Banking developments and regulations in Jordan       
Jordan, like other Arab countries, has witnessed vital economic and social reforms to 
encourage financial markets and financial firms to be more efficient and to achieve economic 
growth. In the wake of the 1988-1989 crises, Jordanian national currency experienced major 
depreciations and total debt of the economy reached 196% of GDP (Isik et al. 2005). That 
occasion has led the Jordanian government to ask the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 
help in restructuring its debts and the country signed up to a stabilisation program with IMF 
and a structural adjustment program with the World Bank. These programs aimed to increase 
revenues of the country and to reduce its expenditures by applying long-term strategies such 
as upgrading privatisation of state firms, restructuring tax laws and reviewing previous 
regulations, etc. 
In March 1997, the Jordanian government removed the maximum limit of foreign direct 
investments, so during the period of (1997-2000) major state corporations, such as Jordan 
Telecommunication Company, Aqaba Railway Line, and public transport and duty free 
markets, have been partly or wholly privatised. Compared to other Arab countries which have 
oil-based economies, Jordan succeeded in creating a well-diversified economy as well as 
well-developed financial services. The output of services represents about 72% of GDP, 
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while finance, real estate and business services are 21% of GDP (Isik et al. 2005). Based on 
the monetization ratio (M2 to GDP) which shows the relative size or the debt of a state’s 
financial sector, these figures indicate that Jordan’s ratio is superior (112%) to other Arab 
economies. This greater ratio denotes that the Jordanian market has a fairly large monetary 
sector relative to the size of its economy (Eltony, 2003). The financial sector in Jordan is 
primarily intermediated through the banking sector. Jordan’s banking sector is fully privately 
owned, well developed and profitable (Al-Fayoumi and Abuzayed, 2009). The establishment 
of Jordanian banking sector took place in 1927 and the first bank started to operate was the 
British bank. The main activity of this bank was to operate as a fiscal agent to the government 
due to the absence of Central bank in that period (Aladwan, 2015). Then, the Arab bank 
began its business and became the head office in 1949. Given the fact that there is increase in 
a number of commercial banks and government financial needs, the Central Bank of Jordan 
(CBJ) was established in 1964 and afterwards The Jordanian banking sector is controlled and 
supervised by CBJ. Although, the CBJ is financed by the Jordanian government, the CBJ 
operates independently of regulatory oversight. The number of banks operating in Jordan 
currently stands at 25 banks, of which two are Islamic banks and eight are branches of 
foreign banks. Recently, the banking industry in Jordan has witnessed major changes in laws 
and regulations for the purpose of making the banking industry in line with international 
standards. After 1993, the CBJ set up a number of financial reforms in terms of deregulation 
and liberalisation interest rates and credit ceiling, minimum capital adequacy and presenting 
modern prudential regulation and supervision (Bdour and Al-Khoury, 2008). Moreover, the 
banking supervision has been strengthened in the last years as it has shifted to a risk-based 
system from the rule-based system. The CBJ applies strict controls to ensure that banking 
regulations are generally consistent with international standards. These regulations consists of 
bank payments, foreign currency positions, government securities transactions, commercial 
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notes, loans, capital adequacy and others (Al-Fayoumi, N and Abuzayed, 2009).  In this 
respect, according to (the Jordanian banking law, 2000) all banks either domestic or foreign 
are required to comply with a number of conditions in terms of registration, license fees, 
presentation of business details, minimum capital of 40JD million for domestic banks and 
20JD for branches of foreign banks. In regard to the history of foreign banks in Jordan, it 
took place in 1949 when British Bank started its banking activities in the Middle East 
followed by Egyptian Arab Land Bank in 1951, Standard Chartered Bank in 1969, and the 
City Bank and N A Bank in 1974. Additionally, the CBJ issued the banking Law No. 28 of 
2000 to cope with the latest updates in the field of banking activities. This Law permitted 
banks to deliver a comprehensive group of financial services through (the Comprehensive 
Bank) as this law explained that banks in nowadays are not only limited to provide traditional 
banking services, but also to offer financial consultations, investment portfolio in addition to 
issue managing securities and dealing with foreign exchange. 
2.3.5 Banking developments and regulations in the Gulf Countries Council         
The oil rich countries, particularly in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) which comprises six 
Arab countries namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates. These countries share common economic challenges where the process of financial 
liberalisation and deregulation has been accelerated as part of GCC plan to transform their 
economies from oil-based economy to market-based economy. In this matter, during the last 
decade, a number of developments have been taken place to develop capital market and 
increasing the competitiveness of their banking industry (Srairi, 2011).  
The GCC countries have are similar in economic and social characteristics and heavily 
dependent on oil and gas exports. According to IMF (2013) the hydrocarbon exports of these 
countries account for approximately half of the region’s GDP, contributes about 70% of these 
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economies production and over three-fifth of government revenues. However, after the oil 
boom, real GDP growth in these economies for the period 2003-2007 was about 6.5% 
compared to the earlier years which were less than 4%. Additionally, after the financial crisis 
and its consequences negatively influenced these economies with real GDP of 0.3% in 2009, 
despite the growth has turned around for the period 2010-2012 to reach 6%.  Following the 
2007 crisis, the importance of the development of robust regulation has received much 
attention from policy makers in the GCC. The monetary authorities have already approved 
strategies in order to set minimum requirements for banks planning to establish branches over 
GCC market. These requirements, as pointed out by Ben Naceur et al. (2011) are proposed to 
avoid occurrences relating to crashes, corruption, fraud and failures. Guidelines and 
requirements have been issued to take into account capital size, licensing, and capital reserve, 
monitoring and examination of licenced foreign banks, bank closures, and minimum capital 
retention, minimum age of banks (ten years), and other requirement (Hassan et al.2012). 
However, the banking sector still dominate the financial sector in the GCC, which is 
relatively concentrated with a few banks mainly owned by royal family, and the state has 
only a modest ownership share; nevertheless, most of specialized banks are fully state owned 
(Ben Naceur et al. 2011). Nevertheless, the banking sector in the GCC is considered to be 
well-developed comparing to others in MENA. Mostafa (2007) documented that financial 
sector in the GCC is well-functional and developed, perceiving advanced technology. It is 
more open and interacts with the world more than financial sectors in the rest of the MENA 
region.  
As this area is well developed and functioning, there should be much attention paid to it, with 
discussion in the banking regulation and supervision. Let us start by Bahrain, which is 
considered the smallest Gulf state and is a member of the Arab GCC with a GDP of 5.5$ 
billion. Bahrain now is becoming a regional financial services centre as financial institutions 
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and capital markets are operating there and also a member of the WTO and a number of other 
international organisations. Bahrain’s economy relies on different sources consisting of 
financial markets, oil and gas, ship repair and tourism. During the last two decades, the 
Bahraini government has implemented a policy of economic diversification into 
manufacturing, finance and services. The oil and gas industry in Bahrain represents a lower 
percentage of GDP (17%) than in other GCC economies (average 35%). In contrast, the non-
oil sector now contributes over 80% of GDP and about one-third of exports. 
The capital market in Bahrain, established in 1989, listed 38 companies on the stock market 
at the end 1998 with a combined market capitalisation of US$5.2 billion (Islam et al., 2003; 
Olson and Zoubi, 2011) and deregulation and liberalisation have taken place to enable 
participation by non-GCC corporations. Concerning the banking sector in Bahrain, the 
Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA) employs all duties and responsibilities that are related to 
the Central Bank. The BMA has adopted the Basle Committee guidelines on market risk to 
ensure the capital adequacy, growth and performance of Bahraini banks. Conventional 
commercial banks in Bahrain were founded earlier than in most other countries in the GCC, 
as they are 19 commercial banks and 48 offshore banking units. Further, a number of foreign 
banks such as Citibank and Arab Banking Corporation (ABC) have opened their business. 
In respect to UAE, its economy can be considered a strong and diversified economy, the non-
oil revenues have become a critical source of national income accounting for 74% of total 
GDP in 1999 and oil revenues still contribute to drive non-oil projects (Al Shamsi et al., 
2009). Additionally, the Central Bank of the UAE estimated that the rate of inflation 
decreased to below 3% during the period of 1998-1999 and 2000, compared other year in the 
past. However, the UAE banking industry which is ranked as a second following Saudi 
Arabia within GCC in terms of the size of assets comprising the Central Bank (CB) and 
commercial banks (local and foreign banks and other specialised banks and financial firms).   
35 
 
The Central Bank of the UAE was established in 1980 and its duties and responsibilities 
regard advising the governments on monetary and financial issues, issuing currency, 
maintaining gold and foreign currency reserves, formulating credit policy and conducting 
regulation and supervision, The banking sector plays a significant role in the UAE economy 
as it is functions well and is well-developed, technologically advanced and is more opened to 
the wold economy. The UAE commercial market is quite large compared other banks in 
GCC. By the end of 2004 there were 46 banks, with 489 branches to provide banking services 
to the population of around 3.6 million, compared to 14 banks in Saudi Arabia serving some 
23.5 million (Al Shamsi et al., 2009). Foreign banks in the UAE banking sector, based on 
Central Bank (2004), including 21 local banks with a total of 377 branches which are owned 
by UAE. The remaining banks, include 25 banks with 112 branches, are foreign owned.  
With regards to Oman, this country tends to have a nation-wide development and policy in 
order to accomplish a wider geographic distribution of investment and insure growth. One of 
the goals of ‘Oman Vision 2020’ is to diversify the Omani economy: it calls for a major 
involvement by the private sector, particularly the commercial banks. (Al-Muharrami and 
Matthews, 2009). However, the Omani economy is still heavily dependent on oil revenues 
and policy makers in Oman have started to think about generating alternative incomes 
(economic activity in the non-oil sectors) from oil exports. Policy makers recognise the need 
to diversify the economy away from oil and gas as quickly as possible, and they have set their 
’Vision 2020’ plan to reduce the oil sector’s contribution to less than 20% over the next two 
decades (Tarawneh, 2006). Its economy is transforming now to be market based-economy, 
with lower taxation rates, more liberal investments laws and no barriers on capital 
movements into a market. However, commercial banks in Oman take advantage in providing 
customers and clients a full range of greater international banking services inside and outside 
36 
 
of Oman. The main objective of the Omani banking sector is to ensure the quality of business 
services and cash management (Tarawneh, 2006).  
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of MENA banking sector, regulations and major 
events have taken place in this region. The first part of this chapter has introduced a general 
background about MENA region. This has also presented descriptive statistics and major 
trends for banks’ profitability, banks’ size and MENA banking market structure. The 
economic development and banking regulations are also outline in this chapter. Accordingly, 
it can be concluded that the MENA market has a considerable variation in terms of the degree 
of financial development. A number of countries can be considered fairly well advanced, but 
others have to be improved. To evaluate MENA economies as a group, it can be said that this 
market performs better in terms of regulation and supervision matters, as well as in opening 
its doors to the world to assist in its reforms. However, the MENA market needs to work on 
strengthening the institutional environment and encouraging non-bank financial 
improvements. Therefore, compared to other developing economies, the MENA market is 
still performing fine, but it is still ranking behind developed countries and the East Asia 
region. 
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Chapter Three 
Market Structure and determinants of MENA commercial bank 
profitability  
 
3.1 Introduction 
There are two approaches used in the current literature to examine the behaviour of the 
banking industry: structural and non-structural approaches. Structural approaches are 
essentially based on the traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis and the 
efficient structure hypothesis (EH) (see figure 3.1). Research based on structural paradigms 
assumes that market concentration deteriorates competitive condition in a market by adopting 
collusive behaviour among enterprises (Beger, 1995). On the contrary, non-structural 
paradigms state that factors other than market structure and concentration can influence 
market competition; for instance, boundaries to entry/exit and general contestability of the 
market (Panzar and Rosse, 1987). These theories which assume that a positive relationship 
between profitability and market structure exists have been tested and they are supported by 
many cases of empirical findings. The traditional SCP hypothesis argues that market 
concentration creates benefits to firms that enjoy greater market power, giving them the 
ability to set prices that are less favourable to customers and therefore, the positive 
relationship between profitability and market structure is found (Smirlock, 1985; Hannan, 
1991; Berger, 1995). Unlike the above mentioned hypothesis, the competing efficiency 
hypothesis states that the positive relationship between concentration and performance is 
associated with firms having good management and technology, and therefore lower unit cost 
leading to higher unit profits; more efficient firms tend to reveal lower costs and then higher 
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profits. In other words, firms with superior management or production technologies have 
lower cost and hence higher profits (Berger and Hannan, 1989; Beger, 1995). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Market Structure Hypotheses  
The objectives of this chapter are to examine the determinants of MENA commercial banks 
profitability in the context of Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis and the 
Efficient Structure Hypothesis (EH) to obtain evidence of whether market structure in MENA 
plays a role in explaining the performance of the banking industry.    
3.1.1 Determinants of profitability and SCP and EH hypotheses             
Financial intermediaries perform chief financial roles in economies, provide a payment 
mechanism, match demand and supply in financial markets, deal with complex financial 
instruments and markets, provide market transparency, and perform risk transfer and risk 
management functions (Alper and Anbar, 2011). The banking sector plays a crucial role in 
the service-based economy, it is well known that commercial banks contribute to the 
economic development of a country and that an efficient and profitable banking system is 
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necessary condition for economic growth (Alper and Anbar, 2011; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 
2014). Profitability is linked to the ability to earn profit; it is the key measure of the entire 
success of business reflecting the final result of business operation. The profit of a bank 
affects the operating efficiency and the shareholders’ returns and stability of the whole 
economy. The bank management aims to maximise profits and as a consequence the business 
would be more profitable and efficient. However, profit of a bank is mostly driven by 
advances, investments, deposits and other income sources, which are interrelated in the 
business. The preceding confirms the concern of Sharma and Mani (2012) that the 
performance of banks has become a major concern for economic planners and policy makers 
as a result of the way in which banks performing as well as the financial intermediation can 
increase the gains of the real product of the economy. Saona (2011) argues that an efficient 
financial sector improves profitability of banks by increasing the amount of funds available 
for investment as well as enhancing the quality of financial services provided for customers. 
Whilst, Fungacova, Z and Poghosyan (2011) suggested that an increase in advances to gain 
higher interest income may affect deposits in terms of higher interest cost within deposits. 
Additionally, an increase in deposits may be achieved at the expense of advances and 
investments because risk-weighted assets will increase leading to lower capital strength. 
Although regulators and central banks in MENA have been taken some measures to stabilise 
the financial system and enhance the confidence in the banking system, it is still arguable as 
to what factors affect bank profitability in order to help policy makers and regulators in 
forming their policies in MENA economies.  
Regarding the competition in developing banking economies, it is intensified significantly in 
recent years as deregulation, liberalisation, technological progress and globalisation of 
trading and capital markets have impacted all features of banking operations, and 
consequently affected profitability of banks (Obamuyi, 2014). The notion that market 
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structure affects the performance of industry originates in the classical model of theory of a 
firm. In a pure competitive model, there are a large number of banks. The larger number of 
banks, the higher the competition and lower the concentration ratio (Samad, 2008). In this 
matter, the Basic theory of SCP hypothesis is developed by Bain (1951). He posited that the 
economic performance of industry is a function of the conduct of buyers and sellers, which in 
turn is a function of the industry’s structure. The economic perspective of enterprise in the 
industry is based on the welfare maximization (resources employed yield the highest value 
output) is considered as a measurement of economic performance (Tu and Yuan Chen, 2000). 
Moreover, this model emphasises that the economic performance of a sector is a task of the 
conduct of buyers and sellers that represents the role of the sector’s structure. The activities 
of the sector’s buyers and sellers are referred to the conduct as seller activities consist of 
installation and utilisation of capacity, promotional and pricing policies, research and 
development, and inter-firm competition. Industry or sector structure (the determinants of 
conduct) contains variable such as the number and size of buyers and sellers, technology, the 
degree of product differentiation, the extent of vertical integration and the level of barriers to 
entry (Bain, 1951; Tu and Yuan Chen, 2000). A market with relatively few banks and barriers 
to entry would lead banks through collusion and earn supernormal profits. As a result of 
collusion, all banks operating in the market are able to gain monopoly profits, the more 
concentrated the market, the less the degree of market competition. Thus, the SCP hypothesis 
advocates that changes in market concentration may have a positive impact on a firm’s 
financial performance, suggesting that the subsequent positive relationship between market 
structure and performance is a result of non-competitive pricing behaviour of banks with a 
large market share (Berger and Hannan, 1989; Goldberg and Rai, 1996). The main argument 
emphasised by the SCP supports the collusive power of the market and stimulates the 
41 
 
strategies that improve market concentration. Therefore, if SCP holds in the banking sector, 
those strategies can be endorsed.  
However, the positive relationship between market concentration and performance has been 
challenged by the EH hypothesis. The EH argues that the aggressive behaviour of efficient 
banks in the market causes a growth in such banks’ size and market share. The EH implies 
that the positive association of market share and higher performance is the result of a firm’s 
superior efficiency. It is argued that higher profits made by large firms in a concentrated 
market are the consequence of economies of scale and superior efficiency (Berger, 1995; 
Goldberg and Rai, 1996). In case where a firm is highly efficient relative to competitors, the 
firm is able to maximise profits by sustaining its size and pricing strategy or by reducing its 
prices and expanding its operations. Berger and Hannan (1989) pointed out that firms which 
enjoy a superior efficiency in a market produce an unequal market share and a high level of 
concentration. Hence, this hypothesis implies that the positive direction between profit and 
concentration leads to lower costs and accomplished through superior operational 
management and an efficient production process (Goldberg and Rai, 1996).                    
A number of empirical studies of SCP and EH have been investigated the relationship 
between the market structure and bank performance. Hannan (1991), employed an explicit 
model upon the banking business in order to develop and evaluate critically the relationship 
between bank conduct and market structure implied by SCP model. This model proposed the 
function of market share and concentration in estimating the association between firm 
conduct and market structure. In this regard, Hannan (1991) and Goldberg and Rai (1996) 
highlighted that the relationship between return on assets and market concentration should 
comprise measures of the capital asset ratio as well as the ratio of fixed costs to total assets in 
the regression model. 
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However, other Determinants of banks’ profitability are considered to be a major matter to 
bank management and policy makers as they enable them to set policies which would have 
long-standing or permanent effects on the entire banking system in MENA and other 
economies. There are a number of important factors responsible for affecting bank 
performance. The persistence of bank profit is particularly driven by bank-specific and 
industry characteristics, and macroeconomic condition. Rasiah (2010) noted that the internal 
determinants include management controllable factors such as liquidity, investment in 
securities, investment in subsidiaries, loans, non-performing loans and overhead 
expenditures. Other determinants such as savings, current account deposits, fixed deposits, 
total capital and capital reserves and money supply also play a role in affecting profitability 
of banks. On the other hand, there are external factors affecting the bank performance which 
are beyond the control of the management such as interest rates, market growth and gross 
domestic product, inflation rates and market share. In this matter, The banking literature 
recognise numerous determinants of bank profitability, including bank size, the extent to 
which bank is diversified, capital adequacy, the attitude of the bank’s owners and managers 
toward risks, the ownership categories and the level of external competition the bank 
encounters. 
The theories in respect to capital and profitability as well as bank size and profitability have 
been examined by several studies (Berger, 1995; Demirgue-kunt and Huizinga, 1999; 
Pasiouras F and Kosmidou K, 2007; Kosmidou K, 2008; Sufian and Habibullah, 2009; 
Sufian, 2012; Trujillo-Ponce, 2013). The theories comprise the signalling theory, expected 
bankruptcy cost hypothesis, risk-return hypothesis, structure conduct performance, market 
power and efficiency hypothesis. The relationship between capital and profitability is 
explained by signalling theory (Berger, 1995). It argues that higher capital reveals a positive 
signal to the market value of a bank, which in turn leads the management to provide (signals) 
43 
 
indirect information that future prospects will be improved. Given this fact, a lower leverage 
implies that the bank is performing much better than one which relies on higher leverage. 
Furthermore, bankruptcy hypothesis suggests that banks should hold more equity in order to 
be further away from financial distress especially in case where bankruptcy costs are high 
(Berger, 1995). A number of previous studies (Demirgue-kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Pasiouras 
F and Kosmidou K, 2007; Kosmidou K, 2008; Sufian and Habibullah, 2009; Sufian, 2012; 
Trujillo-Ponce, 2013) have documented that a positive relationship between capital and 
profitability is supported by signalling hypothesis and bankruptcy cost hypothesis. On the 
other hand, risk-return theory argues that increasing leverage leads to increase risks and then 
higher expected returns. In this case, if a bank takes more risks to increase returns by using 
more leverage, the capital adequacy represented by equity to assets will be declined, 
suggesting a negative relationship between capital and bank performance in terms of 
profitability (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007; Obammyi, 2014). 
3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
Early empirical studies have examined both price information (Berger and Hannan, 1989) 
and firm performance as represented by profitability variables (Lloyd-Williams and Molynex, 
1994). In a multi-product industry such as the banking sector, it is not recommended to 
employ a single measure of price as a proxy of a firm’s overall performance for banking 
business. On the contrary, profitability measures can be regarded as a comprehensive 
performance measure because they incorporate both expenditures and revenues into one 
measure (Lloyd-Williams and Molynex, 1994).  
However, the market concentration was first employed to measure the impact of 
concentration on performance among banks in the domestic United States market. In this 
regard, Lloyd-Williams et al. (1994) investigated the applicability of two competing 
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hypotheses, SCP and EH, to assess the structure of the banking industry in Spain using the 
concentration ratio and market share for each bank to characterise its efficiency over the 
period 1986-1988. Findings implied that market concentration is found to have a positive 
impact on performance of Spanish banks measured by return on assets (ROA), which in turn 
supports the traditional SCP hypothesis. In the same context, the relationship between market 
structure and performance of European banks has been investigated by Goldberg and Rai 
(1996). It concentrates on studying solely large banks in each country as the European 
banking market is controlled by large banks with branching spread across the country, so that 
it is doubtful that branches are able to significantly impact any prices. The empirical results 
do not reveal a positive and remarkable relationship between concentration and profitability 
for the sample of banks in 11 countries during four years of the study (1988-91). Further, it 
did not observe any evidence to support one of two versions of the efficient hypothesis for 
banks operating in those countries with low concentration of banks. Finally, slight support 
was detected for either the SCP hypothesis; and hence a simple policy of strict boundaries on 
cross-border acquisitions and growth is not reasonable.                
In emerging economies, the effect of the 1991 liberalisation policy has been examined by Tu 
and Yuan Chen (2000) to identify whether market structures and firm performance in the 
industry differ in the periods before and after the 1991 revision to the Banking Act. They 
tested two competing hypotheses (SCP hypothesis and EH hypothesis) in the context of 
market structure and the performance of enterprises. Findings prior to the 1991 revisions do 
not support both hypotheses (SCP and EH) in Taiwan’s banking sector. Whereas, results 
assert that the 1991 revision to the Banking Act have stimulated competition and brought 
about an emphasis on efficiency in the banking business in Taiwan. 
In respect to MENA economies, the impact of a bank’s characteristics, financial structure and 
macroeconomic indicators on its net interest margins and profitability in Tunisian 
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commercial banks is examined by Ben Naceur (2003) for the period 1980-2000. This study 
found that the market concentration has a negative and significant impact on net interest 
margins but is insignificant with returns on average assets. Such results indicate that market 
concentration is less beneficial in terms of profitability for the Tunisian commercial banks 
and competition. Whilst, in the State of Qatar, Elsiefy (2013) investigated determinates of 
conventional and Islamic banks’ profitability over the period 2006-2011. Results support SCP 
hypothesis as the relation between profitability of conventional banks and market 
concentration is found. Also, another study which included all the Arab Gulf countries (Al-
Muharrami and Matthews, 2009) evaluated the performance of the Arab Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) banking sector in the context of the structure conduct performance (SCP) 
hypothesis over the period 1993-2002. In respect to methodology and data of this study, Al-
Muharrami and Matthews (2009) employed the methodology of Berger and Hannan (1997) in 
testing the relationship between market structure and bank performance as the basic model. 
Data of the study covers 52 banks operating in five GCC countries during the period 1993 - 
2002, as well as the UEA during the period 1995-2002. The empirical findings of the study 
showed that the banking business in the Arab GCC is influenced by the mainstream SCP 
hypothesis. According to the above arguments which show that the relation between bank’s 
profitability and market concentration could be positive; hence, the first hypothesis to 
examine SCP can be formulated as follows:  
Hypothesis 1(H1): Bank superior profitability in MENA region is due to high market 
concentration (SCP hypothesis) 
 
On the other hand, Smirlock (1985) argues that in concentrated markets, profitability is 
resulted from superior operational efficiency. This argument has been investigated by a 
number of studies in emerging economies. In Bangladesh’s banking sector, two hypotheses, 
the SCP and the efficiency hypotheses (EH) were tested by Samad (2008) using the approach 
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adopted by Smirlock (1985) and Lloyd-Williams and Molynex (1994) as the basis of the 
methodology of the study took into account both market share and concentration to test the 
two competing hypotheses. Empirical findings of this study showed that the SCP hypothesis 
is rejected for explaining bank performance in Bangladesh as return on assets and return on 
equity for the three or four largest banks were not satisfactory, one of which functioned with 
losses. On the other hand, findings with regards to the coefficient of market share were 
positive and significant and therefore the EH hypothesis is supported.  
Aguirre et al. (2008) empirically examined and critically reinvestigated the SCP and EH 
hypotheses in terms of individual banks of different sizes which function within specific 
universal and functional regulatory banking regimes. All data of this study were gathered 
from balance sheets and income statements with regards to large commercial banks in ten 
nations for a total of 133 banks. In the case of commercial banks granted an authorisation by 
governments of countries, to perform activities relating to investment trading, real estate, and 
insurance activities, the bank is categorised as belonging to the universal banking regulatory 
regime. On the other hand, the bank is classified to work within the limits of the functional 
banking framework. With respect to the sample, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Switzerland and UK are considered as the set of markets which have embraced the universal 
banking regulatory framework and their banks run within its limits A total of 79 individual 
banks were selected for the period 1986-1994, comprising 672 observations. Belgium, Japan, 
and the US are considered to be countries that work within limits of the functional or 
segmented banking system as data were selected in terms of 54 banks for the period 1986-
1994, containing of a total of 443 observations. They suggested support for the EH indicating 
that efficient banks earn higher market shares and gain profit ability and therefore, banks 
which operate in nations that permit non-traditional activities are more efficient and 
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profitable. In respect to the way in which size and banking systems impact bank performance, 
results state that the universal banking and separated system are supported by EH hypothesis.  
The effects of bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic determinants of bank 
profitability in Greece were examined by Athanasoglou et al. (2008), who employed an 
empirical structure that combines the traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
hypothesis. Greek banks reinforced their position in the domestic banking business by 
adopting new technology as well as improving infrastructure, which in turn played a 
remarkable role in enhancing the performance of bank profitability. This study examined the 
profitability of Greek banks for the period 1985-2001, and the analysis was restricted to just 
commercial banks as banks in Greece are typically general-purpose banks and they used the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman (HHI) index to represent market concentration. Findings of the study 
indicate that profitability perseveres to a moderate extent to imply that leavings from 
perfectly competitive market structure cannot be that large. With respect to bank-specific 
determinates all of them show a significant effect on bank profitability, excluding size. 
However, there is no evidence to support the SCP hypothesis and business cycle displays a 
positive asymmetric impact on bank profitability in case that output is above its trend. 
Therefore, it seems sound to assume that bank efficiency matters on banking profitability, 
along with the competing hypothesis H2 can be stated as: 
Hypothesis 2(H2): Bank profitability in MENA region is due to better efficiency (EH)  
However, Determinants of banks’ profitability are considered to be an important matter to 
bank management and policy makers to pursue policies which will have long-standing or 
permanent effects on the entire banking system in MENA region. A number of important 
factors responsible for affecting bank performance have been examined in the banking 
literature including bank size, the extent to which bank is diversified, capital adequacy, the 
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attitude of the bank’s owners and managers toward risks, the ownership categories and the 
level of external competition the bank encounters. The relationship between capital and 
profitability is explained by signalling theory (Berger, 1995; Trujillo-Ponce, 2013). It argues 
that market value of bank is influenced by higher capital. Berger (1995) pointed out that the 
management of a bank provides (signals) subtle information that future prospects will be 
improved by increasing capital. This argument suggests that a lower leverage implies that a 
bank is performing much better than one which relies on higher leverage. Furthermore, 
bankruptcy hypothesis suggests that banks should hold more equity in order to withstand 
financial distress especially in a case where bankruptcy costs are high (Berger, 1995). A 
number of previous literatures (Demirgue-kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Pasiouras, F and 
Kosmidou, K, 2007; Kosmidou K, 2008; Sufian and Habibullah, 2009; Sufian, 2012; 
Trujillo-Ponce, 2013) have confirmed the positive relationship between capital and 
profitability is supported by signalling hypothesis and bankruptcy cost hypothesis. On the 
other hand, risk-return theory argues that increasing leverage leads to increase risks and then 
higher expected returns. If a bank takes more risks to increase returns by depending on more 
leverage, the capital adequacy represented by equity to assets will be declined and therefore 
the conventional risk-return hypothesis would indicate that a negative relationship between 
capital and bank performance in terms of profitability (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007; 
Obammyi, 2014). In other words, improved capital contributes to a bank’s higher 
performance and supports the argument that well capitalised banks face lower risks of 
becoming bankrupt and therefore enjoy higher profitability (Demirgue-Kunt and Huizinga, 
1999; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007; Kosmidou, 2008). These arguments lead me to assume 
a direct relation between capital adequacy and profitability of MENA banks as follows: 
Hypothesis 3(H3): There is a positive relationship between the capital adequacy and 
bank’s profitability  
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To investigate the argument that efficient cost management is regarded as a key mechanism 
to enhance profitability of banks, cost to income ratio (COST) is considered to be a proxy of 
operational efficiency for commercial banks in the MENA countries. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999); Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007); Kosmidou (2008); Obamuyi (2014); and 
Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014) documented that poor cost management is one of the key 
variables to reveal poor profitability of commercial banks in various economies. Bejaoui and 
Bouzarrou (2014) highlighted the importance of operating costs, especially staff expenses, as 
overstaffing costs can negatively affect the profitability of banks. This matter could be due to 
social relationships in developing economies as state banks still have a large share in the 
economy and frequently employ more people in order to reduce unemployment rates. 
Therefore, this thesis expects that there is a negative association between cost management 
and bank’s profitability: 
Hypothesis 4(H4): There is a negative relationship between the cost management and 
bank’s profitability 
In respect to bank size which is measured by total assets, in a number of recent studies, this 
factor is found to be negatively related to profitability of banks and operational performance, 
indicating that larger banks are likely to generate fewer profits when compared to small 
banks. Obamuyi (2014) and Tan and Floros (2012) suggested that the negative relationship 
could be that, as the commercial banks are becoming extremely large, the bureaucratic 
procedures have negatively affected their performance. Obamuyi (2014) selected Nigeria as 
one of developing economies, and stressed that the forced mergers and acquisitions of 
Nigerian banks in 2006, which resulted in the number of banks to drop from 89 banks to 24 
groups of banks, caused to decline of returns of banks. In such matters, merger decisions 
should receive more attention and be carefully considered by policy makers and banking 
regulators to avoid having negative outputs, and therefore negatively affecting the financial 
50 
 
stability. Trujillo-Ponce (2013) and Obamuyi (2014) suggested that larger and diversified 
banks are more likely to exhibit poor performance, while smaller banks can be more efficient 
by reducing asymmetric information issues associated with lending activities. This assertion 
supports the argument that smaller banks display economies of scale. Also Chen and Liao 
(2011) emphasised that the negative coefficient of bank size indicate that larger banks tend to 
make lower profits, exhibiting diseconomies of scale, whereas smaller banks are likely to 
gain more profits. Studies in other markets governed by European and American verify the 
existence of economies of scale. Differences can be explained by variations between two 
banking markets in terms of regulations of banks, qualifications of employees, economic 
indicators and concentration level. I argue that the larger the bank, the larger the number of 
employees and the more bureaucratic procedures, which in turn leads to have negative effects 
on the bank performance. The preceding arguments led me to formulate the fifth hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 5(H5): There is a negative relationship between bank size and bank 
profitability     
In addition to above discussion, the banking literatures argue that banking profitability is 
influenced by increasing in portfolio of loans. The relation between risk and profitability of 
banks measured by the loan ratio has been investigated by a number of scholars (Chen and 
Liao, 2011; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007; Sufian and Habibullah, 2009; Sufian, 2012; 
Trujillo-Ponce, 2013). They revealed a positive and significant relationship to the 
profitability, indicating that (lending more loans) can positively affect the profitability of 
commercial banks. In other words, a higher figure of net loans to deposits and short term 
funding means lower liquidity, meaning that the less liquid bank is able to generate more 
profits. They clearly show an increase in loans ratio results to improved performance of 
banks. Alexiou and Sofoklis (2009) argue that an increase in liquidity will cause a decline in 
profitability. Such argument highlights the trade-off between liquidity and profitability. In 
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this regard, Trujillo-Ponce (2013) documented that the larger the bank’s loan portfolio is on 
its balance sheet, the higher is its profitability. However, this thesis tests whether there is a 
direct relationship between bank risk and profitability as follows:  
Hypothesis 6(H6): There is a positive relationship between the loan ratio and bank 
profitability     
3.3 Data and Methodology   
This chapter is concerned with assessing the impact of market structure and determinants of 
performance of MENA banks, including bank-specific variables and macroeconomic 
variables, in the context of the Structure-Conduct-Performance hypothesis (SCP) and 
Efficiency hypothesis (EH). The findings can be used by regulators and policy makers to 
examine the relationship between market structure and performance so as to decide whether 
they should intervene to change market structure to enhance competition and quality of 
banking services and to deter insolvency. Also, findings in this chapter can be used by 
regulators, policymakers and other stakeholders to optimise managerial, human and capital 
resources and to enhance viability of confidence in the financial system.  Furthermore, these 
findings contribute by providing evidence of whether banks with foreign ownership perform 
better than state banks.  
3.3.1 Model Variables  
3.3.1.1 Profitability Variables (Dependent Variable) 
In this methodology, the bank performance measures used are the return on assets (ROA), the 
return on equity (ROE) and net interest margin (NIM). A number of studies of the SCP and 
determinants of bank profitability have been employed ROA, ROE and NIM to represent 
financial performance (Smirlock, 1985; Berger, 1995; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 1999; 
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Flamini et al. 2009; Samad, 2008; Tu and Yuan Chen, 2000; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014). 
As pointed out by Smirlock (1985) and Lloyd-Williams et al. (1994) that ROA has delivered 
strong evidence that market concentration relates to profitability. Goldber and Rai (1996) 
suggested that ROA is considered to be suitable in measuring changes in bank performance 
over a period, because banks’ income and expense mechanisms are more closely associated 
with assets. However, their results, based on ROA, ROE and NIM justify using net interest 
margin as a proxy for the ability of banks to affect prices, while, the ROE is more appropriate 
to reflect what owners seek to maximise. 
3.3.1.2 Bank specific, market structure and macroeconomic Variables (Independent 
variables) 
Numerous bank characteristics are employed as internal factors of banks performance, as 
they are necessary to control for determinants of commercial banks’ performance. The set of 
variables which controls bank-specific characteristics include cost-to-income ratio, the ratio 
of equity to total assets, spending on fixed assets, and the ratio of a bank’s loans to customers 
and short-term funding, asset size the loan-loss provisions to gross loans. 
Bank size (SIZE) is measured by using total assets (Smirlock, 1985; Lloyd-Williams, 1994; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Samad, 2008; Tu and Yuan Chen, 2000; Dietrich and 
Wanzenried, 2014). The bank size variable takes into consideration differences derived by 
size in terms of economies of scale. This thesis employs the bank’s total assets as a 
measurement of bank size. Compared to smaller banks, larger banks are expected to 
experience economies of scale by having superior investments opportunities. In other words, 
such a variable is used as a proxy of size to capture possible cost advantages related to size 
(economies of scale). Economic theory proposes that market structure impacts firm 
performance (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999). In the case of an industry subject to 
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economies of scale, larger firms can be more efficient and can provide services at lower cost. 
Further, the theory of banking firms emphasises that a bank can reap economies of scale up to 
certain limit, beyond which diseconomies of scale set in. 
The cost to income ratio is defined as operating costs (staff salaries, property costs, 
administrative expenditures) over total generated revenues. It measures the overheads or 
expenses required to run a bank or to measure the effect of efficiency in expenditures 
management on bank performance (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007; Kosimdou, 2008; 
Obamuyi, 2014; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014). The key component of which wages and 
administrative expenses as percentage of income can provide information on variation of 
bank expenditures over banking system. Even though higher expenditures can negatively 
affect profitability of a bank meaning that higher costs decrease profits, such a case may not 
always happen. The justification is that higher volumes of costs can be related to higher 
amounts of banking activities and thus higher revenues. This variable is expected to have a 
negative effect on bank performance because MENA banks are not expected to run their 
activities at lower costs. 
In addition, policy makers and bank managers should pay attention to the liquidity 
management and especially to the measurement of their needs associated with the loans and 
deposits process. For this matter, the ratio of a bank’s loans divided by deposits and short 
term funding (LOFUND) is utilised to measure bank liquidity risk (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 
2007; Kosimdou, 2008; Samad, 2008; Obamuyi, 2014; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014). 
Portfolio theory assumes that higher risk investments are usually correlated to higher returns. 
In other words, the higher volumes of loans as percentage of deposits, the higher the risk for a 
bank, and therefore higher returns. Samad (2008) found a positive relationship between loans 
to deposits and profitability. Whilst, Kosimdou (2008) asserts that without the required 
liquidity and funding to meet obligations, a bank may be bankrupted. Therefore, in order to 
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protect the bank from being insolvent, banks usually hold liquid assets, which can be 
transformed to cash. 
The EQAS variable is included in this model as a measure of capital strength in line with 
previous studies including (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 
2007; Kosimdou, 2008; Samad, 2008; Sufian, 2012; Obamuyi, 2014; Dietrich and 
Wanzenried, 2014). The capital adequacy as suggested by Sufian (2012) is vital for banks in 
developing economies because it provides additional strength to withstand financial crisis and 
increase safety for depositors during unstable economic conditions. Moreover, the bank with 
a higher capital ratio is regarded relatively safer and protected in the event of loss or 
liquidation, and lower risk increases a bank’s creditworthiness and therefore reduces costs of 
funding. The variable which is included all return-bearing assets other than loans is securities 
(other earning assets) to total assets ratio (SECAST). Olsen and Zoubi (2011) assert that this 
ratio is found to be positively related to profitability of banks; but if a bank invests too much 
in loans at the expense of other securities, the relationship could become negative. The 
variable (EXPTEC) is created by the researcher to be a proxy of how much a bank spends on 
fixed assets generating operation and bank services and consequently revenues. 
In order to measure quality of credit risk, this study uses the loan-loss provisions to gross 
loans to represent a proxy of credit risk. The coefficient of LOARESG is expected to be 
negative since bad loans are related to decreased bank profitability. Sufian (2012) emphasises 
that the higher the bank’s exposure to high risk loans, the higher the accumulation of unpaid 
loans, leading to low profits. 
In respect to macroeconomic and market structure variables, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) is used in the current study as a proxy of market concentration, which is employed by 
policymakers and regulators in the banking sector and it is computed by squaring the market 
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share of each bank competing in a defined geographic banking industry and then summing 
the squares as follows:  
𝑯𝑯𝑰 = ∑ (𝑴𝑺𝒊)
𝟐𝒏
𝒊=𝟏        (3.1) 
Where MS refers to the market share of firm and n denotes the number of firms operated in 
the industry. Results ranges from zero in a market with unlimited number of banks and 
to10,000 in a market with one bank (100% market share). The increase in the Herfindahl 
index indicates a decrease in competition and an increase of market power, whereas 
decreasing HHI implies the opposite. Alternatively, if whole percentages are used, the index 
ranges from 0 to 10,000 "points".  
The HHI can be used to measure concentration in different circumstances. For instance, it can 
be used to measure the degree of market concentration of income and outputs of firms. The 
HHI is helpful in investigating horizontal mergers as the market concentration is influenced 
by mergers or acquisition. The HHI plays a crucial role in measuring the concentration 
degree in the banking industry. However, the second measure to estimate the market structure 
is the market share (MS) as it takes the market share of each bank in a market. Therefore, 
market share MS refers to the market share of a bank in a market measured by total assets. 
Regarding Macroeconomic indicators, the literature (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; 
Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007; Kosimdou, 2008; Samad, 2008; Sufian, 2012; Obamuyi, 
2014; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014) suggest that macroeconomic condition can plays a role 
in influencing banking operations. Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014) assert that bad economy 
may deteriorate the quality of loan portfolio producing credit losses, which ultimately reduces 
the bank’s profits. In addition, profitability of banks can be pro-cyclical since gross domestic 
product growth (GDPGR) impacts net interest income through lending activities as demand 
for lending is growing (decreasing) in cyclical upswings (downswings). So that, the structure 
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of financial market, the legal and political environment, the economic condition of the 
country may affect the performance of banking industry. Such a variable (GDPGR) is 
considered the most commonly macroeconomic factor used as it measures of total economic 
activity within an economy. GDPGR is expected to have a positive effect on bank’s 
performance as literatures document that there is a positive relationship between economic 
growth and financial sector performance. Another important factor that affects both costs and 
revenues of banks is inflation (INF). The relationship between inflation and bank 
performance depends on whether inflation is anticipated or unanticipated. With respect to 
anticipated inflation, banks are able to adjust interest rates which will lead to increased 
revenue over costs (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999). 
To investigate whether ownership influences bank profitability, in this study I categorise a 
bank as state-owned bank if the government owns more than 50%. Whilst, a bank is 
considered to be a foreign bank if foreigners own more than 50% of its shares are owned by 
foreign investors. Earlier studies (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Pasiouras and 
Kosmidou, 2007; Micooo et al. 2007; Kosimdou, 2008; Samad, 2008; Sufian, 2012; 
Obamuyi, 2014; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014) suggested that such variables can rely on 
the development condition of a country. They highlighted that foreign banks may make more 
profits than domestic banks in emerging economies since they have a technological edge and 
have a good reputation, as well as providing banking services with lower funding costs.  
Whilst, foreign banks operating in well developed markets are not likely to be strong enough 
to overcome informational disadvantages Additionally, Micco et al. (2007) provides evidence 
that state-owned banks in developing economies tend to be less profitable and relatively 
inefficient compared to their private and foreign competitors. 
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Table 3.1 Definitions of variables used in assessing profitability of banks  
Variable Description 
Log Logarithm 
ROA Return on  assets is the net income after tax divided by average total assets 
ROE Return on  equity is measure of the return on shareholder funds  
NIM Net interest margin  
EQAS Equity to total assets. This variable to measure capital adequacy, computed as equity to total assets. High 
capital-asset ratios indicate low leverage and therefore lower risks 
COST The cost to income ratio. It provides information on the efficiency of the management concerning 
expenses relative to the revenues it generates. Higher ratios indicate a less efficient management.  
LOFUND This is a measure of liquidity  risk computed as loans to deposits and short term funding. Higher ratios 
imply lower liquidity.  
SIZE Total assets represent a proxy for bank size including earning assets + cash and due from banks + 
foreclosed real estate + fixed assets +goodwill. 
SECAST Total securities to total assets include loans and advances +trading securities + derivatives +available for 
the sale securities + held to maturity securities + equity investments +government bonds+ other securities  
EXPTEC Spending on fixed assets, calculated by capital expenditure and other expenses to fixed assets. Capital 
expenses refer to costs spending on fixed assets. Fixed assets include tangible assets fixed assets (land, 
buildings and installations, furniture office, computers etc.)  
CR The Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is a measure of market concentration within the 
industry and is used as indicator of the amount of competition among banks 
MS A measure calculated by dividing the assets of bank with the assets of all banks operating in a county  
LOARESG Loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio as a measure for credit quality and credit allocation. 
GDPGR The real gross domestic product (GDP) growth. 
INF The real inflation rate. 
FORE Dummy variable for foreign ownership  
STATE Dummy variable for state ownership  
Coun Dummy variable for country effects 
year Dummy variable for year effects 
Source: Bankscope database and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3.2 reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in this chapter. I report 
mean and the standard deviation (in brackets) for the full sample in MENA economies during 
the study period (1999-2012). Additionally, I checked whether there exist any significant 
differences among variables of different countries. For such purpose, this study reported 
means and standard deviation of every variable for every single country. Concerning, 
profitability variable, It is evident that UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain 
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are above the MENA economies average and it is observed that on average commercial banks 
in UAE and Qatar are the highest in profitability. Such fact confirms that commercial banks 
in higher income MENA economies tend to perform better and be more profitable than other 
low income MENA economies such as Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon and Morocco.  
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics for bank’s specific and macroeconomic variables  
Country  Cost EQ AS Size  Loanast  Loaresg  SECAST GDPGR INF Lofund Exptec ROA ROE 
Bahrain  46.28    
(14.24)        
11.04 
 (2.76)         
1.17 
(1.01)   
44.31    
 (12.78)      
5.74   
 (4.77)         
0.250   
 (0.13)   
5.43 
(1.75)      
95.98  
( 25.69)         
56.56 
(16.42) 
2.08 
(1.62) 
1.04 
(1.15) 
9.39 
(11.11)      
Oman  44.80 
(6.77)           
12.97  
(2.24)         
390 
(416) 
69.44 
 (7.97)        
6.08 
 (4.08)        
0.101 
(0.061)      
4.51  
 (3.14)        
118.72 
 (17.22)     
87.27 
(9.54) 
2.71 
(1.58) 
1.89 
(1.28) 
14.05 
(10.11)    
Qatar  32.58 
(8.76)            
13.90 
(3.63)           
1.12 
(1.81)   
57.26  
(6.99)        
5.41 
(7.86)            
0.206 
(0.163)      
12.05 
(6.43)            
187.83  
  (42.4)      
(71.66) 
10.707 
1.64 
(1.30) 
2.46 
(1.13) 
17.89 
(9.62) 
Saudi 
Arabia  
38.24 
(10.82)      
12.18   
(3.11)           
2.29 
(1.74)     
50.78  
 (9.62)         
5.03 
(4.93)             
0.308 
(0.094)      
4.87 
(3.05)         
101.30 
(10.67)              
61.05 
(12.72) 
1.593 
(0.594) 
2.23 
(1.58) 
18.63 
(13.84) 
UAE 32.21 
(10.11)         
17.11 
(5.630)          
1.25 
(1.89)   
61.74 
(11.14)          
6.73 
(5.97)           
0.076 
(0.058)       
4.64 
(4.15)        
193.10 
(41.78)               
82.70 
(17.13) 
1.54 
(0.925) 
2.48 
(1.55) 
14.84 
(7.26) 
Kuwait  29.36 
(8.09)         
12.19 
(2.70)           
1.42 
(1.20) 
54.68 
(10.93)           
6.04  
(3.32)          
0.233 
(0.108)      
4.32 
(5.94)         
124.88 
(18.13)        
65.60 
(12.55) 
1.26 
(0.418) 
1.86 
(1.52) 
13.90 
(20.99) 
Egypt  54.50 
(32.11)       
9.60 
(4.79)          
576 
(932) 
39.87  
(11.96)           
13.52 
(8.53)           
0.252 
(0.120)      
4.64 
(1.71)          
151.65  
(52.77)          
47.02 
(14.38) 
2.505 
(1.98) 
0.89 
(1.72) 
10.75 
(25.64) 
Jordan  51.77 
(15.41)       
11.77    
(6.42)       
 858 
(1.28)  
44.01 
(7.41)           
7.44 
(6.62)            
0.176 
(0.072)        
5.46 
(2.22)           
104.11 
(18.34)        
56.70 
(13.50) 
1.54 
(0.722) 
1.23 
(1.06) 
11.79 
(16.51) 
Lebanon  63.76  
(27.81)       
8.94 
(4.52)           
340 
(489) 
26.40  
(8.69)         
11.26 
(10.58)             
0.351 
(0.120)       
3.96 
(3.33)            
97.43 
(13.76)          
(30.71) 
(11.02) 
1.166 
(1.501) 
0.76 
(0.846) 
12.58 
(35.12)    
Morocco  57.04 
(24.59)        
7.85  
(2.99)           
1.20 
(1.03) 
45.90 
(20.10)         
3.32 
(3.12)            
1.12  
(7.63)      
4.32 
(2.02)         
100.06  
(7.10)         
(46.00) 
(18.69) 
1.685 
(1.59) 
0.79 
(1.18) 
9.43 
(36.07) 
Tunisia  63.26 
(25.64)      
11.54 
(13.99)       
185 
(165) 
62.67 
(23.31)         
18.08 
(15.12)           
0.074  
(0.110)       
3.93  
(2.23)         
109.04 
(13.34)            
83.33 
(64.01) 
1.78 
(1.20) 
0.30 
(4.51) 
6.31 
(34.68) 
 
The capitalization of commercial banks also differs considerably according to the income 
level. It shows that the average ratio of equity to assets (EQAS) is 11.42 but the banks 
operate in Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and Qatar are better capitalised than 
other banks in other MENA countries. These findings can be justified by regulatory 
interventions, which also differ from country to country due to the economic and financial 
development and national income level. Indeed, high capitalisation ratio indicates that banks 
have significant capacity to expand lending without raising capital (Mamatzakis et al. 2005).  
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In respect to cost to income ratio, banks in low income MENA economies on average are 
neither efficient nor developed compared to other MRNA economies such as GCC. It is 
observed that banks in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon and Jordan revealed higher cost to 
income than the average of whole MENA reflecting that banking sector in those markets are 
not that developed and efficient in managing costs of operating banks and regulations. These 
observations can be explained by regulation and, administrative costs, corporate governance 
and bank employment policies that need to be reviewed. Table 3.2 also implies that banks in 
Egypt, Lebanon and Tunisia are not able to control their quality of credit which leads to have 
higher non-performing loans, whilst, banks in GCC economies revealed lower than other 
MENA reflecting that regulations and banking management are much better than those in the 
other countries in the study sample.  
3.5 The Basic form of the Model 
Assessing bank performance is not an easy mission as it involves evaluating the interaction 
between bank specific variables and macroeconomic variables affecting the profitability the 
bank. One of the important aspects of investigating the effect of external factors is by 
estimating the influence of market structure as additional input on bank performance 
(outputs) as profits. It is mentioned earlier, the relationship between bank performance and 
market structure is explained by two competing hypotheses which are SCP hypothesis and 
EH hypothesis. The specification of the SCP model in banking industry is based on a profit-
concentration relationship which is defined as follows: 
𝑷𝒊 = 𝒇(𝑪𝑹, 𝑿𝒊)        (3.2) 
𝑃𝑖 variable can be captured by the return on average assets (ROA), return on average equity 
(ROE) and (NIM). CR represents the concentration index estimated by HHI assuming that 
more concentrated banks are able to gain higher outputs (profits), and 𝑋𝑖 represents a vector 
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of control variables that account for bank-specific and market- specific features that influence 
prices of banking services. 
However, this approach has been challenged by the EH hypothesis, which argues that the 
aggressive behaviour of efficient banks in the market causes a growth in such banks’ size and 
market share. The EH implies that the positive association of market share and higher 
performance is the result of a firm’s superior efficiency. 
Smirlock (1985), Lloyd-Williams et al. (1994), Tu and Yuan Chen (2000) and Samad (2008) 
have postulated that EH is specified as market share- profitability relationship. In this case, 
the bank’s superior efficiency can be captured by market share variable (MS), and equation 
(3.2) is re-specified as follows: 
𝑷𝒊 = 𝒇(𝑪𝑹, 𝑴𝑺, 𝑿𝒊)        (3.3) 
The reduced-form profit equation is employed to determine whether the traditional SCP and 
efficiency hypotheses best explain bank performance are captured in equation (3.4). 
Coefficients for variables are estimated using the ordinary least-square (OLS) regression. 
𝑷𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑪𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝑴𝑺𝒊𝒕 + ∑ 𝝀𝒊𝑿𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
+ ∑ 𝝀𝒊𝒀𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕        (𝟑.𝟒) 
Where 𝑖 denotes an individual bank; 𝑡 represents the year; where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is a profit and 
performance measure, 𝐶𝑅 is a measure of market concentration which is estimated by using 
HHI, 𝑀𝑆 is used to represent market share of a bank. And 𝑋𝑖 is used a vector representing 
bank-specific variables, while,  𝑌𝑖 representing macroeconomic variables. and 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is the 
random error. The traditional SCP hypothesis can be supported by the coefficient of CR, 
𝛼1 > 0 and the coefficient of MS, 𝛼2 = 0. These coefficients indicate that market share has 
no impact on a bank’s profitability and that profitability is resulting from monopoly 
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behaviour measured by HHI. On the other hand, efficiency hypothesis (EH) is found to be 
true if  𝛼1 = 0 and  𝛼2 > 0 as they imply that banks with a large market share are more 
efficient and consequently earn higher profits. Furthermore, the combination of 𝛼1 = 0 and 
𝛼2 = 0 supports the presence of a quiet-life hypothesis or regulation-dominated market 
structure. 
3.5.1 Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Fixed Effects Dummy Variable (LSDV) and 
Random effects Estimations 
Panel data may have a group of effects, time effects or both and these effects can be fixed or 
random. This study uses unbalanced panel data combining cross section and time series data 
and it presents the estimation of SCP model. It does not find evidence of correlations among 
independent variables as all tests verified the good fit of the models. This thesis investigates 
determinants affecting bank MENA performance in the context of SCP hypothesis taking into 
account control for unobserved heterogeneity using the fixed effects. The decision to use the 
fixed or random effect model is based on the implementation of Hausman test. If the value 
obtained by the Hausman test is less than 5% significance level, the study must reject the null 
hypothesis that the random effects model is appropriate in favour of alternative hypothesis. 
OLS, LSDV and random effects which are examined in this study have been employed by 
previous studies (Alper and Anbar, 2011; Fungacova and Poghosyan, 2011; Sufian, 2012 and 
Obamuyi, 2014). Robust standard error is also applied in order to correct heteroscedasticity 
(see Baltagi, 2008).  
In order to examine bank (equation 3.4), profitability determinants in the context of SCP 
hypothesis the following equations are used: 
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𝑳𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑪𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝑴𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟒𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑭𝑼𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝑬𝑿𝑷𝑻𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑺𝑮𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟖𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒊𝒕 +
𝒀𝟗𝑳𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬 + 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹   (3.5) 
Next, return on average equity is used as dependent variable representing profits of banks as 
well as steps of eliminating variables are repeated respectively:  
  𝑳𝑹𝑶𝑬𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑪𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝑴𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟒𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑭𝑼𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝑬𝑿𝑷𝑻𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑺𝑮𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟖𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒊𝒕 +
𝒀𝟗𝑳𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬 + 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹   (3.6) 
As net interest margins is considered a measure of operational income of banks, this 
variable has been taken into account to be investigated, as it relies on factors tested 
above to see whether these factors impact this variable or not  
𝑳𝑵𝑰𝑴𝒊𝒕 =  𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑪𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝑴𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟒𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑭𝑼𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝑬𝑿𝑷𝑻𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑺𝑮𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟖𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒊𝒕 +
𝒀𝟗𝑳𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬 + 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹   (3.7) 
Where 𝑖𝑡  is the subscript indicating bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡. LROA, LROE and LNIM are used as 
dependent variables to represent profitability measures as LROA is the log of return on total 
assets, LROE is the log of return on total equity and LNIM is the log of net interest margin. 
With regards to independent variables, CR denotes market concentration of banking sector 
and MS is the market share of a bank in a whole sector.  LCOST is the log of cost to income 
ratio, LEQAS denotes the log of Equity to total assets, LSECAST refers to total securities to 
total assets, LSIZE is log of total assets, LLOFUND denotes loans to deposits and short term 
funding. LEXPTEC refers to spending on fixed assets; LLOARESG represents loss gross 
loan reserve to total loans. In respect to macroeconomic variables LGDPGR is used to denote 
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the real gross domestic product (GDP) growth and LINF is used to represent the real inflation 
rate.  However, to investigate whether ownership influences bank profitability, in this study I 
categorise a bank as state-owned bank (STATE) if the government owns more than 50%, and 
foreign (FORE) if the foreign investor own more than 50%. Finally, COUN and YEAR are 
used to capture country and year effects respectively.  
3.5.2 Generalised Method of Moments Estimations (GMM) 
Bank profitability tends to persist over time, reflecting barriers to market competition, 
informational opacity, and sensitivity to changes in macroeconomic indicators (Athanasoglou 
et al. 2008). Given the dynamic nature of this study, least squares estimation methods 
generate biased and inconsistent estimates (Baltagi, 2008). Another challenge in examining 
the drivers of bank profitability is the potential character of certain determinants. A number 
of explanatory variables are endogenous. Given this fact, Garcia-Herreo et al. (2009), 
Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011) and Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014) pointed out, the more 
profitable the banks, the more able they are to increase their capital by retaining profits. 
Similarly, banks may also pay more for advertising campaigns and increase their size which 
in turn influences profitability. However, the causality could be observed in the opposite way, 
since a bank with higher profit is able to employ more people and therefore decrease its 
operational efficiency. Another important issue is related to unobservable heterogeneity 
across banks which may exists in the MENA commercial banks, differences in corporate 
governance, which cannot be measured well. To address these concerns, this study uses 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation following Arellano and Bond (1991) 
and Arellano and Bover (1995). GMM accounts for endogeneity as it uses lagged values of 
the dependent variable in levels and in differences as well as lagged values of others 
independents variables that are suspected to suffer from endogeneity. Arellano and Bond 
(1991) advocate that consistency and efficiency gains can be attained by using all available 
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lagged values of the dependent variable and lagged values of the exogenous repressors as 
instruments. The GMM estimation also controls for unobserved heterogeneity and for the 
persistence of the dependent variable. In order to determine which variables are endogenous 
and which are exogenous this study uses a modified version of Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
(Athanasoglou et al 2008, Garcia-Herreo et al. 2009, Dietrich and Wanzenried ,2011 and 
Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014) to determine what variables should be treated as 
endogenous. The last task is associated with the risk of omitted variables. To deal with this, 
the study follows the most common strategy by estimating all regressors according to the 
existing literatures, then employing the Wald test, the joint hypothesis that the coefficients of 
the regressors are not significant individually equal to zero. If the null hypothesis is not 
rejected, the equation should be re-estimated only with the controls which were significant in 
the general regression. Otherwise, a less restrictive hypothesis is tested, while still attempting 
to decrease the number of non-significant variables to the maximum extent possible. 
Stopping reducing variables is preferable when the significance of regressors is rejected. 
Overall, such estimations yield consistent estimations of the parameters. The coefficients 
obtained by this way are considered to be more reliable as the number of variables is reduced 
to the minimum (Garcia-Herrero et al. 2009).  
To empirically examine the impact of performance determinants either internal or external, 
the study follows Athanasoglou et al (2008); Garcia-Herreo et al. (2009); Dietrich and 
Wanzenried (2011) and Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014), and employs a dynamic linear 
model given by (3.8): 
                                   
𝑷𝒊𝒕 = 𝑪 + 𝜹𝑷𝒊𝒕 −𝟏 + ∑ 𝝀𝒊𝑿𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
+ ∑ 𝝀𝒊𝒀𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕        (𝟑.𝟖) 
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Where 𝑷𝒊𝒕−𝟏  is the one-period lagged profitability measured by 𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏𝒐𝒓 𝑹𝑶𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝟏 or one-
period lagged for performance measured by 𝑵𝑰𝑴𝒊𝒕−𝟏. And 𝑿𝒊 are bank-specific variables, 
while,  𝒀𝒊 representing macroeconomic variables. A value of 𝜹  denotes the speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium. A value of 𝜹 between 0 and 1 implies that profitability is 
persistent, and it will eventually return to the equilibrium level. Values close to 0 indicate a 
high speed of adjustment and imply a relatively competitive market structure, whereas a 
value close to 1 implies a less competitive market.   
3.6 Empirical Findings  
3.6.1 Empirical results of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Fixed Effects and random 
Effects Estimations                                                          
The results of the examination of the determinants of banking sector profitability are 
presented in tables 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6. The panel data-bank regression models are analysed 
by using different estimators considered. Five columns were made for each estimator pooled 
OLS, between, fixed within, first difference and random effect for combined 11 MENA 
economies. In table 3.3 when log of profitability was measured by return on assets (LROA) 
as dependent variable, the results show that increasing in cost/income is associated with 
lower value of profitability for all estimators. In respect to pooled OLS an additional dollar of 
cost/income leads to decrease profitability of commercial banks by 1.27%, whilst in the 
between estimator, by comparing bank to other banks results indicate that increasing in 
cost/income in comparing to average cost/income across banks, the profitability went down 
by 1.34%. In the fixed effect within, each additional dollar of cost/income above the average 
for banks leads to reduce profitability by 1.25%. For the first difference, it is not significantly 
different from fixed effect and pooled OLS as each increasing in cost/income from one year 
to the next one leads to reducing profitability by 1.27%. 
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Table 3.3 Regression results using Pooled OLS, between, fixed effect, first difference 
and random effect for bank profitability using return on assets (ROA) as dependent 
variable 
𝑳𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏 𝑪𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝑴𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟓𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑭𝑼𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝑬𝑿𝑷𝑻𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑺𝑮𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟏 𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟐 𝑳𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒊𝒕
+ 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬 + 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹  
Variable 
Pooled OLS between Fixed effect First difference Random effect 
CR 
-.661 
(-0.78) 
-2.032 
(-0.36) 
.0202 
(0.03) 
.3693 
(0.80) 
-.2055 
(-0.27) 
MS 
-.0908 
(-1.17) 
-1.8432*** 
(-4.02) 
.1773** 
(2.51) 
.0073 
(0.10) 
.0825 
(1.15) 
LCOST 
-1.277*** 
(-17.53) 
-1.338*** 
(-5.91) 
-1.254*** 
(-15.24) 
-1.271*** 
(-15.82) 
-1.262*** 
(-16.45) 
LEQAS 
.5056*** 
(8.38) 
.5373*** 
(2.94) 
.5561*** 
(7.36) 
.7727*** 
(10.08) 
.5357*** 
(7.98) 
LSECAST 
.0235 
(0.85) 
.0976 
(1.02) 
-.0186 
(-0.63) 
-.0341 
(-0.99) 
-.0004 
(-0.01) 
LSIZE 
-.0036 
(-0.17) 
.1874*** 
(3.10) 
-.1768*** 
(-5.10) 
-.1100*** 
(-4.01) 
-.0620** 
(-2.30) 
LLOFUND 
-.0277 
(-0.44) 
-.2063 
(-1.30) 
-.1271 
(-1.60) 
.0217 
(0.23) 
-.0443 
(-0.65) 
LEXPTEC 
.0666* 
(1.86) 
.0379 
(0.34) 
.1572*** 
(3.94) 
.2172*** 
(5.09) 
.1309*** 
(3.50) 
LLOARESG 
-.104*** 
(-3.62) 
-.0601 
(-0.79) 
-.1248*** 
(-3.74) 
-.1787*** 
(-5.18) 
-.1082*** 
(-3.52) 
LGDPGR 
.0376 
(1.25) 
.4312* 
(1.67) 
.0069 
(0.27) 
-.0059 
(-0.26) 
.0230 
(0.86) 
LINF 
.0989 
(0.97) 
1.109 
(1.21) 
.0975 
(1.11) 
(.0058) 
(0.09) 
.1063 
(1.18) 
FORE 
.2591*** 
(5.27) 
.2408** 
(2.19) 
.1566 
(1.48) 
(.1466)* 
(1.67) 
.2827*** 
(4.06) 
STATE 
.0335 
(0.68) 
.1350 
(1.26) 
.1472 
(1.54) 
.0529 
(0.65) 
.0787 
(1.15) 
Morocco 
.5702*** 
(2.67) 
.6638 
(0.99) 
-.2552 
(-0.62) 
 .5644** 
(2.17) 
Oman 
.4782*** 
(3.82) 
.844* 
(1.89) 
.2214 
(0.89) 
 .4258** 
(2.51) 
Saudi Arbia 
.1203 
(0.85) 
-.1694 
(-0.23) 
.6352** 
(2.50) 
 .3218* 
(1.87) 
Tunisia 
-.1497 
(-0.84) 
-.2424 
(-0.30) 
-1.637*** 
(-4.59) 
 -.3097 
(-1.51) 
2009 
-.3589** 
(-2.45) 
-2.552 
(-1.06) 
-.0498 
(-0.38) 
 -.2160 
(-1.62) 
2010 
-.3839*** 
(-2.66) 
-4.655** 
(-2.25) 
-.0611 
(-0.47) 
 -.2412* 
(-1.84) 
2011 
-.4647*** 
(-3.15) 
-5.171** 
(-2.24) 
-.1243 
(-0.93) 
 -.3144** 
(-2.34) 
2012 
-.3941*** 
(-2.67) 
1.479 
(0.60) 
-.0727 
(-0.54) 
 -.2604* 
(-1.94) 
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CONSTANT 
 
3.917*** 
(4.90) 
-.7707 
(-0.15) 
6.374*** 
(6.68) 
 4.384*** 
(5.23) 
R
2 0.52  
 
0.51  
R
2
 within 
 0.02 0.46  0.44 
R
2
 between 
 0.83 0.42  0.62 
R
2 
Overall 
 0.06 0.44  0.52 
sigma_e 
  .53  .53 
rho 
  .59  .21 
*significant at the 10% level 
**significant at the 5% level 
***significant at 1% level 
L= log, ROA= return on average assets,  COST = cost to income ratio, EQAS = equity to average total assets, SECAST = securities to 
average total assets, SIZE = average total assets, LOFUND = net loans to total deposits, EXPTEC =spending on technological items and 
fixed assets, Loaresg =Loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio as a measure for credit quality and credit allocation  CR = the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman Index (HHI), MS = market share of the assets of first largest bank, GDPGR =real gross domestic, INF =the annual inflation rate, 
Fore =dummy for foreign ownership , state, dummy of state ownership. 
 
The effect of capital strength is different as well for each estimator. In the polled OLS across 
banks and over time, an additional increase of capital led to 51% higher profitability; whereas 
in the between estimator an increase in the capital adequacy in comparing to the averages 
across banks contributes to improve profitability of banks by 54%. In the fixed effects, more 
capital to assets as compared to its own average led to higher profitability of commercial 
banks. With regards to the first difference, if additional capital to assets exists from one year 
to the next, banking profitability would increase by 77%.  
However, there are other variables resulted in declining bank’s profitability, the bank size 
measured by total assets revealed different findings. In the fixed effect, the size variable is 
negative and statistically significant as increasing in size above the average for banks resulted 
in decreasing profitability by 1.77%. While, in the equation 2, bank size is positively related 
and significant to profitability as the average profitability are 19% higher for banks with 
greater size. In respect to spending on fixed assets, findings are found to be positive and 
significant for all estimators with exception of the between estimator. In table 3.3, the market 
share variable (MS) is positive and significantly associated with profitability at 5% level 
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when fixed effect is used. Whereas, in the between estimator, the variable is negative and 
significantly related to bank profits. Regarding foreign ownership as a dummy variable is 
statistically significant and positive for all estimators excluding the fixed effect estimator. 
Table 3.4 reports regression results when return on average equity (ROE) is employed as 
dependent variable. It is revealed that cost management (cost/income) and capital strength 
have negative and significant relationship to profitability measured by ROE in all estimators. 
Justifying why capital adequacy is negative will be presented in the next discussion. This 
table shows that the bank size is also positive and significant for the between estimator and 
negative and significant for fixed effect and first difference. 
Table 3.4 Regression results using Pooled OLS, between, fixed effect, first difference 
and random effect for bank profitability using Log ROE as dependent variable  
𝑳𝑹𝑶𝑬𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑪𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝑴𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒 𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟓𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑭𝑼𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝑬𝑿𝑷𝑻𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑺𝑮𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟏 𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟐 𝑳𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒊𝒕
+ 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬 + 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹  
LROE Pooled OLS Between Fixed effect First difference Random effect 
Cr 
-.8937 
(-1.02) 
-1.647 
(-0.29) 
-.266 
(-0.34) 
.369 
(0.80) 
-.487 
(-0.60) 
Ms 
-.0760 
(-0.94) 
-1.725*** 
(-3.76) 
.184** 
(2.49) 
.007 
(0.10) 
.082 
(1.09) 
LCOST 
-1.227*** 
(-16.23) 
-1.367*** 
(-6.05) 
-1.178*** 
(-13.69) 
-1.271*** 
(-15.82) 
-1.197*** 
(-14.98) 
LEQAS 
-.4183*** 
(-6.68) 
-.430** 
(-2.36) 
-.3151*** 
(-3.98) 
.772*** 
(10.08) 
-.366*** 
(-5.27) 
LSECAST 
.0198 
(0.69) 
.0776 
(0.82) 
-.019 
(-0.63) 
-.034 
(-0.99) 
.000 
(0.00) 
LSIZE 
.0095 
(0.43) 
.187*** 
(3.11) 
-.164*** 
(-4.54) 
-.1100*** 
(-4.01) 
-.042 
(-1.54) 
LLOFUND 
-.0011 
(-0.02) 
-.2092 
(-1.32) 
-.120 
(-1.45) 
.021 
(0.23) 
-.015 
(-0.21) 
LEXPTEC 
.0915** 
(2.46) 
.0487 
(0.44) 
.184*** 
(4.42) 
.217*** 
(5.09) 
.154*** 
(3.96) 
LLOARESG 
-.0691** 
(-2.32) 
-.0461 
(-0.60) 
-.079** 
(-2.29) 
.178*** 
(-5.18) 
-.067** 
(-2.10) 
LGDPGR 
.0275 
(0.88) 
.3279 
(1.27) 
-.001 
(-0.04) 
-.005 
(-0.26) 
.015 
(0.55) 
LINF 
.1196 
(1.13) 
1.031 
(1.13) 
.116 
(1.27) 
.005 
(0.09) 
.125 
(1.33) 
FORE 
.2505*** 
(4.91) 
.242** 
(2.21) 
.078 
(0.71) 
.146* 
(1.67) 
.248*** 
(3.50) 
STATE 
.0267 
(0.52) 
.133 
(1.25) 
.105 
(1.05) 
.052 
(0.65) 
.057 
(0.82) 
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Egypt 
-.1942 
(-1.40) 
-.5463 
(-0.70) 
-.342* 
(-1.66) 
 -.217 
(-1.39) 
Morocco 
.5489** 
(2.48) 
.6556 
(0.98) 
-.328 
(-0.76) 
 .546** 
(2.05) 
Oman 
.3960*** 
(3.04) 
.8136* 
(1.82) 
.082 
(0.32) 
 .321* 
(1.86) 
Saudi Arabia  
.0816 
(0.56) 
-.104 
(-0.14) 
.635** 
(2.39) 
 .277 
(1.58) 
Tunisia 
-.2418 
(-1.30) 
-.245 
(-0.30) 
-1.736*** 
(-4.66) 
 -.371* 
(-1.76) 
2002 
-.1553 
(-1.15) 
-3.985* 
(-1.90) 
-.051 
(-0.44) 
 -.088 
(-0.73) 
2005 
-.0081 
(-0.06) 
-3.554* 
(-1.86) 
.182 
(1.51) 
 .085 
(0.69) 
2009 
-.3572** 
(-2.35) 
-2.875 
(-1.20) 
-.057 
(-0.42) 
 -.229 
(-1.65) 
2010 
-.4063*** 
(-2.71) 
-4.917** 
(-2.38) 
-.092 
(-0.67) 
 -.278** 
(-2.02) 
2011 
-.5059*** 
(-3.30) 
-5.420** 
(-2.35) 
-.174 
(-1.24) 
 -.373*** 
(-2.66) 
2012 
-.4302*** 
(-2.81) 
1.645 
(0.67) 
-.120 
(-0.85) 
 -.313** 
(-2.23) 
CONSTAN 
7.777*** 
(9.36) 
4.463 
(0.88) 
10.141*** 
(10.15) 
 8.063*** 
(9.26) 
R
2
 0.35   0.51  
R
2
 within  0.005 0.317  0.289 
R
2
 between  0.772 0.180  0.456 
R
2
 Overall  0.024 0.227  0.348 
sigma_e   .549  .549 
Rho   .583  .191 
*significant at the 10% level 
**significant at the 5% level 
***significant at 1% level 
L= log, ROE= return on average equity,  COST = cost to income ratio, EQAS = equity to average total assets, SECAST = securities to 
average total assets, SIZE = average total assets, LOFUND = net loans to total deposits, EXPTEC =spending on technological i tems and 
fixed assets, Loaresg =Loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio  as a measure for credit quality and credit allocation   CR = the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman Index (HHI), MS = market share of the assets of first largest bank, GDPGR =real gross domestic, INF =the annual inflation rate, 
Fore =dummy for foreign ownership , state= dummy of state ownership 
 
Table 3.5 Regression results using Pooled OLS, between, fixed effect, first difference 
and random effect for bank profitability using log (NIM) as dependent variable:   
𝑳𝑵𝑰𝑴𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑪𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝑴𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑳𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟓𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑭𝑼𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝑬𝑿𝑷𝑻𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑺𝑮𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟖 𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟗 𝑳𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒊𝒕
+ 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬 + 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹  
Variable 
Pooled OLS Between Fixed effect First Difference Random effect 
CR 
-1.957*** 
(-4.11) 
-1.158 
(-0.30) 
-2.028*** 
(-4.75) 
-.139 
(-0.57) 
-2.000*** 
(-4.67) 
MS 
-.104** 
(-2.32) 
-.636** 
(-2.33) 
-.047 
(-1.14) 
-.017 
(-0.41) 
-.061 
(-1.49) 
LCOST -.297*** -.418*** -.231*** -.155*** -.247*** 
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(-7.99) (-3.42) (-5.57) (-3.85) (-6.36) 
LEQAS 
.231*** 
(7.17) 
.182* 
(1.85) 
.281*** 
(7.19) 
.327*** 
(8.30) 
.277*** 
(7.84) 
LSECAST 
.033** 
(2.22) 
.077 
(1.32) 
.021 
(1.35) 
-.061*** 
(-3.36) 
.026* 
(1.72) 
LSIZE 
-.069*** 
(-5.73) 
-.038 
(-1.06) 
-.076*** 
(-3.88) 
-.047*** 
(-3.19) 
-.068*** 
(-4.48) 
LLOFUND 
.184*** 
(5.30) 
.228** 
(2.33) 
.055 
(1.28) 
.071 
(1.44) 
.108*** 
(2.86) 
LEXPTEC 
.005 
(0.27) 
-.041 
(-0.65) 
.048** 
(2.18) 
.043* 
(1.91) 
.030 
(1.48) 
LLOARESG 
.000 
(0.00) 
.000 
(0.02) 
.000 
(0.04) 
-.061*** 
(-3.47) 
.003 
(0.18) 
LGDPGR 
-.026 
(-1.58) 
-.095 
(-0.49) 
-.023 
(-1.55) 
-.031** 
(-2.50) 
-.025 
(-1.67) 
LINF 
.276*** 
(4.73) 
.786 
(0.93) 
.255*** 
(5.03) 
-.008 
(-0.24) 
.263*** 
(5.12) 
FORE 
.076*** 
(2.79) 
.037 
(0.61) 
-.049 
(-0.84) 
-.257*** 
(-5.80) 
.036 
(0.93) 
STATE 
.067** 
(2.37) 
.065 
(0.99) 
.020 
(0.37) 
.124*** 
(2.83) 
.047 
(1.18) 
Egypt 
-.332*** 
(-4.54) 
-.524 
(-0.81) 
-.392*** 
(-3.44) 
 -.371*** 
(-4.34) 
Jordan 
.484*** 
(7.50) 
.312 
(0.88) 
.529*** 
(4.05) 
 .505*** 
(5.75) 
Kuwait 
.129* 
(1.80) 
.040 
(0.11) 
.427*** 
(3.22) 
 .254*** 
(2.66) 
Morocco 
.148 
(1.22) 
-.164 
(-0.35) 
.563** 
(2.33) 
 .211 
(1.40) 
Oman 
.483*** 
(6.92) 
.401 
(1.10) 
.457*** 
(3.31) 
 .474*** 
(4.94) 
Qater 
.262*** 
(2.67) 
-.274 
(-0.33) 
.341** 
(2.23) 
 .319*** 
(2.80) 
United Arab 
Emirates 
-.214** 
(-2.42) 
-.632 
(-0.74) 
-.020 
(-0.17) 
 -.135 
(-1.38) 
2002 
-.118 
(-1.63) 
-4.202** 
(-2.27) 
-.101 
(-1.60) 
 -.104 
(-1.63) 
2003 
-.168** 
(-2.30) 
1.803 
(1.04) 
-.167*** 
(-2.63) 
 -.164** 
(-2.54) 
2004 
-.244*** 
(-3.25) 
-.0166 
(-0.01) 
-.219*** 
(-3.32) 
 -.230*** 
(-3.45) 
2005 
-.215*** 
(-2.91) 
-1.295 
(-0.87) 
-.199*** 
(-3.05) 
 -.202*** 
(-3.07) 
2006 
-.235*** 
(-3.07) 
-.801 
(-0.54) 
-.239*** 
(-3.49) 
 -.236*** 
(-3.44) 
2007 
-.212*** 
(-2.69) 
2.193 
(1.28) 
-.213*** 
(-3.01) 
 -.214*** 
(-3.03) 
2008 
-.182** 
(-2.27) 
-2.835 
(-1.56) 
-.162** 
(-2.24) 
 -.170** 
(-2.36) 
2009 
-.227*** 
(-2.74) 
-.118 
(-0.06) 
-.226*** 
(-3.00) 
 -.228*** 
(-3.05) 
2010 
-.229*** 
(-2.78) 
1.159 
(0.69) 
-.219*** 
(-2.93) 
 -.227*** 
(-3.06) 
2011 
-.240*** 
(-2.87) 
-3.568** 
(-2.17) 
-.214*** 
(-2.80) 
 -.230*** 
(-3.06) 
2012 
-.226*** 
(-2.70) 
.754 
(0.38) 
-.208*** 
(-2.70) 
 -.219*** 
(-2.89) 
CONSTANT 
1.100** 
(2.46) 
-.831 
(-0.20) 
1.399*** 
(2.66) 
 1.115** 
(2.40) 
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R
2 
0.40 
  0.27  
Within  
0.001 0.284  0.274 
Between  
0.765 0.382  0.520 
Overall  
0.011 0.349  0.400 
sigma_e  
 .309  .309 
Rho  
 .434  .226 
*significant at the 10% level 
**significant at the 5% level 
***significant at 1% level 
            L= log, NIM= net interest margin,  COST = cost to income ratio, EQAS = equity to average total assets, SECAST = securities to 
average total assets, SIZE = average total assets, LOFUND = net loans to total deposits, EXPTEC =spending on technological it ems and 
fixed assets, Loaresg =Loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio as a measure for credit quality and credit allocation , CR = the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman Index (HHI), MS = market share of the assets of first largest bank, GDPGR =real gross domestic, INF =the annual inf lation rate, 
Fore =dummy for foreign ownership , state, dummy of state ownership  
 
However, in order to select an appropriate model between fixed effect and random effect, this 
study uses the Hausman test, assuming that the difference in coefficient between fixed and 
random effects is systematic, providing evidence in favour of fixed effect model. 
Furthermore, In order to apply an appropriate GLS model (OLS or random effects) this thesis 
used the Breusch-Pagan (1980) derived a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test to ensure the validity 
of panel data model 𝐻0 = 𝜎𝜇
2 =  𝜎𝜆
2 =0. In the case of rejection, the null hypothesis of 
constant variance, the random effect is the appropriate model and that a model of pooled 
regression should not be used (Baltagi, 2008). Therefore, the Breusch-Pagan test based on 
Lagrange multipliers is run, leading to reject the null hypothesis of constant variance and 
therefore the random effect is used in a number of models and model of pooled regression 
should not be employed. Additionally, the estimations of regressions either for fixed effects 
or random effects showed that F-statistic and Wald chi2 respectively are significant at 1% 
implying that the models are appropriate and coefficients are different from zero. 
Starting with market structure variables, the sign of market concentration (CR) represented 
by HHI is mixed for all regressions as some are positive and statistically significant at 10% 
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and 5% levels, and others are negative and significant. On the other hand, tables 3.3, 3.4, , 
3.6, 3.7, 3.9 and 3.12, show that market share (MS) of a bank strongly support the competing 
hypothesis (EH) at 1%, 5% and 10% as the coefficient of CR in which the market 
concentration is insignificant and MS is positive and highly significant different from zero 
leading to support the argument that if a bank enjoys a higher degree of efficiency in respect 
to good management and technology than its competitors, the bank can easily gain a larger 
market share by lowering its prices and earning economic profits. MS variable is considered 
to be a crucial factor for bank profitability and therefore the hypothesis (2) is supported. 
These findings are consistent with those Simrlok (1985), Tu and Yuan Chen (2000), and 
Samad (2008) who found the existence of Efficient Structure Hypothesis (EH). But, in other 
regressions the positive sign of CR implies that the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
hypothesis is accepted somehow, emphasising that more banks operate in concentrated 
market yield monopoly profits. The fact that the impact of market concentration is positive in 
MENA economies is vital evidence, and is at least to a certain extent consisting with 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014). Paying attention 
to other regressions, the researcher finds mixed results except for NIM which is negative and 
statically significant in some regressions. Therefore, this study finds some evidence to 
support the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis (SCP) in some cases; the more 
concentrated the market, the lower the degree of competition and thus monopoly profits.   
Turning to the frim-specific variables, it can be seen in all tables, capital strength and cost 
efficiency management are the key determinates of ROA in all columns for all regressions 
leading to confirm hypotheses (3) and (4). Such findings show relatively significant and high 
coefficient of the equity to assets (EQAS). This variable is positively related to a bank’s 
performance in terms of profitability (ROA) and is statistically significant to support that 
commercial banks operating in the MENA economies are more likely to rely on higher 
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capital in order to avoid risks and therefore enjoy higher profitability (e.g. Berger, 1995; 
Demirgue-kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Pasiouras F and Kosmidou K, 2007; Kosmidou K, 2008; 
Sufian, 2012; Trujillo-Ponce, 2013; Sufian and Habibullah, 2009). The findings of Pasiouras 
and Kosmidou (2007) are of particular importance when considered in the context of the 
current discussion about capital adequacy ratios. They documented that capital adequacy is 
positively associated with profitability under the hypothesis that well-capitalised banks may 
enjoy access to cheaper and less risky sources of funds and better quality asset markets. Also, 
Elsiefy (2013) supports the argument that well-capitalised banks face lower risks of 
bankruptcy and therefore generate higher profit. The positive relationship between 
profitability and capital implies that banks with larger capital tend to have more opportunities 
to diversify their business operations by strengthening their ability to assume risks and attract 
funds at low cost (Berger, 1995; Obamuyi, 2013). The overall impact will be an improvement 
of their lending with positive effects on profitability. In this context, Dietrich and Wanzenried 
(2014) suggest that better capitalised banks are safer compared to those with lower capital 
ratios and they are more likely to face lower costs of funding due to lower potential 
bankruptcy costs. Such argument are also confirmed by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), 
Bejaoui and Bouzgarrou (2014), Obamuyi (2014) and Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007). As 
generally speaking, banks which reveal a high equity to assets ratio are considered to be safer 
in the incident of failure and liquidation. Such an objective is also supported by Sufian (2012) 
who states that strong capital structure is vital for commercial banks in developing markets 
since it provides additional strength to withstand financial crises and increases safety for 
depositors over unstable macroeconomic condition of a country. 
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Table 3.6 Regression results using fixed effect and random effect for bank profitability 
using Log (ROA) as dependent variable 
𝑳𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏 𝑪𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝑴𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟓𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑭𝑼𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝑬𝑿𝑷𝑻𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑺𝑮𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟖 𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟗 𝑳𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒊𝒕
+ 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬 + 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹  
LROA Random Effects Random Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
CR 
-.205 
(-0.21) 
-.169 
(-0.18) 
-.089 
(-0.11) 
.580 
(1.09) 
MS 
.082 
(1.48) 
.081 
(1.46) 
.166*** 
(2.73) 
.114* 
(1.78) 
LCOST 
-1.26*** 
(-11.43) 
-1.26*** 
(-11.54) 
-1.31*** 
(-11.75) 
-1.22*** 
(-10.12) 
LEQAS 
.535*** 
(5.30) 
.530*** 
(5.50) 
.533*** 
(5.05) 
.687*** 
(6.00) 
LSECAST 
-.00 
(-0.01) 
 -.016 
(-0.44) 
-.029 
(-0.71) 
LSIZE 
-.062* 
(-1.72) 
-.062* 
(-1.81) 
-.190*** 
-5.64 
-.073** 
(-2.01) 
LLOFUND 
-.044 
(-0.52) 
 
-.170* 
(-1.74) 
-.064 
(-0.66) 
LEXPTEC 
.130*** 
(3.09) 
.133*** 
(3.38) 
.149*** 
(3.43) 
.159*** 
(3.41) 
LLOARESG 
-.108** 
(-2.48) 
-.101** 
(-2.46) 
-.145*** 
(-3.32) 
-.150*** 
(-3.16) 
LGDPGR 
.023 
(0.92) 
.022 
(0.89) 
.028 
(1.63) 
-.000 
(-0.04) 
LINF 
.106* 
(1.73) 
.109* 
(1.77) 
-.006 
(-0.10) 
.069 
(1.13) 
FORE 
.282*** 
(2.90) 
.288*** 
(3.04) 
.141 
(1.15) 
.09 
(0.74) 
STATE 
.078 
(0.97) 
.082 
(1.02) 
.144 
(1.33) 
-.000 
(-0.01) 
Egypt 
-.193 
(-1.02) 
-.193 
(-1.03) 
-.298* 
(-1.74) 
 
Morocco 
.564*** 
(2.92) 
.562*** 
(2.92) 
-.250 
(-0.54) 
 
Oman 
.425** 
(2.30) 
.400** 
(2.12) 
.282 
(1.61) 
 
Saudi Arabia 
.321* 
(1.70) 
.321* 
(1.70) 
.635** 
(2.22) 
 
Tunisia 
-.309 
(-0.93) 
-.319 
(-1.00) 
-1.57*** 
(-4.49) 
 
UAE 
.111 
(0.66) 
.100 
(0.57) 
.293* 
(1.76) 
 
2010 
-.241* 
(-1.90) 
-.236* 
(-1.89) 
 -.181 
(-1.51) 
2011 
-.314** 
(-2.45) 
-.311** 
(-2.41) 
 -.246* 
(-1.90) 
2012 
-.260** 
(-2.35) 
-.258** 
(-2.32) 
 -.221* 
(-1.86) 
CONSTAN 
4.38*** 
(4.15) 
4.18*** 
(4.66) 
7.55*** 
(7.96) 
4.27*** 
(3.97) 
R
2 
0.53 0.53 0.45 0.43 
 F-stat 
Probability  
1062.97 
0.0000 
1017.45 
0.0000 
25.45 
0.0000 
23.70 
0.0000 
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Hausman test 
Probability 
43.88 
0.1722 
36.43 
0.3561 
52.68 
0.0004 
219.25 
0.0000 
Breusch and Pagan 
test 
192.53 
0.0000 
195.53 
0.0000 
  
*significant at the 10% level 
**significant at the 5% level 
***significant at 1% level 
L= log, ROA= return on average total assets,  COST = cost to income ratio, EQAS = equity to average total assets, SECAST = securities to 
average total assets, SIZE = average total assets, LOFUND = net loans to total deposits, EXPTEC =spending on technological it ems and 
fixed assets, Loaresg =Loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio (L𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐺) as a measure for credit quality and credit allocation,  CR = the 
Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI), MS = market share of the assets of first largest bank, GDPGR =real gross domestic, INF =the annua l 
inflation rate, Fore =dummy for foreign ownership , state, dummy of state ownership.       
On the other hand, results show that equity to assets variable appeared to be negative and 
statistically significant at 1% and 5% levels which are in line with the theory that the increase 
of capital paid by shareholders decreases the return on equity as the number of shareholders 
increased. Elsiefy (2013), Trujillo-Ponce (2013) and Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014), and 
other studies claim that returns on shareholders reveal a decrease since the increase of capital 
paid by shareholders.  Trujillo-Ponce (2013) and Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014) suggested 
that the decline in ROE resulting from increase in capital ratio cannot be interpreted as 
decline in the wealth produced using the capital invested. Rather, they can be perceived as a 
result of the decreased level of leverage of the banks. Elsiefy (2013) stated that banks which 
have more capital become more stable and safer from crises but that at the same time, banks 
will be less profitable. Also, Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014) pointed out that banks with 
more equity automatically have a lower ROE. However, future studies are desired to 
accurately investigate the appropriate capital requirements for banks which are stable and at 
the same time can generate reasonable profits.  
Unsurprisingly, poor cost management (cost/income) is one of the largest contributors to poor 
financial performance for commercial banks in the MENA countries as the relatively high 
coefficient is negative and significant for all regressions. Such findings are supported by 
Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007), Kosmidou (2008), Alexiou and Sofoklis (2009), and 
Trujillo-Ponce (2013) as they documented that poor cost management is one of the key 
contributors to poor profitability for banks. The more efficient the bank, the higher the 
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profitability will be, indicating that banks are considered to be efficient when they reduce 
costs of operations and thereby improve their performance (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014; 
Obamuyi, 2013; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; and Bejaoui and Bouzarrou, 2014). In 
this matter, Bejaoui and Bouzarrou (2014) pointed out that an efficient cost management is 
essential to improve the profitability of banks emphasising the importance of operating costs, 
particularly staff expenses, which affect the profitability of banks. I argue that the probable 
reason for such finding is that administrative and personnel expenses are relatively high in the 
MENA economies. This suggests that commercial banks in the MENA economies should 
take the necessary actions in order to achieve more efficient costs and therefore increase their 
profits to survive in the market. 
Referring to the relationship between bank size (SIZE) which is measured by average total 
assets and performance, results show that a bank’s performance is negative and statistically 
significant when examining a bank’s size in all regressions and thus hypothesis (5) is 
supported. The results suggest that large banks are likely to generate lower profits when 
compared to small banks. In this regard, Obamuyi (2013) and Tan and Floros (2012) 
advocate that the negative relationship could be that, as banks are becoming extremely large, 
the bureaucratic procedures have negatively affected their performance. Also, Chen and Liao 
(2011) highlighted that the negative coefficients of bank size indicates that larger banks tend 
to make lower profits, whereas smaller banks are likely to gain more profits. Therefore, 
banking regulators and policy makers in MENA should pay more attention to merger 
decisions since they are more likely to be negative than positive. Trujillo-Ponce (2013) stated 
that larger and more diversified banks tend to perform poorly, suggesting that smaller banks 
can more efficiently reduce asymmetric information problems related to lending. Also, 
Obamuyi (2014) advocated that smaller banks experience economies of scale, while larger 
banks reveal diseconomies of scale and provide more support to other studies which showed 
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that smaller banks enjoy economies of scale and diseconomies for larger firms (Pasiouras and 
Kosmidou, 2007 and Chen and Laio, 2011).  
The sign of securities to total assets (SECAST) is significant at 1% and 5% with net interest 
margin in tables 3.5, 3.8, 3.10 and 3.11 indicating that banks’ securities do contribute in 
making interest margins for banks in MENA economies. The SECAST are positive and 
significant at 5% and 10%, related to net interest margins. Such results could justify that 
banks operating in the MENA markets tend to invest in less risky investments such as 
treasury bills, bonds and deposits in overseas, and still relying on traditional lending activities 
showing the inability or unwillingness of the management of banks to create new investments 
opportunities.  
Table 3.7 Regression results using fixed effect and random effect for bank profitability 
using Log (ROE) as dependent variable 
𝑳𝑹𝑶𝑬𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑪𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝑴𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒 𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟓𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑭𝑼𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝑬𝑿𝑷𝑻𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑺𝑮𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟖 𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟗 𝑳𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒊𝒕
+ 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬 + 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹  
LROE Fixed Effects Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects 
CR 
-.266 
(-0.27) 
-.288 
(-0.27) 
-.382 
(-0.43) 
.738 
(1.25) 
MS 
.184** 
(2.51) 
.129** 
(1.99) 
.175*** 
(2.72) 
.125** 
(1.87) 
LCOST 
-1.17*** 
(-8.95) 
-1.18*** 
(-10.05) 
-1.25*** 
(-9.71) 
-1.15*** 
(-8.46) 
LEQAS 
-.315** 
(-2.37) 
-.316*** 
(-2.92) 
-.349*** 
(-2.70) 
-.200 
(-1.52) 
LSECAST 
-.019 
(-0.49) 
 -.015 
(-0.40) 
-.020 
(-0.48) 
LSIZE 
-.164*** 
(-3.31) 
-.065 
(-1.18) 
-.185*** 
(-5.06) 
-.064 
(-1.61) 
LLOFUND 
-.120 
(-1.18) 
 
-.171* 
(-1.75) 
-.067 
(-0.66) 
LEXPECT 
.184*** 
(4.11) 
.109** 
(2.29) 
.174*** 
(3.83) 
.178*** 
(3.70) 
LLOARESG 
-.079 
(-1.59) 
 
-.100** 
(-2.08) 
-.111** 
(-2.18) 
LGDPGR 
-.001 
(-0.04) 
-.008 
(-0.28) 
.026 
(1.41) 
-.008 
(-0.37) 
LINF 
.116* 
(1.89) 
.041 
(0.48) 
-.018 
(-0.28) 
.068 
(1.08) 
FORE 
.078 
(0.52) 
.130 
(0.94) 
.058 
(0.38) 
.008 
(0.05) 
STATE 
.105 
(0.83) 
-.007 
(-0.06) 
.105 
(0.85) 
-.015 
(-0.15) 
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Egypt 
-.342* 
(-1.72) 
-.319 
(-1.43) 
-.301 
(-1.59) 
 
Saudi Arabia 
.635* 
(2.09) 
.412 
(1.22) 
.648** 
(2.34) 
 
Tunisia  
-1.73*** 
(-4.36) 
-.618 
(-1.30) 
-1.68*** 
(-4.63) 
 
2002 
-.051 
(-0.54) 
-.323** 
(-2.25) 
 -.037 
(-0.41) 
2011 
-.174 
(-1.27) 
-.310* 
(-1.95) 
 -.263** 
(-1.99) 
2012 
-.120 
(-0.93) 
-.263* 
(-1.76) 
 -.234* 
(-1.92) 
CONSTAN 
10.14*** 
(7.29) 
8.57*** 
(6.38) 
11.67*** 
(11.01) 
8.18 
 
R
2 
0.32 0.25 0.30 0.28 
 F-stat 
Probability  
10.61 
0.0000 
11.40 
0.0000 
11.10 
0.0000 
10.53 
0.0000 
Hausman test 
Probability 
57.16 
0.01 
355.19 
0.0000 
62.95 
0.0000 
21461.33 
0.0000 
    L= log, ROE= return on average assets,  COST = cost to income ratio, EQAS = equity to average total assets, SECAST = securities to 
average total assets, SIZE = average total assets, LOFUND = net loans to total deposits, EXPTEC =spending on technological it ems and 
fixed assets, Loaresg =Loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio as a measure for credit quality and credit allocation, CR = the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman Index (HHI), MS = market share of the assets of first largest bank, GDPGR =real gross domestic, INF =the annual inf lation rate, 
Fore =dummy for foreign ownership , state, dummy of state ownership   
 
The relationship between risk and profitability of banks is mixed but statistically 
insignificant, while in tables 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.8, 3.10 and 3.11 the ratio net loans to total 
deposits reveals positive coefficient and statistically significant to the net interest margin and 
at 5% and 1% levels. Such findings indicate that (loans) can positively affect the profitability 
of commercial banks. In other words, a higher figure of net loans to deposits and short term 
funding means lower liquidity, and findings imply that less liquid banks in the MENA 
economies can generate more profits which is consistent with previous studies  (Chen and 
Liao, 2011; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007; Trujillo-Ponce, 2013; Sufian and Habibullah, 
2009; and Sufian, 2012). They clearly show an increase in bank liquidity ratio results to 
improved performance of banks. Alexiou and Sofoklis (2009) suggest that an increase in 
liquidity will cause a decline in profitability. Such arguments highlight the trade-off between 
liquidity and profitability. In this regard, Trujillo-Ponce (2013) documented that the larger the 
bank’s loan portfolio is on its balance sheet, the higher is its profitability. Hence, in such 
cases, bank loans in commercial banks in MENA economies tend to be more highly valued 
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than alternative investment opportunities such as securities. In other words, the MENA 
banking sector is more likely to depend on traditional lending activities, suggesting that those 
commercial banks are still conservative and that there is an unwillingness or inability from 
management to create new investment opportunities. The problem to guarantee sufficient 
levels of liquidity without negatively affecting the performance of banks in MENA countries 
needs skilful management. Therefore, hypothesis (6) is supported in some cases.   
Table 3.8 Regression results using fixed effect and random effect for bank performance 
using Log NIM as dependent variable:    
𝑳𝑵𝑰𝑴𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑪𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝑴𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑳𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟓𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑭𝑼𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝑬𝑿𝑷𝑻𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑺𝑮𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟖 𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟗 𝑳𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒊𝒕
+ 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬 + 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹  
LNIM Random effect Fixed effect  Fixed effect  
CR 
-2.00 
(-4.67) 
-1.240*** 
(-3.15) 
-.508** 
(-2.02) 
MS 
-.061 
(-1.49) 
-.003 
(-0.08) 
-.050 
(-1.18) 
LCOST 
-.247*** 
(-6.36) 
-.230*** 
(-5.61) 
-.227*** 
(-5.45) 
LEQAS 
.277*** 
(7.84) 
.248*** 
(6.76) 
.343*** 
(9.11) 
LSECAST 
.026* 
(1.72) 
.012 
(0.83) 
.011 
(0.78) 
LSIZE 
-.068*** 
(-4.48) 
-.104*** 
(-6.22) 
-.049*** 
(-2.96) 
LLOFUND 
.108*** 
(2.86) 
.091** 
(2.17) 
.055 
(1.38) 
LEXPTEC 
.030 
(1.48) 
.041* 
(1.85) 
.016 
(0.75) 
LLOARESG 
.0030 
(0.18) 
.008 
(0.50) 
-.019 
(-1.10) 
LGDPGR 
-.025 
(-1.67) 
-.036*** 
(-2.73) 
-.041*** 
(-2.74) 
LINF 
.263*** 
(5.12) 
.221*** 
(5.32) 
.144*** 
(3.16) 
FORE 
.036 
(0.93) 
-.052 
(-0.89) 
-.240*** 
(-4.34) 
STATE 
.047 
(1.18) 
.056 
(1.04) 
-.003 
(-0.06) 
Egypt 
-.371*** 
(-4.34) 
-.339*** 
(-2.98) 
 
Jordan 
.505*** 
(5.75) 
.440*** 
(3.38) 
 
Kuwait 
.254*** 
(2.66) 
.409*** 
(3.08) 
 
Morocco 
.211 
(1.40) 
.658*** 
(2.73) 
 
Oman 
.474*** 
(4.94) 
.397*** 
(2.87) 
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Qatar 
.319*** 
(2.80) 
.306** 
(2.01) 
 
Saudi Arabia 
.098 
(1.00) 
.245* 
(1.72) 
 
2003 
-.164** 
(-2.54) 
 -.093 
(-1.44) 
2004 
-.230*** 
(-3.45) 
 -.132** 
(-2.00) 
2005 
-.202*** 
(-3.07) 
 -.144** 
(-2.20) 
2006 
-.236*** 
(-3.44) 
 -.134** 
(-1.99) 
2007 
-.214*** 
(-3.03) 
 -.121* 
(-1.74) 
2008 
-.170** 
(-2.36) 
 -.061 
(-0.88) 
2009 
-.228*** 
(-3.05) 
 -.126* 
(-1.74) 
2010 
-.227*** 
(-3.06) 
 -.119 
(-1.65) 
2011 
-.230*** 
(-3.06) 
 -.106 
(-1.45) 
2012 
-.219*** 
(-2.89) 
 -.106 
(-1.44) 
CONSTANT 
1.11** 
(2.40) 
1.51*** 
(3.47) 
1.152*** 
(2.64) 
R
2 
0.40 0.26 0.21 
Wald Chi2, F 
Probability  
546.67 
0.0000 
16.87 
0.0000 
11.27 
0.0000 
Hausman Test 
27.04 
0.8597 
38.01 
0.0254 
56.92 
0.0000 
Breusch and Pagan test 
312.12 
0.0000 
  
*significant at the 10% level 
**significant at the 5% level 
***significant at 1% level 
LOG= L, NIM= net interest margin to average total assets,  COST = cost to income ratio, EQAS = equity to average total assets, SECAST = 
securities to average total assets, SIZE = average total assets, LOFUND = net loans to total deposits, EXPTEC =spending on technological 
items and fixed assets, Loaresg =Loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio (L𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐺) as a measure for credit quality and credit allocation, 
CR = the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI), MS = market share of the assets of first largest bank, GDPGR =real gross domestic, INF =the 
annual inflation rate, Fore =dummy for foreign ownership , state, dummy of state ownership.           
Turning to the spending on fixed assets, findings (EXPTEC) of this variable indicate that 
spending on fixed assets contributes to making banks more profitable as is statistically 
significant and positively related to a bank’s performance (ROA) in all cases of regression 
with exception for NIM variable which are positive but insignificant. According to such 
outputs, it can be said that foreign ownership and financial deregulations took place over this 
period may be forced commercial banks to increase their investments in fixed assets and 
superior banking techniques. As Chelo and Manlagnit (2011), Chen and Liao (2011), 
Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) pointed out, foreign bank entry and financial reforms are 
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related to spillover effects on the banking sector through their ownership-specific advantages, 
possession of technology, and through an increase in competition. 
Loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio (𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐺) as a measure for credit quality and credit 
allocation. It can be observed that from analysis results, this variable is found to have a 
statistically significant negative and rather robust impact on profitability of commercial banks 
in all regression equations confirming what others found (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014; 
Ahmad et al., 2012; Bejaoui and Bouzgarrou, 2014; Trujillo-Ponce, 2013 and Alper and 
Anbar, 2011). The control of credit quality remains a debatable matter, especially in the case 
of emerging economies. Confirming with Ahmad et al. (2012), I would suggest that 
commercial banks operating in MENA should reduce loss on loans by implementing effective 
recovery and advancing of loans policy because less loss on loans portfolio leads to higher 
profitability of banks and ensure the stability of the whole economy. Regarding Spanish 
banking profitability, Trujillo-Ponce (2013) documented this variable to be a very important 
determinant as profitability decreased significantly and such relationships could exist because 
an increase in the doubtful assets, which do not accrue income, requires a bank to allocate a 
major percentage of its gross margin to provision to cover expected credit losses; therefore, 
profitability will be dropped. Further, Alper and Anbar (2011) stated credit portfolio volume 
and weak asset quality affect negatively profitability of banks. 
Table 3.9 Regression results using fixed effects for bank performance using Log (ROA) as 
dependent variable  
𝑳𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑪𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝑴𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟓𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑭𝑼𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔 𝑳𝑬𝑿𝑷𝑻𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕 + +𝒀𝟕𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟖𝑳𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬
+ 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 
LROA  Fixed effect   Fixed effect  Fixed 
 Effect  
Fixed effect  
CR 
0.293 
(0.434) 
0.249 
(0.411) 
0.720* 
(1.750) 
0.892*** 
(2.340) 
MS 
0.118 
(1.629) 
0.143** 
(2.080) 
0.073 
(1.006) 
0.108 
(1.567) 
LCOST 
-1.208*** 
(-15.528) 
-1.272*** 
(-16.541) 
-1.177*** 
(-15.531) 
-1.259*** 
(-16.959) 
LEQAS 0.635*** 0.610*** 0.750*** 0.716*** 
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(10.012) (9.981) (12.522) (12.132) 
LSECAST 
0.014 
(0.569) 
0.010 
(0.407) 
0.004 
(0.183) 
-0.004 
(-0.193) 
LSIZE 
-0.069** 
(-2.201) 
-0.087*** 
(-3.270) 
0.004 
(0.155) 
-0.025 
(-1.092) 
LLOFUND 
0.001 
(0.029) 
-0.031 
(-0.583) 
0.007 
(0.144) 
-0.022 
(-0.422) 
LEXPTEC 
0.103*** 
(2.741) 
0.089*** 
(2.392) 
0.097*** 
(2.679) 
0.086*** 
(2.360) 
LGDPGR 
0.014 
(0.540) 
0.044** 
(1.924) 
0.009 
(0.353) 
0.040* 
(1.743) 
LINF 
0.085 
(0.942) 
-0.030 
(-0.410) 
0.057 
(0.727) 
-0.089 
(-1.326) 
FORE 
0.189** 
(1.818) 
0.169 
(1.621) 
0.058 
(0.607) 
0.037 
(0.381) 
STATE 
0.052 
(0.576) 
0.047 
(0.515) 
-0.055 
(-0.639) 
-0.071 
(-0.820) 
Egypt 
-0.308 
(-1.544) 
-0.279 
(-1.404) 
  
Saudi Arabia 
0.474** 
(1.817) 
0.496** 
(1.948) 
  
Tunisia 
-0.476** 
(-1.793) 
-0.485** 
(-1.817) 
  
YEAR=2002 
-0.223** 
(-2.063) 
 -0.231** 
(-2.13) 
 
YEAR=2004 
-0.168 
(-1.479) 
 -0.178 
(-1.616) 
 
YEAR=2009 
-0.171 
(-1.340) 
 -0.234** 
(-1.965) 
 
YEAR=2010 
-0.209 
(-1.634) 
 -0.278*** 
(-2.345) 
 
YEAR=2011 
-0.292** 
(-2.220) 
 -0.364*** 
(-2.974) 
 
YEAR=2012 
-0.250** 
(-1.883)  
-0.338*** 
(-2.756)  
CONSTANT 
3.821*** 
(4.375) 
4.911*** 
(6.857) 
2.449*** 
(3.366) 
3.855 
(6.405) 
R2Adjused 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.62 
F-test 
 
15.99652 
0.0000 
17.03325 
0.0000 
16.38279 
0.0000 
17.47713 
0.0000 
Hausman test 
 
84.648168 
0.0000 
67.532980 
0.0000 
56.761092 
0.0003 
39.757405 
0.0001 
*significant at the 10% level 
**significant at the 5% level 
***significant at 1% level 
L= LOG, ROA = Return on average assets, COST = cost to income ratio, EQAS = equity to average total assets, SECAST = securities to 
average total assets, SIZE = average total assets, LOFUND = net loans to total deposits, EXPTEC =spending on technological it ems and 
fixed assets, CR = the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI), MS = market share of the assets of first  largest bank, GDPGR =real gross 
domestic, INF =the annual inflation rate, Fore =dummy for foreign ownership , state, dummy of state ownership  
 
Regarding the impact of macroeconomic indicators on ROA, the researcher observes 
different findings as GDPGR is significant and positive when year effect is not taken into 
consideration for the ROA in the table 5.9 at 5% and 10% levels as well as highly significant 
at 1% in the table 5.3. This finding supports the argument of the relation between economic 
growth and financial sector performance. Such finding is in line with Pasioouras and 
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Kosmidou (2007), Kosmidou (2008), Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014), Sufian (2009) who 
provided support to the argument of positive association between economic growth and 
financial sector performance. Obamuyi (2013) claims that the positive impact of higher GDP 
reflects improved business activities, which ultimately leads to higher profitability. On the 
other side, table 3.5 reports that net interest margins are negatively related to GDP growth 
and significant in some regressions. However, the inflation effect (INF), this variable reveals 
mixed results and it is not significant in any regression model when (ROA) return on average 
assets is used. In contrast, when (NIM) net interest margin results are used, results are highly 
significant, supporting the claim that banks in inflation period are more likely to generate 
interest revenues. Also, this result is supported by the fact that the relationship between bank 
operating performance (NIM) and inflation depends on whether the inflation is anticipated or 
unanticipated, so that during the study period, the levels of inflation were anticipated by 
commercial banks in MENA.    
The foreign ownership as a dummy variable equals 1 if at least 50% of the bank’s capital 
comes from foreign investors and 0 otherwise. In all columns this variable is positive and 
significant at 10%, 5% and 10% respectively for tables 3.3, 3.4, 3.6 and 3.9 and most of 
regressions confirm the argument that banks with foreign ownership tending to be more 
profitable than domestic banks in MENA economies (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 1999; Dietrich 
and Wanzenried. 2014; Farazi el al. 2011). Such results can be explained by foreign banks 
being exempted from unfavourable domestic banking regulations as well as those banks 
applying advanced banking techniques as supported by Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014) who 
stated that foreign banks in developing economies are likely to overcome any informational 
disadvantage relative to domestic banks through superior banking techniques. On the other 
hand, foreign-owned banks seem to reveal lower interest margins than domestic banks in the 
MENA countries. This result may justify that foreign banks seem to offer favourable rates to 
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attract more customers which in turn reduces their interest margin. With regards to state-
owned banks, we do not find strong evidence to prove that state banks are more profitable 
than privately-owned banks in the tables 3.3 and 3.4. While in table 3.5 and 3.8, when net 
interest margin (NIM) and return on average equity (ROE) are used as dependent variables, 
state-owned banks are found to be less profitable than privately owned banks in a number of 
regressions.    
Turning to the year effect, it can be observed that 2002 has negative and significant 
relationship with profitability of banks due to the collapse in economic activity that arose in 
developed economies. Economies in European Union for the period 2000-2001 and the 
United States in 2002 and 2003 are influenced by that recession and thereby affected their 
investments in MENA economies. The Global Financial Crisis and 2008 financial crisis are 
negative and statistically significant in some cases with profitability in terms of ROA. Two 
years, 2011 and 2012, are negatively related and significant to ROA in all cases as countries 
such Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain have experienced deterioration in their 
financial and economic systems. In this context, IMF suggests that countries undergoing 
political transitions tended to witness short term declines in investments and growth as well 
as tourism revenues and exports. 
Table 3.10 Regression results using fixed effects and for bank performance using log 
NIM as dependent variable: 
𝑳𝑵𝑰𝑴𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑭𝑼𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝑬𝑿𝑷𝑻𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟕𝑪𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟖𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟗 𝑳𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬 + 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵
+ 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 
LNIM Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects  
LCOST 
 
-0.337*** 
(-9.050) 
        
LEQAS 
  
0.239*** 
(9.633) 
       
LSECAST 
 
 
 
0.043*** 
(3.259) 
      
LSIZE 
 
  
 
-0.09*** 
(-5.321) 
     
LLOFUND 
 
   
 
0.173*** 
(5.587) 
    
LEXPTEC      -9.29    
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 (-0.004) 
CR 
 
     
 
-0.638* 
(-1.756) 
  
LGDPGR 
 
       -0.019 
(-1.212) 
 
LINF 
 
       
 
0.285*** 
(5.218) 
FORE 
 
-0.068 
(-1.165) 
-0.107* 
(-1.873) 
-0.105* 
(-1.758) 
-0.15*** 
(-2.532) 
-0.042 
(-0.699) 
-0.105* 
(-1.751) 
-0.104* 
(-1.734) 
-0.094 
(-1.530) 
-0.107* 
(-1.794) 
STATE 
 
-0.088* 
(-1.764) 
-0.103** 
(-2.076) 
-0.071 
(-1.376) 
0.010 
(0.200) 
-0.012 
(-0.237) 
-0.058 
(-1.132) 
-0.058 
(-1.140) 
-0.054 
(-1.044) 
-0.059 
(-1.162) 
Egypt 
 
-0.285** 
(-2.507) 
-0.194* 
(-1.744) 
-0.33*** 
(-2.801) 
-0.358** 
(-3.089) 
-0.280** 
(-2.415) 
-0.33*** 
(-2.822) 
-0.38*** 
(-3.160) 
-0.33*** 
(-2.827) 
-0.45*** 
(-3.782) 
Jordan 
 
0.381*** 
(2.776) 
0.353*** 
(2.645) 
0.353** 
(2.508) 
0.272* 
(1.937) 
0.351** 
(2.512) 
0.334** 
(2.357) 
0.387*** 
(2.683) 
0.334** 
(2.360) 
0.306*** 
(2.185) 
Kuwait  
 
0.241* 
(1.725) 
0.441*** 
(3.271) 
0.427*** 
(3.002) 
0.481*** 
(3.390) 
0.374*** 
(2.650) 
0.410*** 
(2.871) 
0.430*** 
(3.005) 
0.410*** 
(2.874) 
0.332** 
(2.335) 
Lebanon 
 
0.242** 
(2.097) 
0.205* 
(1.830) 
0.109 
(0.925) 
0.018 
(0.151) 
0.277** 
(2.302) 
0.125 
(1.044) 
0.028 
(0.217) 
0.126 
(1.064) 
0.112 
(0.960) 
Morocco 
 
0.583*** 
(4.045) 
0.560*** 
(3.999) 
0.439*** 
(2.981) 
0.437*** 
(2.988) 
0.569*** 
(3.862) 
0.457*** 
(3.067) 
0.399*** 
(2.643) 
0.456*** 
(3.090) 
0.427*** 
(2.916) 
Oman 
 
0.439*** 
(3.018) 
0.482*** 
(3.400) 
0.474*** 
(3.161) 
0.408*** 
(2.755) 
0.395*** 
(2.664) 
0.424*** 
(2.823) 
0.442*** 
(2.948) 
0.424*** 
(2.831) 
0.366** 
(2.459) 
Qatar 
 
0.094 
(0.650) 
0.162 
(1.146) 
0.200 
(1.341) 
0.260* 
(1.751) 
0.219 
(1.483) 
0.195 
(1.302) 
0.270* 
(1.738) 
0.187 
(1.212) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
Saudi Arabia 
 
0.043 
(0.295) 
0.203 
(1.424) 
0.151 
(1.005) 
0.366** 
(2.379) 
0.181 
(1.215) 
0.166 
(1.101) 
0.094 
(0.602) 
0.166 
(1.101) 
0.139 
(0.934) 
Tunissia 
 
0.378*** 
(2.698) 
0.385*** 
(2.818) 
0.373*** 
(2.560) 
0.112 
(0.763) 
0.306** 
(2.143) 
0.297** 
(2.047) 
0.216 
(1.428) 
0.297 
(2.058) 
0.258* 
(1.805) 
UAE 
 
0.333*** 
(2.775) 
0.340*** 
(2.909) 
0.511*** 
(4.136) 
0.499*** 
(4.095) 
0.437*** 
(3.591) 
0.458*** 
(3.719) 
0.397*** 
(3.108) 
0.456*** 
(3.704) 
0.255** 
(2.000) 
YEAR=2001 
 
-0.094 
(-1.843) 
-0.089* 
(-1.791) 
-0.105** 
(-2.019) 
-0.089* 
(-1.718) 
-0.092* 
(-1.786) 
-0.102* 
(-1.940) 
-0.104** 
(-1.986) 
-0.104** 
(-1.975) 
-0.108** 
(-2.079) 
YEAR=2002 
 
-0.123** 
(-2.435) 
-0.096* 
(-1.946) 
-0.14*** 
(-2.782) 
-0.116** 
(-2.248) 
-0.126** 
(-2.449) 
-0.14*** 
(-2.604) 
-0.14*** 
(-2.688) 
-0.14*** 
(-2.641) 
-0.15*** 
(-2.846) 
YEAR=2003 
 
-0.176*** 
(-3.547) 
-0.16*** 
(-3.241) 
-0.17*** 
(-3.408) 
-0.14*** 
(-2.820) 
-0.16*** 
(-3.092) 
-0.17*** 
(-3.335) 
-0.18*** 
(-3.549) 
-0.18*** 
(-3.346) 
-0.19*** 
(-3.708) 
YEAR=2004 
 
-0.222*** 
(-4.446) 
-0.21*** 
(-4.322) 
-0.23*** 
(-4.487) 
-0.18*** 
(-3.458) 
-0.21*** 
(-4.042) 
-0.22*** 
(-4.260) 
-0.24*** 
(-4.531) 
-0.23*** 
(-4.163) 
-0.25*** 
(-4.840) 
YEAR=2005 
 
-0.174*** 
(-3.523) 
-0.13*** 
(-2.596) 
-0.14*** 
(-2.845) 
-0.077 
(-1.510) 
-0.118** 
(-2.352) 
-0.130** 
(-2.549) 
-0.15*** 
(-2.887) 
-0.13*** 
(-2.582) 
-0.128** 
(-2.541) 
YEAR=2006 
 
-0.188*** 
(-3.840) 
-0.15*** 
(-3.101) 
-0.16*** 
(-3.207) 
-0.085* 
(-1.652) 
-0.15*** 
(-2.901) 
-0.16*** 
(-3.088) 
-0.18*** 
(-3.476) 
-0.16*** 
(-3.043) 
-0.21*** 
(-4.107) 
YEAR=2007 
 
-0.169*** 
(-3.453) 
-0.13*** 
(-2.742) 
-0.14*** 
(-2.727) 
-0.043** 
(-0.825) 
-0.119** 
(-2.386) 
-0.14*** 
(-2.700) 
-0.16*** 
(-3.101) 
-0.14*** 
(-2.664) 
-0.21*** 
(-4.008) 
YEAR=2008 
 
-0.125** 
(-2.566) 
-0.090* 
(-1.885) 
-0.099** 
(-1.979) 
0.004 
(0.091) 
-0.101** 
(-2.028) 
-0.099** 
(-1.966) 
-0.124** 
(-2.391) 
-0.104* 
(-1.959) 
-0.20*** 
(-3.675) 
YEAR=2009 
 
-0.143*** 
(-2.934) 
-0.121** 
(-2.540) 
-0.115** 
(-2.298) 
-7.89 
(-0.001) 
-0.106** 
(-2.146) 
-0.110** 
(-2.193) 
-0.14*** 
(-2.628) 
-0.113** 
(-2.235) 
-0.22*** 
(-4.043) 
YEAR=2010 
 
-0.130*** 
(-2.657) 
-0.115** 
(-2.411) 
-0.100** 
(-2.002) 
0.019 
(0.350) 
-0.096* 
(-1.931) 
-0.096* 
(-1.909) 
-0.123** 
(-2.353) 
-0.099* 
(-1.944) 
-0.22*** 
(-3.942) 
YEAR=2011 
 
-0.114** 
(-2.338) 
-0.112** 
(-2.337) 
-0.102** 
(-2.036) 
0.025 
0.469150 
-0.103** 
(-2.075) 
-0.096* 
(-1.884) 
-0.121** 
(-2.323) 
-0.097* 
(-1.928) 
-0.23*** 
(-4.071) 
YEAR=2012 
 
-0.075 
(-1.523) 
-0.069 
(-1.425) 
-0.057 
(-1.126) 
0.083 
(1.482) 
-0.054 
(-1.079) 
-0.046 
(-0.908) 
-0.071 
(-1.357) 
-0.048 
(-0.951) 
-0.19*** 
(-3.338) 
CONSTANT  
 
2.145*** 
(11.765) 
0.259** 
(2.028) 
0.929*** 
(7.825) 
2.105*** 
(8.030) 
0.089 
(0.501) 
0.852*** 
(7.243) 
1.034 
(6.645) 
0.852*** 
(7.284) 
-0.38*** 
(-1.448) 
R
2- 
Adjusted 0.49        0.50         0.46         0.47         0.47         0.46        0.46        0.46         0.47 
F-stat 
Prob 
10.94255 
0.000000 
11.34400 
0.000000 
9.899520 
0.000000 
10.15841 
0.000000 
10.20097 
0.000000 
9.723696 
0.000000 
9.789200 
0.000000 
9.744618 
0.000000 
10.14254 
0.000000 
Hausman test  
 
92.388311 
0.0000 
65.587621 
0.0000 
86.764123 
0.0000 
97.062107 
0.0000 
85.475792 
0.0000 
98.300095 
0.0000 
85.336170 
0.0000 
80.278282 
0.0000 
80.573124 
0.0000 
*significant at the 10% level 
**significant at the 5% level 
***significant at 1% level 
L=Log, NIM=net interest margin , COST = cost to income ratio, EQAS = equity to average total assets, SECAST = securities to average 
total assets, SIZE = average total assets, LOFUND = net loans to total deposits, EXPTEC =spending on technological items and fixed assets, 
CR = the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI), GDPGR =real gross domestic, INF =the annual inflation rate, Fore =dummy for foreign 
ownership, state, dummy of state ownership 
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Table 3.11 Regression results using fixed effects for bank performance using NIM as 
dependent variable: 
𝑳𝑵𝑰𝑴𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑪𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐 𝑴𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟓𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑭𝑼𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝑬𝑿𝑷𝑻𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕 + +𝒀𝟕 𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟖 𝑳𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬
+ 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 
Variable Fixed effect  Fixed effect  Fixed effect  Fixed effect  
CR -1.027*** 
(-2.889) 
-0.361 
(-1.128) 
-0.387 
(-1.664) 
-0.193 
(-0.903) 
MS -0.054 
(-1.281) 
-0.004 
(-0.101) 
-0.065 
(-1.483) 
-0.030 
(-0.736) 
LCOST -0.285*** 
(-7.443) 
-0.288*** 
(-7.548) 
-0.269*** 
(-6.901) 
-0.269*** 
(-7.005) 
LEQAS 0.162*** 
(6.236) 
0.157*** 
(6.133) 
0.188*** 
(7.109) 
0.189*** 
(7.247) 
LSECAST 0.041 
(3.088) 
0.031** 
2.415 
0.031*** 
(2.446) 
0.026** 
(2.030) 
LSIZE -0.081*** 
(-4.916) 
-0.103*** 
(-7.114) 
-0.068*** 
(-4.627) 
-0.075*** 
(-5.791) 
LLOFUND 0.127*** 
(4.192) 
0.139*** 
(4.679) 
0.131*** 
(4.560) 
0.137*** 
(4.795) 
LEXPTEC 0.023 
(1.118) 
0.017 
(0.825) 
-0.010 
(-0.486) 
-0.013 
(-0.667) 
LGDPGR -0.015 
(-1.049) 
-0.031** 
(-2.436) 
-0.031** 
(-2.090) 
-0.041*** 
(-3.079) 
LINF 0.301*** 
(5.809) 
0.254*** 
(6.118) 
0.162*** 
(3.503) 
0.157*** 
(4.069) 
FORE -0.053 
(-0.924) 
-0.058 
(-1.003) 
-0.280*** 
(-5.122) 
-0.275*** 
(-5.030) 
STATE -0.033 
(-0.658) 
-0.011 
(-0.230) 
-0.034 
(-0.686) 
-0.026 
(-0.534) 
Egypt -0.375*** 
(-3.301) 
-0.312*** 
(-2.757) 
  
Jordan 0.440*** 
(3.303) 
0.371*** 
(2.790) 
  
Kuwait  0.329*** 
(2.452) 
0.319** 
(2.367) 
  
Morocco 0.590*** 
(4.164) 
0.651*** 
(4.584) 
  
Oman 0.464*** 
(3.326) 
0.421*** 
(3.010) 
  
Saudi Arabia 0.147 
(0.996) 
0.267* 
(1.844) 
  
YEAR=2001 -0.120** 
(-2.031) 
 -0.091 
(-1.481) 
 
YEAR=2002 -0.138** 
(-2.318) 
 -0.112* 
(-1.815) 
 
YEAR=2003 -0.203*** 
(-3.362) 
 -0.160*** 
(-2.577) 
 
YEAR=2004 -0.257*** 
(-4.073) 
 -0.196*** 
(-3.049) 
 
YEAR=2005 -0.187*** 
(-3.006) 
 -0.144** 
(-2.293) 
 
YEAR=2006 -0.228*** 
(-3.497) 
 -0.148** 
(-2.267) 
 
YEAR=2007 -0.204*** 
(-3.033) 
 -0.123* 
(-1.845) 
 
YEAR=2008 -0.189*** 
(-2.728) 
 -0.096 
(-1.418) 
 
YEAR=2009 -0.237*** 
(-3.338) 
 -0.145** 
(-2.088) 
 
YEAR=2010 -0.233*** 
(-3.289) 
 -0.139** 
(-2.000) 
 
YEAR=2011 -0.229*** 
(-3.148) 
 -0.134** 
(-1.878) 
 
YEAR=2012 -0.215*** 
(-2.943) 
 -0.114 
(-1.604) 
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CONSTANT  1.263*** 
(2.771) 
1.419*** 
(3.763) 
1.586*** 
(4.048) 
1.534*** 
(4.730) 
R
2
 0.55 0.54 0.50 0.50 
F-stat  12.12027 
0.0000 
12.90420 
0.0000 
10.87843 
0.0000 
11.79770 
0.0000 
Hausman test  101.231346 
0.0000 
79.344935 
0.0000 
118.995030 
0.0000 
57.099156 
0.0000 
*significant at the 10% level 
**significant at the 5% level 
***significant at 1% level 
L= Log ,NIM=net interest margin , COST = cost to income ratio, EQAS = equity to average total assets, SECAST = securities to average 
total assets, SIZE = average total assets, LOFUND = net loans to total deposits, EXPTEC =spending on technological items and fixed assets, 
CR = the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI), MS = market share of the assets of first largest bank, GDPGR =real gross domestic, INF =the 
annual inflation rate,  Fore =dummy for foreign ownership, state, dummy of state ownership. 
 
Table 3.12 Regression results using fixed effects for bank performance using Log (ROE) 
as dependent variable 
𝑳𝑹𝑶𝑬𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑪𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝑴𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟓𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑭𝑼𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝑬𝑿𝑷𝑻𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟕 𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟖 𝑳𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬
+ 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 
Variable Fixed effect  Fixed effect  Fixed effect  Fixed effect  
CR 
-0.477 
(-0.622) 
-0.594 
(-0.866) 
0.772 
(1.656) 
0.783* 
(1.818) 
MS 
0.129 
(1.562) 
0.161** 
(2.058) 
0.092 
(1.113) 
0.122 
(1.558) 
LCOST 
-1.194*** 
(-13.482) 
-1.259*** 
(-14.397) 
-1.178*** 
(-13.737) 
-1.255*** 
(-14.963) 
LEQAS 
-0.328*** 
(-4.552) 
-0.346*** 
(-4.985) 
-0.220*** 
(-3.249) 
-0.245*** 
(-3.685) 
LSECAST 
0.029 
(0.995) 
0.024 
(0.835) 
0.012 
(0.450) 
0.004 
(0.168) 
LSIZE 
-0.068** 
(-1.900) 
-0.080*** 
(-2.635) 
0.002 
(0.074) 
-0.016 
(-0.625) 
LLOFUND 
-0.039 
(-0.623) 
-0.073 
(-1.176) 
-0.017 
(-0.290) 
-0.049 
(-0.845) 
LEXPTEC 
0.106*** 
(2.484) 
0.093** 
(2.179) 
0.104*** 
(2.531) 
0.093** 
(2.269) 
LGDPGR 
-0.003 
(-0.105) 
0.037 
(1.410) 
-0.008 
(-0.299) 
0.035 
(1.354) 
LINF 
0.029 
(0.289) 
-0.067 
(-0.806) 
0.014 
(0.162) 
-0.107 
(-1.407) 
FORE 
0.115 
(0.975) 
0.098 
(0.831) 
-0.001 
(-0.018) 
-0.021 
(-0.196) 
STATE 
-0.027 
(-0.268) 
-0.040 
(-0.392) 
-0.121 
(-1.236) 
-0.139 
(-1.421) 
Egypt 
-0.342 
(-1.505) 
-0.323 
(-1.432) 
  
Jordan 
0.435 
(1.649) 
0.451* 
(1.716) 
  
Tunisia 
-0.592** 
(-1.958) 
-0.604** 
(-1.991) 
  
YEAR=2002 
-0.335*** 
(-2.731) 
 -0.320*** 
(-2.618) 
 
YEAR=2003 
-0.232** 
(-1.87) 
 -0.210* 
(-1.730) 
 
YEAR=2010 
-0.217 
(-1.495) 
 -0.238* 
(-1.773) 
 
YEAR=2011 
-0.315** 
(-2.102) 
 -0.338*** 
(-2.442) 
 
YEAR=2012 
-0.268* 
(-1.773)  
-0.308** 
(-2.220)  
CONSTANT  
9.023*** 
(9.100) 
9.909 
(12.175) 
7.360*** 
(8.946) 
8.488*** 
(12.475) 
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R
2
 Adjusted 
 
0.46 0.45 0.45 0.44 
F-stat  
 
 
8.202598 
0.000000 
8.637981 
0.000000 
8.438099 
0.000000 
8.911427 
0.000000 
Hausman test  
 
 
88.403493 
0.0000 
54.732305 
0.0001 
52.822391 
0.0009 
31.195915 
0.0018 
*significant at the 10% level 
**significant at the 5% level 
***significant at 1% level 
L=Log, ROE= return onl equity,  COST = cost to income ratio, EQAS = equity to average total assets, SECAST = securities to average total 
assets, SIZE = average total assets, LOFUND = net loans to total deposits, EXPTEC =spending on technological items and fixed assets, CR 
= the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI), MS = market share of the assets of first  largest bank, GDPGR =real gross domestic, INF =the 
annual inflation rate, Fore =dummy for foreign ownership, state, dummy of state ownership  
 Table 3.13 Regression results using fixed effects for bank performance using Log 
(ROE) as dependent variable: 
𝑳𝑹𝑶𝑬𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑳𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑭𝑼𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝑬𝑿𝑷𝑻𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜶𝟕𝑪𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟖𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟗 𝑳𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬 + 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 
Variable  Fixed 
effects 
Fixed 
effects  
Fixed 
effects  
Fixed 
effects  
Fixed 
effects  
Fixed 
effects  
Fixed 
effects  
Fixed 
effects  
Fixed 
effects  
     LCOST 
-0.938*** 
(-10.676) 
        
LEQAS 
  
-0.153** 
(-2.191) 
       
LSECAST 
  
0.078 
 
-0.002 
(-0.094) 
      
LSIZE 
 
  
 
0.058 
(1.613) 
     
LLOFUND 
 
   
 
0.021 
(0.316) 
    
LEXPTEC 
 
    
 
0.139*** 
(2.935) 
   
CR 
 
     
 
-0.031 
(-0.039) 
  
LGDPGR 
 
       0.015 
(0.484) 
 
LINF 
 
       
 
-0.010 
-(0.089) 
FORE 
 
0.100 
(0.815) 
0.078 
(0.621) 
0.058 
(0.450) 
0.090 
(0.692) 
0.067 
(0.507) 
0.056 
(0.435) 
0.058 
(0.450) 
0.071 
(0.557) 
0.058 
(0.450) 
STATE 
 
-0.229** 
(-2.183) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.178 
(-1.621) 
-0.226** 
(-1.997) 
-0.173 
(-1.548) 
-0.196* 
(-1.790) 
-0.179 
(-1.635) 
-0.182* 
(-1.697) 
-0.179 
(-1.635) 
Egypt 
 
-0.071 
(-0.306) 
-0.265 
(-1.125) 
-0.153 
(-0.634) 
-0.142 
(-0.586) 
-0.147 
(-0.605) 
-0.158 
(-0.657) 
-0.156 
(-0.621) 
-0.161 
(-0.682) 
-0.149 
(-0.603) 
Lebanon 
 
-0.237 
(-1.007) 
-0.618** 
(-2.603) 
-0.567** 
(-2.313) 
-0.490** 
(-1.967) 
-0.550** 
(-2.183) 
-0.436* 
(-1.757) 
-0.573** 
(-2.088) 
-0.537*** 
(-2.240) 
-0.568** 
(-2.317) 
Saudi Arabia 
 
0.333 
(1.105) 
0.666** 
(2.196) 
0.649** 
(2.064) 
0.517 
(1.594) 
0.651** 
(2.069) 
0.693** 
(2.211) 
0.645** 
(1.968) 
0.670** 
(2.184) 
0.649** 
(2.064) 
Tunisia 
 
-0.337 
(-1.142) 
-0.710** 
(-2.369) 
-0.555* 
(-1.760) 
-0.446 
(-1.419) 
-0.548* 
(-1.777) 
-0.471 
(-1.529) 
-0.553* 
(-1.697) 
-0.528* 
(-1.721) 
-0.547* 
(-1.773) 
United Arab 
UAE 
 
-0.076 
(-0.312) 
0.438* 
(1.785) 
0.256* 
(0.999) 
0.232 
(0.917) 
0.257 
(1.013) 
0.288 
(1.139) 
0.256 
(0.965) 
0.251 
(1.013) 
0.267 
(1.000) 
YEAR=2002 
 
-0.185* 
(-1.707) 
-0.328** 
(-2.965) 
-0.229** 
(-2.017) 
-0.242** 
(-2.129) 
-0.228** 
(-2.007) 
-0.240** 
(-2.122) 
-0.229** 
(-2.020) 
-0.281** 
(-2.184) 
-0.229** 
(-2.015) 
YEAR=2003 
 
-0.190* 
(-1.793) 
-0.195 
(-1.809) 
-0.185 
(-1.666) 
-0.204* 
(-1.831) 
-0.183* 
(-1.648) 
-0.200* 
(-1.804) 
-0.186* 
(-1.658) 
-0.245* 
(-1.943) 
-0.184 
(-1.656) 
YEAR=2005 
 
0.022 
(0.208) 
0.180* 
(1.695) 
0.179 
(1.633) 
0.139 
(1.244) 
0.180 
(1.641) 
0.157 
(1.440) 
0.177 
(1.581) 
0.123 
(0.992) 
0.178 
(1.627) 
YEAR=2009 
 
-0.269*** 
(-2.615) 
-0.180* 
(-1.734) 
-0.174 
(-1.624) 
-0.250** 
(-2.137) 
-0.174 
(-1.626) 
-0.193* 
(-1.800) 
-0.176 
(-1.566) 
-0.140 
(-1.102) 
-0.171 
(-1.481) 
YEAR=2010 
 
-0.218** 
(-2.137) 
-0.152 
(-1.481) 
-0.116 
(-1.091) 
-0.194 
(-1.667) 
-0.116 
(-1.096) 
-0.130 
(-1.231) 
-0.117 
(-1.052) 
-0.154 
(-1.259) 
-0.111 
(-0.960) 
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YEAR=2011 
 
-0.334*** 
(-3.257) 
-0.301*** 
(-2.898) 
-0.283*** 
(-2.639) 
-0.365*** 
(-3.081) 
-0.285*** 
(-2.653) 
-0.315*** 
(-2.932) 
-0.285*** 
(-2.534) 
-0.344*** 
(-2.742) 
-0.279** 
(-2.331) 
YEAR=2012 
 
-0.291*** 
(-2.819) 
-0.213** 
(-2.037) 
-0.212** 
(-1.969) 
-0.302** 
(-2.495) 
-0.215 
(-1.989) 
-0.246** 
(-2.281) 
-0.214 
(-1.906) 
-0.269** 
(-2.181) 
-0.208 
(-1.694) 
CONSTAN 
 
6.130*** 
(15.028) 
2.885*** 
(9.751) 
2.538 
(10.255) 
1.705 
(2.975) 
2.448 
(6.355) 
2.465*** 
(10.156) 
2.552 
(7.595) 
2.561 
(10.378) 
2.588*** 
(4.657) 
R
2
-Adjusted  
 
0.39 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33 
F-stat  
 
Prob 
7.047296 
0.0000 
6.189164 
0.000000 
5.685791 
0.000000 
5.716775 
0.000000 
5.686882 
0.000000 
5.788591 
0.000000 
5.685702 
0.000000 
5.739210 
0.000000 
5.685779 
0.000000 
Hausaman test  
 
57.828939 
 
0.0003 
65.074801 
0.0000 
70.959841 
0.0000 
64.517722 
0.0000 
70.471147 
0.0000 
66.947515 
0.0000 
68.039434 
0.0000 
54.768142 
0.0008 
70.046907 
0.0000 
*significant at the 10% level 
**significant at the 5% level 
***significant at 1% level 
L=Log, ROE= return on average equity, COST = cost to income ratio, EQAS = equity to average total assets, SECAST = securities to 
average total assets, SIZE = average total assets, LOFUND = net loans to total deposits, EXPTEC =spending on technological items and 
fixed assets, CR = the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI), GDPGR =real gross domestic, INF =the annual inflation rate, Fore =dummy for 
foreign ownership , state, dummy of state ownership 
Table 3.14 Regression results using fixed effects for bank performance using log (ROA) 
as dependent variable 
𝑳𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑪𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝑴𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝑳𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝒆𝒒𝒂𝒔𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑳𝒍𝒐𝒇𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑳𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒈𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟖 𝑳𝒈𝒅𝒑𝒈𝒓𝒊𝒕 + 𝒀𝟗 𝑳𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒕 + 𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 + 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 + 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏
+ 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓  
Variable Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
CR 
 
0.036 
(0.048) 
0.570 
(0.752) 
-0.084 
(-0.112) 
 
MS 
 
0.066 
(1.398) 
0.051 
(1.142)  
 
LCOST 
 
-1.240*** 
(-15.047) 
-1.226*** 
(-14.555) 
-1.244*** 
(-15.096) 
-1.244*** 
(-15.111) 
LEQAS 
 
0.555*** 
(7.319) 
0.575*** 
(7.421) 
0.562*** 
(7.430) 
0.562*** 
(7.436) 
LSECAST 
 
-0.020 
(-0.683) 
-0.005 
(-0.196) 
-0.016 
(-0.557) 
-0.016 
(-0.566) 
LSIZE 
 
-0.217*** 
(-3.944) 
-0.190*** 
(-3.516) 
-0.156*** 
(-4.632) 
-0.156*** 
(-4.632) 
LLOFUND 
 
-0.119 
(-1.501) 
-0.116 
(-1.442) 
-0.114 
(-1.430) 
-0.113 
(-1.427) 
LEXPTEC 
 
0.157*** 
(3.948) 
0.151*** 
(3.682) 
0.159*** 
(3.982) 
0.158*** 
(4.011) 
LLOAREASG 
 
-0.127*** 
(-3.788) 
-0.153*** 
(-4.465) 
-0.123*** 
(-3.699) 
-0.124*** 
(-3.720) 
LGDPGR 
 
0.006 
(0.260) 
 0.009 
(0.375) 
0.009 
(0.366) 
LINF 
 
0.098 
(1.113) 
 0.087 
(0.990) 
0.086 
(0.987) 
FORE 
 
0.158 
(1.500) 
0.138 
(1.258) 
0.159 
(1.505) 
0.159 
(1.508) 
STATE 
 
0.141 
(1.475) 
0.128 
(1.280) 
0.144 
(1.505) 
0.144 
(1.507) 
Saudi Arabia 
 
0.655** 
(2.541) 
0.668*** 
(2.492) 
0.596** 
(2.344) 
0.605** 
(2.509) 
Tunisia 
 
-1.700*** 
(-4.663) 
-1.356*** 
(-3.685) 
-1.595*** 
(-4.469) 
-1.584*** 
(-4.633) 
United Arab UAE 
 
0.249 
(1.148) 
0.383* 
(1.779) 
0.228 
(1.052) 
0.236 
(1.155) 
90 
 
YEAR=2011 
 
-0.066 
(-0.382) 
-0.115 
(-0.839) 
-0.231* 
(-1.820) 
-0.227* 
(-1.879) 
CONSTANT 
 
7.083*** 
(6.057) 
6.945 
(6.054) 
6.133*** 
(6.440) 
6.106*** 
(-1.441) 
R
2
-Adj 0.65 0.63 0.65 0.65 
F-stat 15.47777 14.73692 15.55583 15.67956 
Prob 0.00000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Hausman Test 
 
94.581201 
0.0000 
86.119432 
0.0000 
91.819873 
0.0000 
91.993789 
0.0000 
*significant at the 10% level 
**significant at the 5% level 
***significant at 1% level 
 L= log, ROA= return on average equity,  COST = cost to income ratio, EQAS = equity to average total assets, SECAST = securities to 
average total assets, SIZE = average total assets, LOFUND = net loans to total deposits, EXPTEC =spending on technological items and 
fixed assets, Loaresg =Loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio (L𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐺) as a measure for credit quality and credit allocation, CR = the 
Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI), MS = market share of the assets of first largest bank, GDPGR =real gross domestic, INF =the annual 
inflation rate, Fore =dummy for foreign ownership, state, dummy of state ownership 
 
3.6.2 Empirical results of (GMM) first differences Model 
Tables 3.15, 3.16 and 3.17 report the regression results of the estimation of model (3.8) using 
return on average assets as the profitability variable. Estimations of GMM revealed stable 
coefficient as the Sargan test indicates no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. Even 
though the equations imply that negative first-order autocorrelation exist, it does not mean 
that estimates are inconsistent (Arrelano and Bond, 1991). The highly significant coefficient 
of lagged profitability measured by ROE and lagged net interest margin (NIM) at 10% and 
1% confirm the dynamic character of the model specification for MENA commercial banks. 
Table 3.15 Regression results using GMM (First differences) for bank profitability 
using Log ROA as dependent variable 
𝑳𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑳𝑹𝑶𝑨 (−𝟏) + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑭𝑼𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑺𝑮𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕 𝑳𝑬𝑿𝑷𝑻𝑬𝑪) + 𝜶𝟏𝑪𝑹𝒋𝒕 +  𝜶𝟐𝑴𝑺𝒋𝒕
+ 𝜸𝟐𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒋𝒕 + 𝜸𝟐𝑳𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒋𝒕 + 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻 + 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 
Variable  First difference  First difference First difference First difference  
LROA(-1) 
 
0.001 
(0.169) 
0.001 
(0.180) 
-0.053*** 
(-4.042) 
-0.054*** 
(-4.019) 
LCOST 
 
-1.77*** 
(-23.50) 
-1.77*** 
(-24.68) 
-1.612*** 
(-16.56) 
-1.581*** 
(-16.18) 
LEQAS 
 
0.586*** 
(6.189) 
0.568*** 
(6.315) 
0.633*** 
(6.827) 
0.633*** 
(7.176) 
LSECAST 
 
0.00 
(0.033) 
-0.005 
(-0.189) 
-0.005 
(-0.226) 
-0.016 
(-0.660) 
LSIZE 
 
-0.329*** 
(-5.280) 
-0.277*** 
(-9.285) 
-0.226*** 
(-6.793) 
-0.221*** 
(-6.956) 
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LLOFUND 
 
-0.319*** 
(-4.088) 
-0.317*** 
(-4.274) 
-0.455*** 
(-4.728) 
-0.448*** 
(-4.656) 
LLOARESG 
 
-0.432*** 
(-9.797) 
-0.413*** 
(-10.59) 
-0.457*** 
(-7.613) 
-0.460*** 
(-8.286) 
LEXPTEC 
 
0.512*** 
(13.95) 
0.505**** 
(13.84) 
0.574*** 
(11.42) 
0.548*** 
(11.43) 
CR 
 
0.292 
(0.284) 
0.688 
(0.798) 
3.497*** 
(3.221) 
3.644*** 
(3.605) 
MS 
 
0.954 
(0.840) 
   
LGDPGR 
 
-0.007 
(-0.564) 
-0.006 
(-0.505) 
  
LINF 
 
-0.075 
(-1.034) 
-0.053 
(-0.858) 
-0.039 
(-0.530) 
 
FORE 
 
0.418** 
(2.257) 
0.495** 
(2.53) 
0.604*** 
(3.11) 
0.619*** 
(3.206) 
STATE 
 
0.289 
(1.573) 
0.355** 
(2.029) 
0.266 
(1.619) 
0.365** 
(2.287) 
2001 
 
-0.033 
(-1.200) 
-0.032 
(-1.062) 
-0.036 
(-1.135) 
-0.035 
(-1.103) 
2002 
 
-0.055** 
(-2.258) 
-0.063*** 
(-2.692) 
-0.077** 
(-2.537) 
-0.075 
(-2.454) 
2004 
 
-0.103 
(-1.648) 
-0.113** 
(-2.006) 
-0.146** 
(-2.237) 
-0.144*** 
(-2.215) 
2009 
 
-0.045 
(-1.531) 
-0.048 
(-1.643) 
-0.128*** 
(-3.954) 
-0.129*** 
(-3.914) 
2010 
 
0.066** 
(2.49) 
0.060** 
(2.27) 
0.138*** 
(5.612) 
0.137 
(5.724) 
2011 
 
-0.028 
(-1.086) 
-0.032 
(-1.142) 
-0.055** 
(-2.078) 
-0.056** 
(-2.18) 
2012 
 
0.019 
(1.160) 
0.015 
(1.071) 
0.033 
(2.376) 
0.034 
(2.428) 
Sargan test  
p-value 
67.49135 
0.460196 
68.63240 
0.455720 
73.06676 
0.315263 
73.16571 
0.312398 
*Arellano-Bond test AR(1)in first 
difference P-value 
-5.701222 
0.0000 
-4.277137 
0.0000 
-3.754727 
0.0002 
-4.021250 
0.0001 
**Arellano-Bond test AR(2)in 
first difference P-value 
-0.425490 
0.6705 
-0.610595 
0.5415 
0.412003 
0.6803 
0.448022 
0.6541 
*significant at the 10% level 
**significant at the 5% level 
***significant at 1% level 
 L= log, ROA= return on average assets,  COST = cost to income ratio, EQAS = equity to average total assets, SECAST = securities to 
average total assets, SIZE = average total assets, LOFUND = net loans to total deposits, Loaresg =Loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio as 
a measure for credit  quality and credit allocation , EXPTEC =spending on fixed assets, CR = the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI), MS = 
market share of the assets of first largest bank, GDPGR =real gross domestic, INF =the annual inflation rate, Fore =dummy for foreign 
ownership, state, dummy of state ownership. 
*Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). 
**Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation).  
 
Tables show the coefficient of cost management measured by (cost/income) is statistically 
significant at 1% and negatively associated with the profitability of commercial banks to 
confirm the previous models (least squares, fixed effects or random effects). Furthermore, 
this result is in line with others who have used GMM (Athansoglou et al., 2008; Dietrich and 
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Wanzenried, 2011; Dietrich and Wanzernried, 2014 and Bejaoui and Bouzgarrou, 2014) 
which supports the expectation that the more inefficient the bank, the lower its profitability 
(Hypothesis 4). This outcome emphasises that efficient cost management is necessary to 
enhance the profitability of banks. In other words, it can be said that the negative impact 
implies there is a lack of operating expenditures management as well as excess staff, both of 
which negatively affect the efficiency. In some cases, banks pass part of their increased 
expenses to customers and the remaining part to profits. 
The coefficient of capital adequacy which is defined as (equity/assets) is positive and highly 
significant at 1% level for log of ROA and log of NIM reflecting the sound financial 
condition of commercial banks in MENA economies. This result is similar to least squares 
either fixed effects or random effects and supporting hypothesis (3) and findings of recent 
studies used GMM (Athansoglou et al., 2008; Garcia-Herreo et al., 2009; Dietrich and 
Wanzenried, 2011; Trujillo-Ponce, 2013; Dietrich and Wanzernried, 2014 and Bejaoui and 
Bouzgarrou, 2014). In developing economies such as MENA, this finding can be considered 
by different stakeholders as the degree of bank capitalisation and may be a concern for 
proactive investors and depositors (Garcia-Herreo et al., 2009). Such a fact appears to be the 
consensus in the previous studies, suggesting that more capital leads to reduced costs of 
external debt and therefore better solvency (Trujillo-Ponce, 2013). The researcher in this 
study expected banks with a lower equity ratios to bear more risk, leading to higher returns, 
but according to the argument that well-capitalised banks are safer compared to those with 
lower capital adequacy, banks may face lower costs of funding as a result of lower potential 
bankruptcy costs (Garcia-Herreo et al., 2009; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011; Trujillo-Ponce, 
2013; Dietrich and Wanzernried, 2014). In contrast, the negative impact of banks’ capital on 
the ROE explains that bearing more capital has a negative effect on the ROE. Such result 
reflects the fact that banks with more equity have a lower ROE. 
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With regards to the impact of bank size, I argue that the larger banks, the larger the number of 
employees and the more bureaucratic procedures which in turn affects negatively bank 
performance. the results showed that  bank size (SIZE) which is measured by average total 
assets is found to have a negative and statistically significant effect on profitability (ROA and 
ROE) and bank operating performance (NIM) confirming  hypothesis (5). The results imply 
diseconomies of scale for MENA commercial banks. Obamuyi (2013) and Tan and Floros 
(2012) suggested that the negative relationship could be that, as the banks are becoming 
extremely large, the bureaucratic procedures have negatively affected their performance. 
Also, Chen and Liao (2011) highlighted that the negative coefficients of bank size indicates 
that larger banks tend to make lower profits, whereas smaller banks are likely to gain more 
profits. The forced mergers and acquisitions of banks in Nigeria in 2006, where the number 
of banks declined from 89 banks to 24 groups of banks led to a decrease of returns of banks. 
Therefore, banking regulators and policy makers should pay more attention to merger 
decisions since they are more likely to have negative than positive effect in the profitability 
of the banks and the financial sector. In addition, Trujillo-Ponce (2013) stated that lager and 
diversified banks tend to perform poorly, suggesting that smaller banks can more efficiently 
reduce asymmetric information problems related to lending. Also, Obamuyi (2014) argued 
that smaller banks experience economies of scale, while larger banks reveal diseconomies of 
scale and providing more support to other studies that showed that smaller banks enjoy 
economies of scale and scope and diseconomies for larger firms (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 
2007, and Chen and Laio, 2011). 
The spending on fixed assets is found to have a positive effect on profitability of banks, 
confirming the findings of the previous models, implying that spending on fixed assets plays 
a role in making banks more profitable as it is statistically significant and positively impacts 
bank profitability and performance. According to this result, it can be justified that foreign 
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ownership and financial deregulations taken place over this period may be forced commercial 
banks to increase their investments in fixed assets and greater banking techniques. Chelo and 
Manlagnit (2011), Chen and Liao (2011), and Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) pointed out 
that foreign bank entry is associated with spillover effects on the banking sector through their 
ownership-specific advantages and possession of technology and through increase in 
competition. Further, financial liberalisation and reforms can facilitate development of 
banking industry in terms of human capital, reduced overheads, better allocative efficiency, 
and technology transfer and diffusion.  
In respect to credit quality and measured by loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio 
(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐺), it can be observed that from analyses results, this variable is found to have a 
statistically significant negative and rather robust impact on profitability of commercial banks 
in all regression cases, confirming and what others found (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014; 
Ahmad et al., 2012; Bejaoui and Bouzgarrou, 2014; Trujillo-Ponce, 2013 and Alper and 
Anbar, 2011).The control of credit quality remains a debatable matter especially in the case 
of developing economies. Confirming with (Ahmad et al., 2012) I suggest that commercial 
banks operating in MENA need to pay attention to reduce loss on loans by implementing 
effective recovery and advancing of loans policy because less loss on loans portfolios leads to 
higher profitability for banks and stability of the whole economy. In Spanish banking sector, 
Trujillo-Ponce (2013) documented this variable is a very important determinant as 
profitability decreased significantly and such relationships could exist because an increase in 
the doubtful assets, which do not accrue income, requires a bank to allocate a major 
percentage of its gross margin to provision to cover expected credit losses; therefore, 
profitability will be dropped. 
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Table 3.16 Regression results using GMM (First differences) for bank profitability 
using ROE as dependent variable 
𝑳𝑹𝑶𝑬𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑳𝑹𝑶𝑬 (−𝟏) + 𝜷𝟐 𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒 𝑳𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓 𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑭𝑼𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑺𝑮𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕 𝑳𝑬𝑿𝑷𝑻𝑬𝑪) + 𝜶𝟏𝑪𝑹𝒋𝒕 +  𝜶𝟐𝑴𝑺𝒋𝒕
+ 𝜸𝟐𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒋𝒕 + 𝜸𝟐𝑳𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒋𝒕 + 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻 + 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 
Variable First difference First difference  First difference  
LROE(-1) 
 
0.026* 
(1.749) 
0.023* 
(1.753) 
0.025* 
(1.819) 
LCOST 
 
-1.873*** 
(-20.72) 
-1.789*** 
(-21.69) 
-1.709*** 
(-19.88) 
LEQAS 
 
-1.330*** 
(-14.348) 
-1.298*** 
(-15.078) 
-1.292*** 
(-14.55) 
LSECAST 
 
-0.019 
(-0.610) 
-0.057** 
(-2.249) 
-0.07*** 
(-2.733) 
LSIZE 
 
-0.013 
(-0.132) 
-0.250*** 
(-7.447) 
-0.245*** 
(-6.982) 
LLOFUND 
 
-0.319*** 
(-3.256) 
-0.404*** 
(-5.095) 
-0.400*** 
(-4.921) 
LEXPTEC 
 
0.176** 
(2.341) 
0.201*** 
(3.155) 
0.153*** 
(2.454) 
LLOARESG 
 
-0.232*** 
(-4.750) 
-0.291*** 
(-6.411) 
-0.295*** 
(-6.484) 
CR 
 
-3.672*** 
(-3.140) 
-4.970*** 
(-4.946) 
-4.952*** 
(-4.960) 
MS 
 
-3.935** 
(-2.441) 
  
LGDPGR 
 
0.102*** 
(5.056) 
0.120*** 
(6.595) 
0.124*** 
( 6.71) 
LINF 
 
0.029 
(0.270) 
-0.000 
(-0.001) 
 
FORE 
 
-0.133 
(-0.840) 
-0.334** 
(-2.027) 
-0.337** 
(-2.128) 
STATE 
 
-0.152 
(-1.337) 
-0.238 
(-2.287) 
-0.236** 
(-2.255) 
2003 
 
-0.109*** 
(-2.856) 
-0.139*** 
(-3.577) 
-0.137*** 
(-3.576) 
2004 
 
-0.092 
(-1.145) 
-0.196*** 
(-2.593) 
-0.194** 
(-2.520) 
2005 
 
0.094 
(0.953) 
0.233** 
(2.505) 
0.252*** 
(2.828) 
2006 
 
-0.205*** 
(-2.954) 
-0.162** 
(-2.446) 
-0.158 
(-2.255) 
2007 
 
-0.142* 
(-1.853) 
-0.050 
(-0.805) 
-0.060 
(-0.94) 
2010 
 
0.027 
(1.053) 
0.064*** 
(2.809) 
0.066 
(2.860) 
2011 
 
-0.004 
(-0.148) 
0.004 
(0.176) 
0.006 
(0.245) 
2012 
 
0.031* 
(1.735) 
0.059*** 
(4.447) 
0.063 
(4.469) 
Sargan test  
p-value 
64.92546 
0.616708 
68.55778 
0.526414 
68.97969 
0.512048 
*Arellano-Bond test 
AR(1)in first difference 
P-value 
-6.312862 
0.0000 
-4.981712 
0.0000 
-5.091441 
0.0000 
**Arellano-Bond test 
AR(2)in first difference 
-1.637001 
0.1016 
-1.107742 
0.2680 
-1.182408 
0.2370 
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P-value 
*significant at the 10% level 
**significant at the 5% level 
***significant at 1% level 
L= log, ROE= return on average equity,  COST = cost to income ratio, EQAS = equity to average total assets, SECAST = securities to 
average total assets, SIZE = average total assets, LOFUND = net loans to total deposits, Loaresg =Loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio as 
a measure for credit  quality and credit allocation, EXPTEC =spending on fixed assets, CR = the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI), MS = 
market share of the assets of first largest bank, GDPGR =real gross domestic, INF =the annual inflation rate, Fore =dummy for foreign 
ownership, state, dummy of state ownership. 
*Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). 
**Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation).  
 
With respect to the market structure (CR), results suggest that in some regressions there is a 
positive relationship between market concentration and profitability (ROA) in MENA banks. 
The sign of the coefficient is positive and significant, supporting the hypothesis of SCP 
stressing that banks in concentrated markets yield monopoly profits and hypothesis (1) is 
supported. The point that the impact of market concentration is positive in MENA can be 
further evidence and is in line with the findings of Dietrich and Wanzernied (2014).  For 
macroeconomic variables, the inflation is found to be positively and significantly related net 
interest margin. This fact is explained by theory that banks in inflation periods are more 
profitable and that management for those banks seems to anticipate future inflation 
satisfactorily, which in turn indicates that interest rates have been properly adjusted. The 
effect of GDPGR on bank profitability using ROE is statistically and positive, which implies 
that bank profits in MENA is generated in the growing economic period.  
The results regarding the ownership structure found some support for banks with foreign 
ownership are more profitable than domestic banks, which is in line with other results 
obtained by least square (OLS, fixed effect and random effect). Overall, such findings 
confirm previous studies (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 1999; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014; and 
Farazi el al., 2011). Banks with foreign ownership in MENA are more likely to overcome any 
informational disadvantages relative to domestic banks through superior banking technology.  
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Table3.17 Regression results using GMM (First differences) for bank performance 
using NIM as dependent variable 
𝑳𝑵𝑰𝑴𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑳𝑵𝑰𝑴(−𝟏) + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑭𝑼𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑳𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑺𝑮𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕 𝑳𝑬𝑿𝑷𝑻𝑬𝑪) + 𝜶𝟏𝑪𝑹𝒋𝒕 +  𝜶𝟐𝑴𝑺𝒋𝒕
+ 𝜸𝟐𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒋𝒕 + 𝜸𝟐𝑳𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒋𝒕 + 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻 + 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 
Variable  First difference  First difference  First difference  First difference 
LNIM(-1) 
 
0.137*** 
(8.289) 
0.138*** 
(8.080) 
0.143*** 
(8.702) 
0.144*** 
(8.789) 
LCOST 
 
-0.199*** 
(-3.099) 
-0.165*** 
(-2.638) 
-0.235*** 
(-4.398) 
-0.226*** 
(-4.503) 
LEQAS 
 
0.346*** 
(8.273) 
0.349*** 
(8.858) 
0.344*** 
(11.58) 
0.344*** 
(11.61) 
LSECAST 
 
0.048*** 
(4.305) 
0.047*** 
(4.168) 
0.048*** 
(4.065) 
0.047*** 
(4.051) 
LSIZE 
 
-0.131*** 
(-3.280) 
-0.133*** 
(-3.235) 
-0.081** 
(-1.95) 
-0.102*** 
(-3.01) 
LLOFUND 
 
0.055 
(1.031) 
0.056 
(1.134) 
  
LEXPTEC 
 
0.042 
(1.117) 
   
LLOARESG 
 
-0.147*** 
(-5.543) 
-0.139*** 
(-5.17) 
-0.138*** 
(-5.466) 
-0.143*** 
(-6.230) 
CR 
 
-0.816 
(-1.166) 
-0.354 
(-0.521) 
-0.469 
(-0.672)  
MS 
 
-0.048 
(-0.066) 
0.090 
(0.125) 
-0.071 
(-0.104) 
 
LGDPGR 
 
-0.199*** 
(-9.37) 
-0.188*** 
(-9.163) 
-0.171*** 
(-8.776) 
-0.175*** 
(-9.057) 
LINF 
 
0.451*** 
(3.967) 
0.484*** 
(4.391) 
0.481*** 
(4.562) 
0.473*** 
(4.630) 
FORE 
 
0.020 
(0.203) 
0.039 
(0.394) 
-0.055 
(-0.560) 
-0.002 
(-0.021) 
STATE 
 
-0.491*** 
(-3.431) 
-0.467*** 
(-3.156) 
-0.546*** 
(-3.742) 
-0.492*** 
(-4.368) 
2001 
 
-0.149*** 
(-4.886) 
-0.135*** 
(-4.861) 
-0.132*** 
(-4.961) 
-0.132*** 
(-5.025) 
2009 
 
-0.143*** 
(-7.51) 
-0.145*** 
(-8.087) 
-0.141*** 
(-8.835) 
-0.136*** 
(-8.207) 
2010 
 
-0.008 
(-0.581) 
-0.008 
(-0.641) 
-0.002 
(-0.219) 
-0.001 
(-0.118) 
2011 
 
-0.058*** 
(-3.739) 
-0.054*** 
(-3.831) 
-0.047*** 
(-3.276) 
-0.049 
(-3.332) 
Sargan test  
p-value 
68.00924 
0.442627 
67.55486 
0.492427 
68.30357 
0.466855 
68.18565 
0.539106 
*Arellano-Bond test 
AR(1)in first difference P-
value 
-4.756441 
0.0000 
-4.662228 
0.0000 
-4.287358 
0.0000 
-4.216813 
0.0000 
**Arellano-Bond test 
AR(2)in first difference P-
value 
1.310499 
0.1900 
1.370154 
0.1706 
1.058820 
0.2897 
1.340797 
0.1800 
*significant at the 10% level 
**significant at the 5% level 
***significant at 1% level 
L= log, NIM= net interest margin , COST = cost to income ratio, EQAS = equity to average total assets, SECAST = securities to average 
total assets, SIZE = average total assets, LOFUND = net loans to total deposits, Loaresg =Loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio as a 
measure for credit  quality and credit allocation , EXPTEC =spending on fixed assets, CR = the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI), MS = 
market share of the assets of first largest bank, GDPGR =real gross domestic, INF =the annual inflation rate, Fore =dummy for foreign 
ownership, state, dummy of state ownership. 
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*Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). 
**Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation).  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to investigate determinants of MENA banks profitability in 
the context of SCP and EH hypotheses. Also, to examine whether banks that operate in 
concentrated markets in are able to make monopoly profits and to investigate if the relation 
between market structure and banks’ profitability is due to banks superior efficiency. 
The thesis finds varying levels of market concentration, ranging from continuously low levels 
(Lebanon), high concentration that decreased to medium level (Morocco, Egypt) and to low 
level (Tunisia), medium concentration during the whole period examined (Saudi Arabia, 
UAE), and high level of concentration (Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan). However, 
Market concentration is used then as an input in the other models alongside other variables 
that examine the determinants of bank performance under different assumptions.  
In particular, I then examine whether a bank’s performance can be better explained by the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis, that claims that a highly concentrated 
market leads to collusive behaviour among larger banks, resulting in superior performance 
hypothesis or by the efficient hypothesis (EH) that claims that the positive association of 
market share of a bank and higher performance is caused by the bank’s superior efficiency.  
First, the results of panel analysis and GMM estimators provide evidence that the SCP 
hypothesis is not rejected, emphasising that increased market power yields monopoly profits. 
Second, Market share (MS) is found in OLS, fixed effects regressions to be positive and 
highly significantly different from zero, whilst market concentration is equal to zero, 
supporting the argument that if a bank enjoys a higher degree of efficiency in respect to good 
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management and technology than its competitors, it can easily gain a larger market share by 
lowering its prices and earning economic profits. 
Also, in this context, the aim of this thesis is to examine the effect of bank-specific, industry-
specific and macroeconomic factors on the performance of MENA commercial banks, so that 
the findings to be used by regulators, policymakers and other stakeholders to optimise 
managerial, human and capital resources and to enhance viability of and confidence in the 
financial system.  
The possible implications of this chapter for bank management and regulation are as follows, 
the empirical analysis that investigated the impact of market structure on profitability showed 
collusive power in some cases of the banking industry which asserts that increased market 
power yields monopoly profits supporting the SCP hypothesis. Therefore, the high profits 
were the consequence of higher market concentration and collusion, the provision of financial 
services would hinder potential development of the MENA economy. This finding has 
important implications for the MENA banking industry. It shows that higher profits influence 
regulatory decision in terms of mergers which can be used by regulators and policymakers to 
reassess the market structure and performance so as to decide whether they should intervene 
to change market structure so as to enhance competition and quality of banking services and 
to deter insolvency. Nevertheless, other regressions in this chapter supported the competing 
hypothesis (EH) that if a bank enjoys a higher degree of efficiency in respect of good 
management and technology than its competitors, the bank can easily gain a larger market 
share by lowering its prices and earning economic profits. This principle can encourage 
commercial banks to improve their efficiency by enhancing the abilities of their management 
and investing more in advanced technology to reduce operational costs. 
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Moreover, findings showed that larger the capital ratios (Equity to Assets) the more profitable 
the banks, implying that regulators should insure that MENA commercial banks to remain 
better capitalised in order to earn profits, withstand financial crisis and avoid insolvency. 
Bank size in terms of total assets in MENA economies contributed in reducing profitability 
implying that larger banks were less efficient than small banks. Such a fact is considered to 
be important to regulators, policymaker, bank managers, and prospective investors at the 
MENA economies as to highlight that growing in total assets by acquisition or mergers may 
not be appropriate and effective in this region. The negative impact of size on profitability 
could be attributed to increased bureaucratic procedures and other factors relating to an 
increase in the number of employees, departmental expenditures and appointing of unskilled 
staff. The findings also confirm that spending on fixed assets contributes to making banks 
more profitable, justifying that these investments in MENA economies further develop and 
expand the operations of banks through creating new services in order to be more competitive 
and profitable. My analysis also indicates that commercial banks in the MENA economies are 
still conservative or showing an unwillingness or inability to create new banking investments 
as banks in this region tend to invest in lower risk investments such government bonds, 
treasury bills, bonds and deposits in overseas. In spite of deregulation of banking systems, 
commercial banks in MENA still have higher costs which result in lower profits. In order for 
MENA commercial banks to be competitive and more profitable, they should further reduce 
their operating costs, particularly those of the state banks which tend to be overstaffed. I also 
found that some macroeconomic factors, namely GDP growth and inflation, affect profits. 
GDP growth (GRGDP) had a significant and positive effect on ROA, but also a negative and 
significant impact on net interest margin. The inflation (inf) was found to have higher and 
positive relationship with net interest margin. A possible explanation is that in the inflation 
period, banking industry costs lead to more transactions and commonly to more extensive 
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branch networks, and finally to higher profit revenues showing that during inflation period 
banks effectively shift their costs to customers and increase their profits.  
Finally, the study found that banks with foreign ownership are more profitable and perform 
better than state banks. This result can be explained by foreign banks’ technological 
advantages which can be strong enough to overcome any informational disadvantages in 
lending or raising funds locally. The researcher could argue that foreign banks tend to make 
lower profits than domestic banks in well-developed economies because entering into the 
market of industrial and well-developed economies is more difficult due to high costs and 
strong regulations. In addition, foreign banks’ technological and efficiency advantages in 
developed economies can be insignificant, while facing higher informational and reputational 
disadvantages.  
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Chapter Four 
Assessing Banking Competition in MENA 
Economies 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The degree of competition in the financial sector is an important matter for the efficiency of 
the production of financial services. Further, specific to the banking sector, the financial 
stability can be influenced by excessive competition as it has been acknowledged in 
theoretical and empirical studies. The dynamic role of commercial banks in the economy 
makes the issue of banking competition extremely important. Moreover, a strong relationship 
between competition and growth has long been recognised (Bikker et al., 2012). Also, it has 
been documented that the degree of competition in the banking industry matters as it enables 
firms and households to access financial services and external financing which in turn affects 
the overall economic growth. 
More stable financial and banking systems need to have careful planning and international 
cooperation in order to avoid world financial failure or collapse. This is imperative also from 
the viewpoint of competition authorities as the banking industry is a main deriver of 
economic welfare, stability and growth (Abuzayed et al., 2012; Awdeh et al., 2013; 
Claessens, 2009). As mentioned in Chapter One, financial sectors in the MENA economies 
are still in the early stages of economic development. Capital markets are still weak or almost 
non-existent, and financial markets are dominated by bank-financed credit mechanisms. 
Therefore, testing degrees of effective competition is important for relaxing enforcement 
standards to support economic recovery. As in other economies, the degree of competition in 
103 
 
the banking sector should be measured in terms of actual behaviour of (marginal) bank 
conduct. The policy implications of such concerns are particularly relevant since regulators 
have traditionally employed market structure as a policy variable to recommend measures 
aimed at increasing competition, stimulating financial liberalization and eliminating entry 
barriers for foreign banks  (Turk-Ariss, 2009; Bikker et al., 2012). 
Research on competitiveness of the banking industry in MENA countries is not as common 
as research from Europe, United States and Canada. It is believed this study is the first of this 
kind to cover a large sample of 11 MENA countries for an extended and recent period (14 
years) using panel data analysis. This chapter investigates the degree of competition in 
MENA economies over the period 1999-2012 using 𝐻statistic of Panzar and Rosse to 
measure monopoly power.  
The structure of this chapter is organised as follows. Section two is a review of banking 
literature employed by the Panzar-Rosse model and hypotheses. Section three discusses the 
empirical methodology of the Panzar-Rosse model and data, while section four presents 
empirical results relating to competitive conditions in the MENA markets. The conclusion 
and policy implication are undertaken in section five. 
4.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses development  
In the previous literature in respect to structural approaches such as SCP and EH assume that 
market concentration reduces competitive conditions in a market by adopting collusive 
behaviour among enterprises (Beger, 1995;  Bikker and Bos, 2008). Whilst, the non-structural 
paradigms state that other factors can show influence rather than market structure and 
concentration on market competition; for instance, boundaries to entry/exit and general 
contestability of the market (Panzar and Rosse, 1987). 
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Two non-structural empirical tests for competitive behaviour degree have been widely 
applied on the banking industry. One of models is found on conjectural variations proposed 
by Bresnahan (1982) allowing for the estimation of the competition degree using aggregate 
industry data based on the concept that profit maximising firm in equilibrium will select 
prices and quantities in a way that marginal costs equal their (perceived) marginal revenue. 
This will correspond with the demand price under perfect competition, or with the sector’s 
marginal revenue under collusion. Alternatively, the Panzar and Rosse (1987) model, that I 
use in this thesis and which is frequently applied in empirical banking studies, concentrates 
on the use of bank-level data to estimate the degree of banking competition. It estimates 
reduced-form equations relating gross revenue to a vector of input prices and other control 
variables (Panzar and Rosse 1987; Bikker et al., 2012). In order to investigate whether bank-
level conduct is in accordance with the perfect competition, monopolistic competition or 
monopoly, the H statistic is estimated as the sum of elasticities of gross revenue with respect 
to input prices. The structure and conduct of a market can be reflected by this statistic figure 
as it denotes the percentage variation of the equilibrium revenue derived from the unit per 
cent increase in the price of all factors utilised by a bank.  The estimated value of H statistic 
ranges between 0<H≤1. If H is zero or less than zero then the banking sector is monopoly as 
a result of the economic insight that a monopolist’s revenue will show a reaction in the 
opposite direction to a change in input prices. The market is considered to be monopolistic 
competition when H ranges between more than zero and less than one, but not with firm 
profit maximisation under monopoly conditions. Whilst, under perfect competition, an 
increase in input prices leads to having higher marginal costs and total revenues by the same 
amount of the costs raised. On the contrary, under a monopoly, the increase in input prices 
will cause increases in marginal costs, reduce equilibrium output, and therefore total revenues 
is reduced (Panzaer and Rosse, 1987; Claessens, 2009; Abuzayed, 2012). 
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Under long-term competitive equilibrium, total revenues are equivalently increased when 
input prices observed an increase, and a bank which is unable to cover the increase of input 
prices will be forced to exit the market. As inefficient banks are forced to exit the market, the 
remaining banks in the market will face demand increase leading to a rise in output prices and 
revenues in the same proportion as cost. Therefore, in that way, the H-statistic equals to one 
(Turk-Ariss, 2009; Awdeh et al., 2013; Gunalp and Celik, 2006; Claessens, 2009). 
The Panzar and Rosse model has been adopted by a large number of studies in both 
developed and developing economies. In respect to developed economies, the competition in 
various sectors of the Canadian financial industry (banks, mortgage corporations and trust 
companies) was investigated by Nathan and Neave (1989) employing cross-sectional data 
over the period 1982-1984. They concluded that banks operating in Canada operate under 
monopolistic competition and rejected the hypothesis that Canadian banks, trust companies 
and mortgage companies operate under monopoly and perfect competition. 
Molyneux et al. (1994) assessed the competitiveness degree by selecting a sample of banks 
operating in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain, finding that banks 
operating in each of the countries, apart from Italy, are under monopolistic competition, 
whereas Italian banks operate under monopoly condition. Also, Molyneux et al. (1996) 
investigated the competitive behaviour of Japanese commercial banks, suggesting that 
commercial banks in Japan were operating under monopoly in 1986 and then developed to 
operate under monopolistic competition in 1988. Back to Europe, De Rozas (2007) found that 
the Spanish banking sector is more competitive among lager banks and suggests that a 
remarkable increase in the degree of competition was identified at the turn of the eighties 
when numerous liberalisation-oriented policy measures came into force.  
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A growing body of literature has been also focused on emerging markets. Yildirim and 
Philippates (2002), Drakos and Konstantinou (2003), and Mamatzkis et al. (2005) assessing 
whether structural reforms have made the banking industry in central and Eastern Europe 
more competitive. Yildirim and Philippates (2002) indicated that the majority of banking 
industries cannot be considered as perfect competition or monopoly with the exception of 
Macedonia and Slovakia. Further, Drakos and Konstantinou (2003) suggested that banking 
sectors in those economies operate under monopolistic competition except for Latvia, and 
these findings also have been confirmed by Mamatzakis et al. (2005) suggested that the 
banking sector in South Eastern Europe operates under monopolistic competition. 
In the same context, the nature of competition in the Armenian banking industry has been 
examined by Mkrtchyan (2005), covering the period 1998-2002, and aiming at assessing the 
evolution of competitive structure during the recent transition and the possible forces- market 
power or efficiency contestability that underlie that evolution. Results are consistent with 
previous studies which indicate that the Armenian banking sector is best characterised as 
monopolistically competitive as in several other developing and developed European 
economies in recent years. Further, results also show that over the same period the banking 
industry in Armenia is characterised by increasing concentration, therefore supporting the 
market power hypothesis. 
Gunalp and Celik (2006) evaluated the competitive environment of the Turkish banking 
sector during the period 1990-2000. Their findings suggest that for the period under 
consideration, Turkish commercial banks gained their revenues under monopolistic 
competition condition and revealed that the high profitability of Turkish banking industry 
does not seem to indicate an increase in monopoly power as the banking competition is 
positively influenced by liberalisation process and deregulation measures. The degree of 
competition and concentration in the Turkish banking industry is also investigated by 
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Abbasoglu et al. (2007) using the data from the detailed balance sheet of Turkish banks that 
operated over the period 2001 and 2005. Their results reveal there is no relationship between 
concentration and competition suggesting that H-statistic was always between zero and one, 
which can be interpreted as evidence for the existence of monopolistic competition in the 
Turkish banking industry. Additionally, Aktan and Masood (2010) assessed the competitive 
structure of seventeen dominant banks in Turkish banking sector during the period 1998-2008 
and examine factors which can explain different degrees of competitiveness. Such a model is 
utilised to test for the competitive state of the industry, which also provides the measure of 
competition. Empirical findings of the study imply that the Turkish banking sector is in an 
equilibrium state, further they enjoy long running equilibrium. Moreover, they also found 
banks operating in Turkey can make profits under conditions of monopolistic competition. In 
contrast of this argument (Memic, 2015) investigated the market structure and long term 
equilibrium of banking industry in Bosnia and Herzegovina to evaluate the monopoly power 
of banks during the period 2008-2012. He observes that banks in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
generate their total and interest revenues under monopoly or perfectly collusive oligopoly. In 
the same context, IMF estimated the degree of bank competition for the euro-area economies 
aggregate and the UK, US before and after the recent financial crisis in 2008, and re-
examines whether the introduction of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and 
the euro have had any effect on banking competitiveness. The findings imply that the level of 
bank competition converged across euro area economies in the wake of the EMU, whilst the 
recent global financial crisis led to a decline in competition in several countries in particular 
where large credit and housing booms had headed the crisis.          
In Asia, where the launch of financial sector reforms took place in 1992, the competition in 
Indian banking industry was examined by Prasad and Ghosh (2007). They used annual data 
on scheduled commercial banks over the period 1996-2004. Findings confirm that 
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commercial banks operating in India earn revenues under monopolistic competition 
condition. However, in Africa, Hauner and Peiris (2008) analysed the effects of far-reaching 
banking industry reforms undertaken in low-income countries (in this case, Uganda) on 
banking sector competition and efficiency. They used models of banking competition and 
efficiency that have been mainly employed in industrial economies. Results show that the 
competition level has significantly increased and has been related to a growth in efficiency of 
the banking sector. Furthermore, on average, results suggest that large banks and foreign 
ownership banks perform more efficiently than others, whereas the efficiency of small banks 
has dropped with the increase in competitive pressure. Also, Simatele (2015) argue that the 
competition in South African banking industry is low. But, by using Banzar and Rosse 
approach to bank level data over the period of 1997-2014. In line with literature, the findings 
imply that banks in South Africa operate in monopolistically competitive market which in 
turn would be a comfort to policymakers who have made intensive efforts to improve the 
degree of competition in this market.  
Empirical evidence on the degree of competition using P-R methodology is diverse. Apart 
from well-developed economies and other emerging markets, studies on the MENA banking 
sector are limited to date. In this regard, investigating the degree of market power and 
competitiveness of 12 banking countries in MENA was done by Turk-Ariss (2009) who 
tended to link it to a set of industry and contestability indicators to clarify differences in the 
degree of competition between counties. Results suggest that banks in the Middle East 
operate under monopolistic competition with exception to North African countries, 
confirming what have found in other studies conducted on emerging markets and well-
developed economies. The predominant market structure in the MENA banking sector is 
mostly monopolistically competitive. In the same region, Abuzayed et al. (2012) examined 
the banking power and competitive condition in the banking industry of six MENA 
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economies by using annual panel data for 107 banks over the period 1998-2007. In line with 
the findings in other emerging economies, the banking market structure in those six MENA 
economies characterised as monopolistic competition. This outcome is also confirmed by 
Polemis (2015) who assessed the level of banking competition in eight MENA economies 
over the period 1997-2012. Empirical results are consistent with other literatures, providing 
sufficient evidence in favour of a monopolistically competitive industry. In this case, 
regulators need to go further to guarantee competitiveness in the MENA banking sector by 
allowing more foreign participation and removing activity restrictions.  Overall, it seems 
reasonable to assume that MENA commercial banks generate their revenue under 
monopolistic competition, leading me to predict the following hypothesis for empirical 
testing: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Commercial banks operating in the MENA economies generate 
revenues due to monopolistic competition. 
The above hypothesis is argued by Awdeh et al. (2013) who estimated the degree of 
competition in Arab banking systems, finding that high concentration does not show a 
significant power for Arab banks as competitiveness is greater in banks operating in Lebanon, 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE than in others Arab States. Also, Mensi (2010) 
investigated the use of Panzar and Rosse statistics as a basis for empirical assessment of 
competitive conditions among Tunisian deposit banks covering the period 1990-2007. 
Findings of the study imply that the H-statistic is respectively estimated at 0.87 and 0.91 
reflecting that Tunisian banks operate a under monopolistic competition market. In the same 
market, Kammoun and Ammar (2012) analysed the evolution of competition in the Tunisian 
banking sector for the period 2000-2008, which is considered the period of deregulation and 
liberalisation of the sector. They found empirical results to support the hypothesis that 
monopolistic competition exists in this market. 
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In contrast, Ben Abdelkader and Mansouri (2013) employed the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic 
to evaluate the competitive conditions of the Tunisian banking sector for the period 1999-
2003. Their results suggest that the Tunisian banking market is in long-term equilibrium and 
H-statistic implies that Tunisian banks operate under monopoly condition and they stated that 
liberalisation process and reforms taken place since 1987 could not compensate for the period 
under study. In Egypt, Poshakwale and Qian (2011) examined the effect of financial reforms 
on competitiveness and production efficiency of the Egyptian banking industry as well as the 
short and long-term impact on the growth over the period 1992-2007. Empirical findings 
indicate that the reforms have a positive and significant impact on competitiveness and 
production efficiency, and results support the argument for continuing reform program of the 
financial sector. 
In respect to bank-specific factors, (Abuzayed et al., 2012; Aktan and Masood, 2011; Mensi, 
2010; Turk-Ariss, 2009, Hauner and Peiris, 2008; Prasad and Ghosh, 2007; Gunalp and Celik, 
2006 and Mkrtchyan, 2005;) argue that banks with more capital base can operate better and 
generating higher revenues, supporting the argument that better capitalised banks face lower 
costs of going bankrupt; therefore, their cost of funding results in higher profitability. In 
respect to risk and investment portfolio, net loans to total assets and securities (Mamatzakis et 
al. 2005; Mkrtchyan, 2005; Gunalp and Celik, 2006; Abuzayed et al. 2012) imply that 
commercial banks in emerging economies tend to concentrate on traditional lending or in 
other words a higher fraction of loan to total assets leads to generate more interest income 
and total revenues for commercial banks in a number of developing economies. However, the 
bank size measured by total assets variable is found to be negatively and statistically 
significant in a number of MENA past studies (Turk-Ariss, 2009; and Abuzayed et al., 2012) 
suggesting that size in terms of assets has contributed in reducing revenues and advising that 
larger banks were less efficient than smaller banks. Such outcomes are considered to be 
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important to regulators, policy makers and banks’ managers in the MENA economies as to 
highlight that the growing in total assets by acquisition or mergers may not be appropriate 
and effective, suggesting that smaller banks can more efficiently reduce asymmetric 
information problems. According to such discussion, the second hypothesis is formulated:  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Commercial banks in MENA generate revenues due to capital 
adequacy, loans, securities and bank size.  
4.3 The Data and Methodology 
The study investigates the competitive condition and profitability drivers of commercial 
banks in MENA region in the context of Panzar-Rosse model. It is the first study of its kind 
that examines a large sample of MENA banks for an extensive period (1999-2012) during an 
era of political and economic unrest and transformation that includes the 2007 global crisis, 
providing the ability to draw reliable conclusions.  
4.3.1 Model Variables  
This study examines banks 149 banks from 11 MENA countries, namely Bahrain, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and 
Tunisia, during the period 1999-2012. Kuwait having the smallest number of banks in study’ 
sample with 5 banks and Lebanon the largest with 35 banks. This study uses Bankscope 
database and I included all banks under the condition of having at least two years of operation 
during the examined period. 
Table 4.1 summarises the definitions of variables used in assessing the competition of 
commercial banks and equilibrium tests using Panzar- Rosse model. Following Nathan and 
Neava (1989), Molyneux et al. (1994), Mamatzakis et al. (2005), Turk-Ariss (2009) and 
Abuzayed et al. (2012), this model uses the following two measures of revenues (total 
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revenues to total assets (TR/TA) and interest revenue to total assets (II/TA)) as dependent 
variables, which are explained by factor prices and other bank-specific variables for 
commercial banks in 11 MENA economies over the period 1999-2012. This thesis included 
interest income and non-interest income for the following reasons. Firstly, earlier studies 
(Molyneux et al., 1994; Mkrtchyan, 2005; Turk-Ariss, 2009; Abuzayed et al., 2012; Liu et al., 
2013) argued that most of commercial banks have become more modern banking centres as 
they introduced various types of banking and financial services as well as providing different 
types of loans. Therefore, traditional lending and fee-generating activities represent the major 
sources of revenues for commercial banks. Also, interest revenue (II/TA) is used to represent 
the version that has been used by Molyneux et al., (1996), Gunalp and Celik (2006), Prasad 
and Ghosh (2007) and Aktan and Masood (2010). 
Table 4.1 definitions of variables used in assessing the competition of MENA 
commercial banks and equilibrium tests. 
Table 6.2 Definitions of variables used in testing competition and equilibrium conditions  
Variable  Description  
Ln Natural Logarithm  
TR/TA Total revenue to total assets. Total revenues include revenues generating from loans 
and advances as well as other interest income containing interest from long term 
claims, government securities, commissions, and others  
II/TA  Interest income to total assets  
ROA Return on average assets is the return generated from the assets financed by the bank. 
PF  The unit price of funds proxied by the ratio of interest expense to total deposits. 
Interest expense includes interest paid on deposits and commissions expense and 
payments.  
 
PL  The unit price of labour proxied by the ratio of personnel expenses to the total assets. 
Personnel expenses include wages and salaries, social security contributions, 
contribution to pension funds and others.  
 
PK The unit price of capital expenditure and other expenses to fixed assets. Capital 
expenses refer to costs spending on fixed assets. Fixed assets include tangible assets 
fixed assets (land, buildings and installations, furniture office, computers, ATMs, 
technological items) and intangible fixed assets such as (goodwill, software, research 
and development expenses, etc)  
SIZE Total assets represent a proxy for bank size including earning assets + cash and due 
from banks + foreclosed real estate + fixed assets +goodwill  
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SECAST Total securities to total assets include loans and advances +trading securities + 
derivatives +available for the sale securities + held to maturity securities + equity 
investments +government bonds+ other securities.  
EQAS Equity to total assets. This variable to measure capital adequacy, computed as equity 
to total assets. High capital-asset ratios indicate low leverage and therefore lower 
risks.  
Loanast Net loans to total assets. This is a measure of liquidity computed as loans to total 
assets. Higher ratios imply lower liquidity.   
Fore Dummy variable for foreign ownership  
State Dummy variable for state ownership  
Coun Dummy variable for country effects  
Year Dummy variable for year effects  
 Source: Bank scope database  
The aim of estimation of the H-statistic is to show how bank revenues react to variations in 
cost data, so that the dependent variable is given by the sum of all banking revenues. In this 
context, PF is used to represent the unit price of funds proxied by the ratio of interest expense 
to total deposits; PL is the unit price of labour proxied by the ratio of personnel expenses total 
assets. In this study, as a result of a lack of number of employees, this proxy is used as the 
ratio of personnel expense to total assets according to what previous studies used (Molyneux 
et al., 1994; Aktan and Masood, 2010; Hauner and Peiris, 2011 Abuzayed et al., 2012). 
Whilst, PK denotes the unit price of capital expenditure and other expenses to fixed assets to 
include equipment, information technology, premises, and other non-interest expenses 
(Molyneux et al., 1994; Mkrtchyan, 2005; Gunalp and Celik, 2006). Other explanatory 
variables include bank specific variables similar to those employed in a number of other 
banking studies (Mamatzakis et al., 2005, Aktan and Masood, 2010; Hauner and Peiris, 2011 
Abuzayed et al., 2012). This study used two variables to account for bank-specific risk as 
total equity to assets ratio (EQAS) and loans to assets ratio (LOANAST). With regards to the 
capital adequacy, it is expected that better capitalisation levels and higher allocation of assets 
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to loans will generate more revenues and thus be positively associated with dependent 
variables. The coefficient of loan to assets is expected to be positive as more loans indicate 
more risk and higher returns (Molyneux et al. 1994; Gunalp and Tuncay, 2006; Abuzayed et 
al. 2012). To control for bank size impact, total assets represent bank size, the expected result 
of this variable would provide indication whether banks face economies or diseconomies of 
scale. The securities (other earning assets) to total assets ratio (SECAST) is used to include 
all return-bearing assets other than loans, implying numerous types of securities. But if a 
bank heavily dependents on loans, the relationship could become negative. However, to 
investigate whether ownership influences bank revenues, this study categorises a bank as a 
state-owned bank if the government owns more than 50%, whereas, a bank is considered to 
be a foreign bank if at least 50% of a bank’s shares are owned by foreign investors. It is 
argued that foreign ownership is also regarded to exhibit an impact on bank revenues. Table 
4.2 reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in this model. I report mean 
and the standard deviation (in brackets) for the full sample in MENA economies during the 
study period (1999-2012). 
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics for bank’s profitability and revenues variables and 
macroeconomic variables (average 1999-2012) 
Variable 
/Country   
ROA TR/TA II/TA EQAS SIZE LOANAST SECAST 
Bahrain  1.04 
(1.15) 
0.031 
(0.023)    
0.023 
(0.022)        
11.04 
 (2.76)         
1172 
 (1010)   
44.31    
 (12.78)      
0.250   
 (0.13)   
Oman  1.89 
(1.28) 
0.077 
(0.046) 
0.064 
(0.046)   
12.97  
(2.24)         
390 
(416) 
69.44 
 (7.97)        
0.101 
(0.061)      
Qatar  2.46 
(1.13) 
0.030 
(0.023)   
(0.017 
(0.021) 
13.90 
(3.63)           
1123 
(1810)   
57.26  
(6.99)        
0.206 
(0.163)      
Saudi 
Arabia 
2.23 
(1.58) 
0.045 
(0.016) 
0.032 
(0.008) 
12.18   
(3.11)           
2290 
(1.741)     
50.78  
 (9.62)         
0.308 
(0.094)      
UAE 2.48 
(1.55) 
.075 
(0.051) 
.060 
(0.050) 
17.11 
(5.630)          
1.251 
(1890)   
61.74 
(11.14)          
0.076 
(0.058)       
Kuwait  1.86 
(1.52) 
0.055 
(0.025) 
0.043 
(0.024) 
12.19 
(2.70)           
1420  
(1207) 
54.68 
(10.93)           
0.233 
(0.108)      
Egypt  0.89 
(1.72) 
0.068 
(0.029) 
0.051 
(0.024) 
9.60 
(4.79)          
576 
(932) 
39.87  
(11.96)           
0.252 
(0.120)      
Jordan  1.23 
(1.06) 
0.031 
(0.011) 
0.016 
(0.010) 
11.77    
(6.42)       
 858 
(1280)  
44.01 
(7.41)           
0.176 
(0.072)        
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Lebanon  0.76 
(0.846) 
0.068 
(0.035) 
0.059 
(0.030) 
8.94 
(4.52)           
340 
(489) 
26.40  
(8.69)         
0.351 
(0.120)       
Morocco  0.79 
(1.18) 
0.215 
(1.28) 
0.206 
(1.28) 
7.85  
(2.99)           
1200 
(1030) 
45.90 
(20.10)         
1.12  
(7.63)      
Tunisia  0.30 
(4.51) 
0.044 
(0.024) 
0.026 
(0.022) 
11.54 
(13.99)       
185 
(165) 
62.67 
(23.31)         
0.074  
(0.110)       
In parentheses the standard deviation 
It can be seen that bank profitability and bank revenues in higher income economies, namely 
in UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain, are above the average profitability 
of banks in the area, whereas bank profitability in low income MENA economies such as 
Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon and Morocco is below the average. Table 4.2 also indicates that 
Omani commercial followed by UAE banks rely heavily on interest income affecting II/TA. 
Regarding the capitalization of commercial banks also differs depending on the country, the 
average ratio of equity to assets (EQAS) of banks in MENA region in this sample is 11.42. It 
shows that banks that operate in Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and Qatar are 
better capitalised than other banks in other MENA countries and this may due to regulatory 
interventions. However, Mamatzakis et al. (2005) suggested that high capitalisation ratio 
enables banks to expand lending without raising capital. 
4.3.2 Panzar and Rosse Model  
According to Panzar and Rosse (1987), distinguishing among models for monopoly, 
monopolistic and perfect competitive condition is examined by a specific test, which is based 
on properties of the reduced-form revenue equation using 𝐻 statistic as a measure of the 
competitive state of the banking industry. In other words, the Panzar-Rosse model bears for 
the calculation of a measure of market structure 𝐻-statistic as the sum of the elasticties of 
total revenue of commercial bank in respect to its input prices. The test is derived from the 
general banking model that determines equilibrium output and the equilibrium number of 
banks by maximising profits. The equilibrium total revenue for an individual institution is 
attained by multiplying the profit-maximizing quantity and price. As both of these variables 
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rely on costs, market demand and conduct, the variables that shift cost and demand functions 
as well as factor prices must be included in the revenue function. Therefore, the reduced form 
revenue equation for the 𝑖𝑡ℎ firm can be formulated as follows: 
𝑻𝑹𝒊
𝒍(𝒀𝒊 , 𝒏, 𝒁𝒊) − 𝑪𝒊
𝒍(𝒀𝒊 , 𝒘𝒊 , 𝑻𝒊) = 𝟎       (4.1) 
𝑻𝑹𝒊
𝒍 denotes total revenues, 𝑪𝒊
𝒍 refers to costs, 𝒀𝒊 to outputs, 𝒘𝒊 to a vector of m factors input 
prices, and 𝒁𝒊 and 𝑻𝒊 to vectors of exogenous variables that shift to the bank’s revenue and 
cost functions, respectively; the subindex 𝑖  represents bank; 𝑛 is the number of banks. 
Second, at the market level, it means that, in equilibrium, the zero profit constraints hold: 
𝑻𝑹𝒊
∗(𝒀∗ , 𝒏∗, 𝒁) − 𝒄∗(𝒀∗ , 𝒘 , 𝑻) = 𝟎             (4.2) 
Equilibrium values are represented by (∗). The extent to which a change in factor input prices 
is considered as a measure of market power (𝑑𝑤𝑘,𝑖) as k=1,……,m is revealed in the 
equilibrium revenues (𝑑𝑇𝑅𝑖
∗), earned by bank 𝑖. Panzar and Rosse (P-R) define a measure of 
competition 𝐻 as the sum of the elasticises of the reduced-form revenues with respect to 
factor prices: 
𝑯 = ∑
𝝏𝑻𝑹𝒊
∗
𝝏𝒘𝒌,𝒊
𝒎
𝒌=𝟏  
𝒘𝒌,𝒊
𝑹𝒊
∗                   (4.3) 
Based on equation (4.3) under the assumption of a stable cost function, all changes in 
marginal costs are determined by changes in one or more input prices. Bikker et al. (2009) 
pointed out that 𝐻 statistic results obtained from P-R price equation should be used at 
different points below by denoting interchangeably to 𝐻 and 𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝑅/𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀𝐶. 
Panzar and Rosse indicate that H-statistic can reflect the market structure and its conduct to 
which the bank belongs. The 𝐻-statistic is then calculated as the sum of input elasticities 
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𝐵1 + 𝐵2 + 𝐵3 of total revenues or interest revenue. Molyneux et al. (1994) the estimated 
value of 𝐻 statistic ranges between 0 < 𝐻 ≤ 1. If  the 𝐻-statistic is negative or less than zero, 
the banking market is characterised as monopoly or a perfectly colluding oligopoly. Under 
this condition, an increase in input prices will increase marginal costs, reduce equilibrium 
output and subsequently reduce total revenues (Mamatzakis et al., 2005). If the banking 
sector is characterised by monopolistic competition, the 𝐻-statisctic will lie between 0 and 1. 
Finally, under perfect competition, the 𝐻-statistic will lie on one, as an increase in input 
prices leads to an equivalent increase in total revenues, and banks which cannot cover the 
increase in input prices will be forced to exit the market (Mamatzakis et al., 2005; Turk-
Ariss, 2009). 
In the Panzar-Rosse model, banks should be observed from a long-run equilibrium 
perspective. The equilibrium test is calculated as the sum of input prices elasticities with the 
return on assets (ROA) replacing bank revenue in the regression equation. The hypothesis 
that the value is 0 will be tested as if the finding of H<0, the banking market is under 
disequilibrium, while, H=0 would imply equilibrium condition. Table 4.3 summarises the 
discriminatory power of H-statistic (Molyneux et al. 1994). 
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Table 4.3 the discriminatory power of 𝑯 
Values of H Competitive environment  
H≤ 0 
 
 
0 < 𝐻 < 1 
 
H=1 
Monopoly: each bank operates independently under 
monopoly profit maximisation conditions (H is a decreasing 
function of the perceived demand elasticity) or perfect cartel. 
Monopolistic competition free entry equilibrium  (H is an 
increasing function of the perceived demand elasticity) 
Perfect competition. Free entry equilibrium with full efficient 
capacity utilisation    
Values of 𝐻 Equilibrium test 
𝐻 = 0 
𝐻 < 0 
Equilibrium 
Disequilibrium 
   
According to Nathan and Neave (1989) and Molyneux et al. (1996) there are a number of 
assumptions that need to be considered in order to implement such a model. The first of these 
assumptions is widely used in banking literatures saying that banks in the market have to be 
treated as single product firms, as banks can use their labour, capital, deposits and short term 
funding as inputs in generating interest revenues. Second, it has to be taken into account that 
higher quality services are not related to higher input prices that generate higher revenues 
because bias of H-statistic may result from this correlation. Third, one needs to assume that 
the economic environment for this study can be unpredictable or unstable; hence, to 
overcome this issue, panel data analysis should be used. 
The empirical application of the Panzar-Rosse model assumes that revenue is based on a 
reduced-form equation relating gross revenues to a vector of input prices and other bank-
specific variables. Assuming 𝑛 input single-output production function, the empirical 
reduced-form equation of Panzar-Rosse model is: 
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𝑳𝒐𝒈 𝑻𝑹 = 𝜶 + ∑ 𝜷𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒘𝒊 + ∑ 𝜸𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝑪𝑭𝒋 + 𝜺          (4.4) 
𝑇𝑅 represents total revenue, whereas  𝑤𝑖 is a vector of the price of the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ input factor, and 
𝐶𝐹𝑗 is the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ bank-specific factors. According to the fact that large banks are able to 
generate more revenues, a number of studies have incorporated (Bikker and Haaf, 2002; 
Gunalp and Celik, 2006). Thus, several studies include a log of total assets as one of the 
bank-specific variables in equation (4.5). Also, other studies use the log of revenues divided 
by total assets as the dependent variable log (TR/TA) in the model. The TR/TA is used as 
proxy of output price; (P) is explained from input prices and bank-specific variables (Bikker 
et al. 2012). The three versions of empirical Panzar-Rosse are introduced in the banking 
competition literatures as noted by Bikker and Bos (2008). The first one is the revenue 
equation with a log of total assets as control variable as follows: 
𝑳𝒐𝒈 𝑻𝑹 = 𝜶 + ∑ 𝜷𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒘𝒊 + ∑ 𝜸𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝑪𝑭𝒋 + 𝒍𝒐𝒈 (𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬) + 𝜺          (4.5) 
As it previously mentioned that Panzar and Rosse showed the sum of input prices elasticities 
𝐻𝑠
𝑟 = ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  where r refers to revenue and s to scaled. Such a version has been used by 
Nathan and Neave (1989), Molyneux et al. (1996). The second version of Panzar and Rosse is 
the price equation without total assets as a control factor: 
𝑳𝒐𝒈
𝑻𝑹
𝑻𝑨
= 𝜶 + ∑ 𝜷𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒘𝒊 + ∑ 𝜸𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏
𝒍𝒐𝒈𝑪𝑭𝒋 + 𝜺              (𝟒.𝟔) 
𝐻𝑝 = ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  this version (where p denotes price) has been employed by Bandt and Davis 
(2000) and Mamatzakis et al. (2005). In respect to the last version, the Panzar and Rosse 
price equation controlling for firm size is as follows: 
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𝑳𝒐𝒈
𝑻𝑹
𝑻𝑨
= 𝜶 + ∑ 𝜷𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
𝒍𝒐𝒈𝒘𝒊 + ∑ 𝜸𝒋
𝑱
𝒋=𝟏
𝒍𝒐𝒈𝑪𝑭𝒋 + 𝒍𝒐𝒈 (𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬) + 𝜺            (𝟒.𝟕) 
𝐻𝑠
𝑝 = ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1   where p represents price and s refers to scaled. Such a model has been 
employed by Molyneux et al. (1994). When a log of total assets (SIZE) is taken into account, 
the empirical estimates from a log-log price equation are equivalent to those of corresponding 
log-log revenue equation, with the sole distinction that the coefficient on log (SIZE) will 
differ by 1 (Bikker et al. 2012).  
As noted by Mamatzakis et al. (2005), the Panzar and Rosse approach enjoys some vital 
advantages, mainly due to its simplicity and transparency, without a decline in efficiency. 
Further, the availability of data becomes less of a constraint because data about revenues 
tends to be more noticeable than output prices, and bank-level data allows for bank-specific 
differences in production function and type of operation to be investigated. In addition, the 
non-necessity to define the location of the market a prior indicates that the possible bias 
caused by the misspecification of market restrictions is avoided, which in turn a bank 
operates in more than one country, as is often the case in MENA economies.  
Following Nathan and Neava (1989), Molyneux et al. (1994), Mamatzakis et al. (2005), 
Turk-Ariss (2009) and Abuzayed et al. (2012), the current study estimates the following two 
measures of revenues (total revenues to total assets (TR/TA) and interest revenue to total 
assets (II/TA)) which are explained by factor prices and other bank-specific variables for 
commercial banks in 11 MENA economies over the period 1999-2012 using panel analysis: 
𝑳𝒏𝑻𝑹/𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕 =
𝒂𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑳𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑲𝒊𝒕 + 𝜹𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 +
𝜸𝟐𝒍𝒏𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆 + 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 + 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏 + 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 + 𝜺       (4.8) 
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Where the dependent variable TR/TA is a measure of total revenue computed as interest 
income and non-interest income to total assets. Also, interest revenue (II/TA) is used to 
represent the version that has been used by Molyneux et al., (1996), Gunalp and Celik (2006), 
Prasad and Ghosh (2007) and Aktan and Masood (2010). 
𝑳𝒏𝑰𝑰/𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕 = 𝒂𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑳𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑲𝒊𝒕 + 𝜹𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 +
𝜸𝟐𝒍𝒏𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆 + 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 + 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏 + 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕       (4.9) 
The purpose estimating the H-statistic is to show how bank revenues react to variations in 
cost data, so that the dependent variable is given by the sum of all banking revenues. PF is 
used to represent the unit price of funds proxied by the ratio of interest expense to total 
deposits. PL is the unit price of labour proxied by the ratio of personnel expenses total assets. 
In this study, as a result of a lack of number of employees, this proxy is used as the ratio of 
personnel expense to total assets according to what previous studies used (Molyneux et al., 
1994; Aktan and Masood, 2010; Hauner and Peiris, 2011 Abuzayed et al., 2012). PK denotes 
the unit price of capital expenditure and other expenses to fixed assets to include equipment, 
information technology, premises, and other non-interest expenses (Molyneux et al., 1994; 
Mkrtchyan, 2005; Gunalp and Celik, 2006). Other explanatory variables include bank 
specific variables and are similar to those employed in a number of other banking studies 
(Mamatzakis et al., 2005, Aktan and Masood, 2010; Hauner and Peiris, 2011 Abuzayed et al. 
2012). This thesis used two variables to account for bank-specific risk as total equity to assets 
ratio (EQAS) and loans to assets ratio (LOANAST). With regards to the capital adequacy, it 
is expected that better capitalisation levels and higher allocation of assets to loans will 
generate more revenues and thus be positively associated with dependent variables. The 
coefficient of loan to assets is expected to be positive indicating more risk and higher returns 
(Molyneux et al. 1994; Abuzayed et al. 2012; Gunalp and Tuncay, 2006). To control for bank 
size impact, banks’ total assets represents size variable leading to account for possible 
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economies of scale. The result of this variable would provide indication whether banks face 
economies or diseconomies of scale. The securities (other earning assets) to total assets ratio 
(SECAST) is used to include all return-bearing assets other than loans, implying numerous 
types of securities. But if a bank invests too much in loans, the relationship could become 
negative. To investigate whether ownership influences bank revenues, in this study according 
to the argument that bank ownership is also regarded to exhibit an impact on bank revenues, I 
categorise a bank as a state-owned bank if the government owns more than 50%. Whilst, a 
bank is considered to be a foreign bank if at least 50% of a bank’s shares are owned by 
foreign investors. Also, in Panzar-Rosse model, commercial banks should be perceived from 
a long-run equilibrium perspective. Consistent with previous studies, Molyneux et al. (1994), 
Mamatzakis et al. (2005), Turk-Ariss (2009) and Abuzayed et al. (2012), the long-run 
equilibrium for test the value of 𝐻 is performed by running the same equation using return on 
total assets (ROA) as the dependent variable: 
𝑳𝒏𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 =  𝒂𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑳𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑲𝒊𝒕 + 𝜹𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕 +
𝜸𝟐𝒍𝒏𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆 + 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 + 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏 + 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 + 𝜺       (4.10) 
 
4.3.3 The hypothesis testing  
This chapter investigates the validity of two hypotheses. First, I examine the hypothesis (H1) 
that commercial banks operating in MENA countries increase revenue due to monopolistic 
competition. To examine this hypothesis I computed the H-value in the notation of equations 
(4.8), (4.9) and  𝐻-statistic states as (𝛽1  + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3) and I used Wald test in the Panzar-Rosse 
model. If H-value is larger than zero and smaller than unity whilst Wald test results indicate 
that H=0 and H=1 are rejected, then an evidence that the hypothesis H1 is supported. 
Secondly, I investigate the hypothesis (H2) that commercial banks operating in MENA 
countries increase revenue due to bank-specific factors (securities, loans to assets, size and 
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capital adequacy). To examine this hypothesis, I test the significance and magnitude of 
coefficients that examine securities, loan to assets, size and capital adequacy in the respective 
Panzar-Rosse model. 
As previously mentioned, this study uses unbalanced panel data combining cross section and 
time series data presenting the estimation of reduced-form revenue equation. Evidence is not 
found of correlation among independent variables as all tests verified the good fit of the 
models. Additionally, in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity, the regression models 
are estimated by using the fixed effects and the decision to use fixed effects versus random 
effects for this model is based on running the Hausman specification test. However, robust 
standard error is applied in order to correct heteroscedasticity, see Baltagi (2008).   
4.4 Empirical results 
4.4.1 Empirical results for Competitive conditions  
The following analysis is concentrated on competition (H-statistic) and individual factors 
using fixed models based on the results of the Hausman test to account for the countries’ 
specific differences and competitive structures differences within MENA economies. 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 report the regression results using total revenues (TR/TA) and interest 
income (II/TA) respectively. Paying attention to H-value (the sum of price elasticity: PF, PK 
and PL), this study observes that all H values in all models are less than one and greater than 
zero, which in turn supports rejection of null hypothesis H=0, H=1. The overall results 
indicate that commercial banks operating in the MENA economies were earning their 
revenues (total revenue to total assets and interest revenue to total assets) under monopolistic 
competition for the period of the study. The H-statistic for table 4.4 varies generally between 
0.73 and 0.83 for total revenues (TR/TA) and 0.86 and 0.90 for interest income suggesting 
the monopolistic competition is the best description of degree of competition. More specific, 
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the test of Hypothesis (Wald test) for banks operating in 11 MENA economies included in 
the sample rejects perfect and monopoly conditions of the banking industry. Results of the 
Wald test confirms that all commercial banks in the sample operate under conditions of 
monopolistic competition and hypothesis (1) is supported. Findings of H-statistic are in line 
with those in MENA economies and other emerging markets (Mkrtchyan, 2005; Gunalp and 
Celik, 2006; Prasad and Ghosh, 2007; Hauner and Peiris, 2008; Turk-Ariss, 2009 Mensi, 
2010; Abuzayed et al. 2012). A monopolistic competition structure can be considered 
consistent with existence of product differentiation in banking and with the fact that banks are 
more likely to be varied in terms of product quality and advertising in spite their main 
business being fairly similar.  
Table 4.4 Panzar and Rosse model competition results using Total revenue to total 
assets as dependent variable 
𝒍𝒏𝑻𝑹/𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕 =  𝒂𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑳𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑲𝒊𝒕 + 𝜹𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜸𝟐𝒍𝒏𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆 + 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 + 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏 + 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 + 𝜺 
lnTR/TA Fixed effect 1 Fixed effect 2 Fixed effect 3 Fixed effect 4 
lnPF 
0.162*** 
(5.324) 
0.318*** 
(13.604) 
0.240*** 
(8.039) 
0.345*** 
(14.403) 
lnPK 
0.139*** 
(5.848) 
0.125*** 
(5.120) 
0.098*** 
(4.047) 
0.098*** 
(3.946) 
lnPL 
0.433*** 
(13.134) 
0.384*** 
(11.460) 
0.394*** 
(11.756) 
0.353*** 
(10.450) 
lnSECAST 
-0.021** 
(-1.409) 
-0.030** 
(-1.945) 
-0.020 
(-1.359) 
-0.027* 
(-1.784) 
lnSIZE 
0.013 
(0.689) 
-0.093*** 
(-6.032) 
-0.007 
(-0.454) 
-0.074*** 
(-4.923) 
lnEQAS 
0.058** 
(1.964) 
0.029 
(0.989) 
0.046 
(1.528) 
0.040 
(1.300) 
lnLOANAST 
0.208*** 
(5.648) 
0.168*** 
(4.503) 
0.125*** 
(3.462) 
0.133*** 
(3.662) 
FORE 
-0.038 
(-0.591) 
-0.099 
(-1.475) 
-0.011 
(-0.185) 
-0.091 
(-1.405) 
STATE 
0.058 
(1.006) 
0.108* 
(1.823) 
-0.017 
(-0.291) 
-0.002 
(-0.038) 
Egypt 
0.489*** 
(3.789) 
0.335*** 
(2.543) 
  
Kuwait  
0.690*** 
(4.512) 
0.751*** 
(4.771) 
  
Lebanon 
1.018*** 
(7.527) 
0.745*** 
(5.470) 
  
Oman 
0.802*** 
(5.054) 
0.777*** 
(4.746) 
  
Qatar 
-0.120 
(-0.753) 
-0.060 
(-0.364) 
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Saudi Arabia 
0.747*** 
(4.500) 
1.003*** 
(5.945) 
  
Tunisia 
0.444*** 
(2.753) 
0.160 
(0.982) 
  
United Arab 
UAE 
0.774*** 
(5.826) 
0.825*** 
(6.029) 
  
YEAR=2001 
-0.103* 
(-1.826) 
 -0.100 
(-1.659) 
 
YEAR=2002 
-0.167** 
(-2.867) 
 -0.136** 
(-2.175) 
 
YEAR=2003 
-0.240*** 
(-4.025) 
 -0.190*** 
(-3.009) 
 
YEAR=2004 
-0.302*** 
(-4.960) 
 -0.244*** 
(-3.802) 
 
YEAR=2005 
-0.187*** 
(-3.195) 
 -0.146** 
(-2.363) 
 
YEAR=2006 
-0.183*** 
(-3.195) 
 -0.146** 
(-2.413) 
 
YEAR=2007 
-0.274*** 
(-4.713) 
 -0.245*** 
(-4.008) 
 
YEAR=2008 
-0.361*** 
(-6.048) 
 -0.311*** 
(-5.029) 
 
YEAR=2009 
-0.393*** 
(-6.297) 
 -0.325*** 
(-5.104) 
 
YEAR=2010 
-0.440*** 
(-6.708) 
 -0.350*** 
(-5.287) 
 
YEAR=2011 
-0.520*** 
(-7.720) 
 -0.423*** 
(-6.260) 
 
YEAR=2012 
-0.507*** 
(-7.365) 
 
-0.398*** 
(-5.802) 
 
C 
-1.990*** 
(-5.334) 
-0.064 
(-0.208) 
-0.710*** 
(-2.500) 
0.228 
(0.895) 
Adj-R2  
 
0.65 0.63 0.59 0.58 
F-statistic 
 
Prob(F-
statistic) 
19.45333 
0.000000 
19.39191 
0.000000 
16.60936 
0.000000 
17.03012 
0.000000 
Hausman Test 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
H-value 
 
0.73 0.83 0.73 0.80 
Wald test for 
H=0 
256.1878 
0.0000 
342.2198 
0.0000 
260.4348 
0.0000 
324.5863 
0.0000 
Wald test for 
H=1 
33.27291 
0.0000 
14.69518 
0.0000 
34.22769 
0.0000 
20.81476 
0.0000 
TR/TA=Total revenue to total assets, PF= price of fund (interest expense to deposits), PK= price of capital (non-interest 
expenses to fixed assets, PL =price of labour (personal expenses to total assets), SECAST =securities to total assets, SIZE= 
Total assets, EQAS= equity to total assets, LONAAST= net loans to assets, FORE= dummy for foreign ownership, STATE= 
dummy for state ownership .         
The regression coefficients for the sum of input price (PF, PK, and PL) are all positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level in the table 4.4 and 4.5. The coefficient of PF which is 
the price of fund is generally positive and significant for all regression in the table 4.4 
implying that the higher interest expense relative to deposits and short term funding paid by 
banks, the more allocation of revenues. Also, the price of capital (PK) and price of labour 
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(PL) which represented by the unit price of expenditures to fixed assets and the unit price of 
personal expense to total assets respectively are positive and statistically significant at 1% 
which indicates that increasing these price leads to an increase in revenues of MENA 
commercial banks. The unit price of capital is the determinant of total revenue ratio (TR/TA) 
which may be justified by the importance of private money transfers and investments 
expenditures (e.g., in ATMs) which have been incurred during the period for which revenues 
are fee-based. These results are in line with those of several other emerging economies, 
particularly in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Turkey, India, Armenia, MENA economies 
(Mkrtchyan, 2005; Abuzayed et al. 2012; Gunalp et al. 2006).  
Table 4.5 Panzar and Rosse model competition results using interest income to total 
assets (II/TA) 
𝑳𝒏𝑰𝑰/𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕 =  𝒂𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑳𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑲𝒊𝒕 + 𝜹𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜸𝟐𝒍𝒏𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆 + 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 + 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏 + 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 + 𝜺 
ln II/TA Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect  Fixed effect 
lnPF 
 
0.314*** 
(6.957) 
0.457*** 
(13.333) 
0.413*** 
(9.208) 
0.495*** 
(13.871) 
0.311*** 
(7.008) 
lnPK 
 
0.117*** 
(3.309) 
0.104*** 
(2.913) 
0.057 
(1.580) 
0.059 
(1.617) 
0.112*** 
(3.178) 
lnPL 
 
0.440*** 
(9.002) 
0.396*** 
(8.086) 
0.382*** 
(7.598) 
0.349*** 
(6.981) 
0.440*** 
(9.161) 
lnSECAST 
 
0.004 
(0.187) 
-0.000 
(-0.029) 
0.007 
(0.307) 
0.005 
(0.243)  
lnSIZE 
 
0.034 
(1.204) 
-0.086*** 
(-3.799) 
-0.004 
(-0.177) 
-0.075*** 
(-3.352) 
0.031 
(1.088) 
lnEQAS 
 
0.030 
(0.693) 
-0.004 
(-0.093) 
0.013 
(0.297) 
0.003 
(0.081) 
 
lnLOANAST 
 
0.232*** 
(4.262) 
0.197*** 
(3.617) 
0.105* 
(1.947) 
0.119** 
(2.218) 
0.228*** 
(4.237) 
FORE 
 
-0.025 
(-0.259) 
-0.093 
(-0.949) 
0.018 
(0.192) 
-0.059 
(-0.622) 
-0.021 
(-0.223) 
STATE 
 
0.100 
(1.158) 
0.162* 
(1.872) 
-0.004 
(-0.051) 
0.015 
(0.176) 
0.090 
(1.081) 
Egypt 
 
0.377* 
(1.881) 
0.209 
(1.039) 
  0.371* 
(1.871) 
Jordan 
 
-0.461** 
(-2.011) 
-0.544** 
(-2.343) 
  -0.472** 
(-2.066) 
Kuwait 
 
0.711*** 
(3.082) 
0.775*** 
(3.312) 
  0.713*** 
(3.097) 
Lebanon 
 
1.237*** 
(5.957) 
0.942*** 
(4.575) 
  1.223*** 
(5.925) 
Morocco 
 
0.219 
(0.903) 
0.201 
(0.816) 
  0.215 
(0.890) 
Oman 
 
1.086*** 
(4.501) 
1.045*** 
(4.268) 
  1.082*** 
(4.524) 
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Qatar 
 
-0.652*** 
(-2.687) 
-0.591** 
(-2.404) 
  -0.642*** 
(-2.654) 
Saudi Arabia 
 
0.566** 
(2.253) 
0.837*** 
3.33016 
  0.576** 
(2.300) 
Tunisia 
 
0.290 
(1.179) 
-0.035 
(-0.143) 
  0.274 
(1.134) 
United Arab  
 
0.901*** 
(4.428) 
0.953*** 
(4.616) 
  0.893*** 
(4.458) 
YEAR=2003 
 
-0.158* 
(-1.792) 
 -0.096 
(-1.019) 
 -0.161* 
(-1.838) 
YEAR=2004 
 
-0.248*** 
(-2.743) 
 -0.170* 
(-1.771) 
 -0.242*** 
(-2.706) 
YEAR=2005 
 
-0.185** 
(-2.123) 
 -0.130 
(-1.404) 
 -0.178** 
(-2.058) 
YEAR=2006 
 
-0.106 
(-1.246) 
 -0.049 
(-0.538) 
 -0.090 
(-1.074) 
YEAR=2007 
 
-0.280*** 
(-3.248) 
 -0.236*** 
(-2.583) 
 -0.269*** 
(-3.148) 
YEAR=2008 
 
-0.355*** 
(-4.011) 
 -0.281*** 
(-3.033) 
 -0.345*** 
(-3.924) 
YEAR=2009 
 
-0.375*** 
(-4.059) 
 -0.279*** 
(-2.926) 
 -0.363*** 
(-3.963) 
YEAR=2010 
 
-0.400*** 
(-4.122) 
 -0.274*** 
(-2.767) 
 -0.385*** 
(-4.012) 
YEAR=2011 
 
-0.456*** 
(-4.574) 
 -0.321*** 
(-3.182) 
 -0.442*** 
(-4.492) 
YEAR=2012 
 
-0.427*** 
(-4.187)  
-0.272*** 
(-2.657)  
-0.411*** 
(-4.089) 
C 
 
-2.163*** 
(-3.881) 
0.015 
(0.0335) 
-0.491 
(-1.154) 
0.527 
(1.399) 
-2.039*** 
(-3.928) 
R
2
Adj 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.56 0.64 
F-stat 
Prob 
18.20111 
0.000000 
19.00043 
0.000000 
14.97435 
0.000000 
15.99828 
0.000000 
18.66738 
0.000000 
Hausman Test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
H-value 0.87 0.95 0.85 0.90 0.86 
Wald test for 
H=0 
162.2284 
0.0000 
211.5632 
0.0000 
154.3207 
0.0000 
186.9861 
0.0000 
165.2505 
0.0000 
Wald test for 
H=1 
3.456834 
0.06 
0.409220 
0.5225 
4.512654 
0.033 
2.091809 
0.1483 
4.093356 
0.04 
Dependent variable: II/TA= Interest revenue to total assets. Independent variables PF= price of fund (interest expense to 
deposits), PK= price of capital (non-interest expenses to fixed assets, PL =price of labour (personal expenses to total assets), 
SECAST =securities to total assets, SIZE= Total assets, EQAS= equity to total assets, LONAAST= net loans to assets, 
FORE= dummy for foreign ownership, STATE= dummy for state ownership . 
Turning to bank-specific variables, the sign of SECAST is negative and significant at 5% 
with TR/TA indicating that banks’ securities do not contribute in generating revenues for 
banks in MENA economies. However, the capital adequacy (EQAS) variable, is found to be 
positive and statistically significant at 10% and 5% level, suggesting that banks operate in the 
MENA region with higher ratio of EQAS tend to create more revenues, supporting the 
argument that capital adequacy is positively associated with revenues under the hypothesis 
that well capitalised banks may enjoy access to cheaper and less risky source of funds and 
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better quality asset market. With regards to the regression coefficient of the bank size 
measured by total assets (size) variable is negatively and statistically significant in some 
columns of table 4.4 and table 4.5, telling that size in terms of total assets in MENA 
economies contributed in reducing revenues and showing that larger banks were less efficient 
than smaller banks. These findings show that larger banks reveal diseconomies of scale, 
suggesting to regulators, policy makers and banks’ managers in the MENA economies to 
highlight that the growing in total assets by acquisition or merger may not be appropriate and 
effective, and to suggest that smaller banks can more efficiently reduce asymmetric 
information problems. Turing to the risk variable which is represented by net loans to total 
assets (loanast), such variable has been used by several studies to denote liquidity or risk 
(Mamatzakis et al. 2005; Mkrtchyan, 2005; Gunalp and Celik, 2006; Abuzayed et al. 2012). 
The variable of net loans to total assets is statistically significant with both variables of 
revenues at 1% and 5%, implying that a higher fraction of loans to total assets leads to 
generate more interest income and total revenues for MENA commercial banks. The positive 
and significant coefficient of LOANAST, in aggregation with negative and significant 
coefficient of SECAST would raise a concern that MENA commercial banks tend to depend 
on traditional lending activities, where their competitive position may be eroded in the long 
run by Islamic banks, in line with the findings of Olson and Zoubi (2011) that Islamic banks 
are more revenue efficient than conventional banks because Islamic banks hold more 
profitable assets than the loans and securities held by conventional banks. In other words, 
there is unwillingness or inability from management of MENA commercial banks to consider 
new investments opportunities. Overall, findings suggest a positive relationship between bank 
revenues and bank-specific variables in terms of capital adequacy, size and loan to assets 
confirming hypothesis (2).   
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Concerning the ownership dummy variable, in spite of weak evidence, banks with foreign 
ownership tend to generate less revenue than state banks as coefficients of foreign dummy are 
negative and significant solely in regressions employed without year and country effects 
dummies in tables 4.4 and 4.5. However, in order to account for factors such as development 
in regulations and financial policies, the current study used years and country dummies 
variables. All years are compared to the basis year 1999 and countries are compared to 
Bahrain. The overall results from regressions show that the revenues variables are negatively 
affected by year dummy effect at 1% and 5% significant levels. Further, results as shown in 
table 4.4 and 4.5 indicate that commercial banks in Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Oman, 
Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates can generate more revenues. 
The Panzar and Rosse model is considered to be valid if the banking sector operates in 
equilibrium condition. The equilibrium test is employed to observe if the market is in 
equilibrium. Under long-term competitive equilibrium, an increase in average costs of inputs 
in the short run leads to reductions in revenues, therefore resulting in departing of occupants. 
The demand increase can be noted after such an exit for the remaining occupants. In the long 
term, an unchanged equilibrium level of output is expected. It should be mentioned that 
competitive conditions under equilibrium are changeable during the sample period, so that 
changes in banking are taken as gradual. 
The sum of elasticity of return on assets with respect to input prices is measured by the long-
term equilibrium test, as advocated by a number of authors (Abdelkader et al. 2013; 
Abuzayed, et al 2012; Gunalp, and Celik, 2006). In order to carry out this test, the study 
computed and run equation (4.10) using return on asset ratio (ROA) and employ Wald test to 
obtain F-statistics. However, if H=0, therefore, the data are in equilibrium. If rejected, the 
banking industry is supposed not to be in equilibrium level. But, it should be noted that 
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equilibrium does not indicate that competitive conditions are not allowed to change. Rather, 
that changes in the banking sector are gradual (Mamatzakis et al. 2005).   
The equilibrium tests for the fixed effects models are presented in the table 4.6. The good fit 
of the fixed effects models are verified by the Hausman test. Findings confirm that the 
hypothesis of equilibrium (H=0) cannot be rejected in all regressions. Therefore, the overall 
findings suggest that commercial banks operating in the MENA economies were earning their 
revenues under long-term equilibrium of monopolistic competition for the study period. 
 
Table 4.6 Panzar and Rosse model equilibrium test using ROA as dependent Variable   
𝑳𝒏𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 =  𝒂𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑳𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑲𝒊𝒕 + 𝜹𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕
+ 𝜸𝟐𝒍𝒏𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒆 + 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 + 𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏 + 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓 + 𝜺 
ROA Fixed effect  1 Fixed effect  2 Fixed effect  3 Fixed effect  4 
lnPF 
-0.070 
(-1.341) 
0.089** 
(2.233) 
-0.15*** 
(-3.011) 
0.060 
(1.539) 
lnPK 
0.148*** 
(3.540) 
0.137*** 
(3.231) 
0.171*** 
(4.259) 
0.166*** 
(4.024) 
lnPL 
-0.088 
(-1.549) 
-0.128** 
(-2.217) 
-0.102** 
(-1.877) 
-0.161 
(-2.884) 
lnSECAST 
0.020 
(0.712) 
0.001 
(0.054) 
0.006 
(0.247) 
-0.019 
(-0.720) 
lnSIZE 
0.019 
(0.534) 
-0.022 
(-0.821) 
0.114*** 
(3.904) 
0.044* 
(1.731) 
lnEQAS 
0.845*** 
(12.005) 
0.835*** 
(12.222) 
1.000*** 
(15.549) 
0.996*** 
(15.337) 
lnLOANAST 
0.172** 
(2.625) 
0.110* 
(1.683) 
0.243*** 
(3.987) 
0.216*** 
(3.453) 
FORE 
0.209* 
(1.793) 
0.181 
(1.541) 
0.139 
(1.283) 
0.039 
(0.355) 
STATE 
0.070 
(0.685) 
0.063 
(0.612) 
-0.066 
(-0.690) 
-0.083 
(-0.838) 
Lebanon 
-0.259 
(-1.119) 
-0.465** 
(-2.036) 
  
Qatar 
0.482* 
(1.753) 
0.479* 
(1.711) 
  
Saudi Arabia  
0.651** 
(2.300) 
0.762*** 
(2.683) 
  
Tunisia  
-0.434 
(-1.528) 
-0.567** 
(-2.002) 
  
United Arab UAE 
0.552*** 
(2.458) 
0.555*** 
(2.426) 
  
YEAR=2002 
-0.27*** 
(-2.560) 
 -0.31*** 
(-2.969) 
 
YEAR=2003 
-0.197** 
(-1.854) 
 -0.27*** 
(-2.604) 
 
YEAR=2004 
-0.214** 
(-1.986) 
 -0.31*** 
(-2.935) 
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YEAR=2009 
-0.29*** 
(-2.659) 
 -0.47*** 
(-4.491) 
 
YEAR=2010 
-0.270** 
(-2.354) 
 -0.48*** 
(-4.427) 
 
YEAR=2011 
-0.44*** 
(-3.706) 
 -0.66*** 
(-6.006) 
 
YEAR=2012 
-0.36*** 
(-2.979)  
-0.60*** 
(-5.361)  
C 
-3.46*** 
(-4.828) 
-2.33*** 
(-4.130) 
-5.63*** 
(-11.353) 
-4.31*** 
(-9.706) 
H- value  -0.01 0.09 -0.08 0.06 
Wald test for H=0 
 
 
Prob 
 0.017002 
 
 
 0.8963 
1.647420 
 
 
 0.1996 
 1.131234 
 
 
 0.2877 
 0.81890 
 
 
 0.3657 
Hausman test P-
value 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 
 
 
 
F-statistic 
0.54 
 
 
11.79327 
0.0000 
0.52 
 
 
11.99862 
0.0000 
0.53 
 
 
12.1966 
0.0000 
0.50 
 
 
11.9020 
0.0000 
Dependent variable: ROA=return on average assets. Independent variable: PF= price of fund (interest expense to deposits), PK= price of 
capital (non-interest expenses to fixed assets, PL =price of labour (personal expenses to total assets), SECAST =securities to total assets, 
SIZE= Total assets, EQAS= equity to total assets, LONAAST= net loans to assets, FORE= dummy for foreign ownership, STATE= dum my 
for state ownership  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examined under what competitive conditions, the commercial banks in eleven 
MENA countries increase their revenues (interest revenues, or total revenues) and whether 
they increase their profitability under long term equilibrium condition.  
To assess both hypotheses we computed the output elasticities of Capital, labour and Fund 
factors, after accounting for other factors, such as state ownership, foreign ownership, state 
ownership, securities to assets, equity to assets, loans to assets, and then I computed the 
Panzar-Rosse H- statistic and tested for the significance of the factors, I tested for fixed 
effects and for different equilibrium positions.  
First, I concluded that the banking sector in MENA countries operate under monopolistic 
competition, whenever total revenues is the dependent variable, whilst they compete in 
perfect competition whenever interest income is the measure of revenue used. The variable of 
net loans to total assets is found to be statistically significant with both variables of revenues 
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suggesting that a higher fraction of loans to total assets leads to generate more interest 
income and total revenues for MENA commercial banks. This finding would raise a concern 
that commercial banks in the MENA economies tend to concentrate on traditional lending 
activities or, in other words, imply that there is unwillingness or inability from management 
of commercial banks to consider new investments opportunities. 
There is some support that state banks are associated to increasing revenue, if I don’t account 
for year effects. However, both country and year effects were found significant and when I 
account for them, the state effect becomes insignificant. I don’t find any support that foreign 
ownership is a significant explanatory variable for the competitive condition.  
Second I found that banks operate under long-term competitive equilibrium, which means 
that an increase in inputs leads to reduction of revenues in the long run and departure of 
occupants, which is overall encouraging. I found negative and significant year effects during 
the years of Arab uprising (2011, 2012), but also in other recessional years (2009, 2010) and 
a significant and positive effect of foreign ownership factor when return on asset is used to 
test equilibrium, as well as equity to assets (suggesting that banks should be highly 
capitalised). Overall, the findings suggest that allowing more foreign bank participation and 
eliminating barriers on banks is very important to enhance competitiveness in MENA 
banking industry. Additionally, estimating the competitive condition in MENA banking 
industry and its development over time is considered to be some of interests to regulators and 
policy makers in that region because they would enable them to assess that structural reforms 
and whether they should go further to make MENA banking sector more competitive. 
Finally, the positive effect of capital factor (Equity to assets), indicates that regulations 
should require well-capitalised banks to safeguard the stability of the financial system in the 
long run as well as encourage banks to reduce focusing on lending activities and start 
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working on creating other investment opportunities to maintain their market share, 
particularly there is a considerable growth in Islamic banks in MENA economies.  
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Chapter Five 
Total productivity and Efficiency of commercial banks in MENA 
Economies 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present the empirical results of the this study for 149 banks from 
11 countries in the MENA region namely Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 
Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. As it has been 
highlighted in earlier studies that total factor productivity and technical efficiency of 
commercial banks were measured by utilising the DEAP version 2.1 program which was 
written by Tim Coelli from the Centre for Efficiency and Productivity Analysis, at the 
University of Queensland, Australia. This software considers a variety of models (Coelli, 96): 
1) Standard CRS and VRS, DEA approaches concerning the calculation of technical and 
scale efficiencies (where applicable). 
2) The extension of the above approaches to involve the cost and allocative efficiencies. 
These methods are introduced in Fare et al. (1994). 
3) In respect to panel data analysis, the application of Malmquist DEA methods is 
applied to compute indices of total factor productivity (TFP) change, technological 
change; technical efficiency change and scale efficiency change. These methods are 
outlined in Fare et al. (1994) as well. 
The liberalisation of the banking industry and increasing number of bank failures in the 1980s 
and early 1990s resulted in increasing academic interest in the examination of banking 
productivity (Beger & Humphry, 1997; Jaffry et al., 2007; Sufian and Habibullah, 2013). 
Conducting a study to investigate productivity of MENA commercial banks is therefore of 
major importance, for one more reason: stock exchange markets operating in the MENA 
economies are not highly efficient and well-developed; therefore, the banking system has an 
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even more crucial role in funds allocation. The existence of productive and efficient banks 
would contribute in reducing costs and improve profitability which in turns leads to maintain 
the stability of the financial system and improve the overall economic productivity and 
growth. Given the fact, the data of this thesis is panel data, using DEA and Malmquist to 
measure productivity change TFPCH of a firm is required (J.Coelli, 1996). 
5.2 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) Literatures and Hypotheses Development  
Berger and Humphrey (1997) outlined that there are two major approaches for measuring 
efficiency: the parametric approach and nonparametric approach. In general, the parametric 
approach specifies a functional form for the cost, revenue, profit or production relationship 
among inputs, outputs and other factors such as the environment. The most common method 
used in the parametric approach is Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). In contrast, the best-
known nonparametric approach is Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which is a linear 
programming formulation that outlines a nonparametric relationship between multiple 
outputs and multiple inputs, or it can be defined as a mathematical model for making 
production frontiers and measuring the relative efficiency of these frontiers (Humphrey and 
Beger, 1997). However, Vassiloglou and Giokas (1990) pointed out that DEA measures 
efficiency by estimating an empirical production function, which represents the highest value 
of outputs/benefits that could be generated by inputs/resources as given by a range of 
observed input/output measures. The original idea of DEA is to present a methodology 
whereby, within a set of comparable decision making (DMUs), those exhibiting best practice 
could recognised, and would produce an efficient frontier (Cook and Seiford, 2009). 
Therefore, DEA can help to determine an efficient frontier that contains the majority of 
efficient decision making units (DMUs) such as banks. Linear programming methods tolerate 
the construction of best practice cost and production frontiers from these data and 
performance of a bank is judged relative to this frontier (Al Shamsi et al., 2009). According 
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to Berger and Humphrey (1997), the main disadvantage of the nonparametric approach 
(DEA) that assumes there is no random error in constructing the frontier. There is no lack that 
temporarily provides a decision making unit better measured one year from the next, and no 
inaccuracies generated by accounting rules that would make measured outputs and inputs 
differ from economic outputs and inputs. In this section DEA applications in the banking 
industry will be discussed as several studies have examined the efficiency and productivity of 
banks by employing the DEA approach. 
It should be noted that there is a problem specification of DEA inputs and outputs; Sathye 
(2003) pointed out that inputs and outputs could be divided into two approaches, which are an 
intermediation approach and production approach. The intermediation approach, banks are 
regarded as financial intermediates which transfer financial assets between surplus 
institutions and deficit institutions. Therefore, outputs can be containing loans and deposits, 
whereas inputs may be workforce, fixed assets and loanable moneys. On the other hand, the 
production approach, banks are considered to be producers of banking services for customers, 
which are associated with transformation of deposit accounts and process loans. Outputs in 
this model may consist of interest income and non-interest income, while inputs can include 
labour and physical assets. This model has been employed in the banking industry in order to 
examine the efficiency of banks in terms of resources as well as banking services provided by 
those banks. As shown in equation (5.1) DEA is an efficient frontier which calculates a 
comparative ratio of weighted sum of outputs to weighted sum of inputs utilising linear 
programming.  
Efficiency = 
𝒘𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝒔𝒖𝒎 𝒐𝒇 𝒐𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒔
𝒘𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒕𝒆𝒅  𝒔𝒖𝒎 𝒐𝒇 𝒊𝒏𝒑𝒖𝒕𝒔
      (𝟓.𝟏) 
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The relative efficiency ranges between 0 and 1, where 0 represents inefficiency firms, and a 
score of 1 is defined as an efficient operation relative to others. Burki and Niazi (2010) 
evaluated how financial reforms influence the banking efficiency of domestic and foreign 
banks in Pakistan by using a unique bank level data for the period 1991-2000. They 
implemented the DEA approach to investigate efficiency of each year cross-section of banks 
from 1991 to 2000. Estimated efficiency of each yearly cross-section was observed to 
decrease suggesting that Pakistani banks moved away from their efficient cost frontier at the 
first phase of financial reforms (1993-96) due to increase in costs for promoting competition 
and regulations requirements . However, after 1996 with the introduction of the second phase 
of financial reforms, the efficiency was improved. Another study of the relative efficiency of 
bank branches in Greece was implemented by Vassiloglou and Giokas (1990) using DEA on 
20 branches. The efficiency of each branch is measured by comparing it to the set of branches 
under examination as the efficiency of each branch is evaluated, with respect to obvious 
knowledge of the inputs - outputs relationships. All branches being assessed are given the 
efficiency rating (E≤ 1) conditional on the data set under investigation. Therefore, the 
evaluation of a branch as relatively inefficient indicates the existence the branch’s data 
explaining superior efficiency. Likewise, the evaluation of a branch as efficient indicates that 
the data set has no branches functioning efficiently. In terms of input and output selection, 
labour was selected as a major input in this study because of its effects on both levels of 
production and costs. This input was measured in individual hours at each branch. A variety 
of supplies that used at the branch are considered to be associated with the level of production 
and for easiness of combination, and they were measured in terms of monetary value at 
standard costs. The third input is the branch installation itself as it is related to the production 
level and the measurement was the square meters of branch floor-space. The number of 
computer terminals at each branch was selected as the fourth input for exploring deviations in 
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output volumes due to automation. Regarding outputs, branch outputs were measured in 
terms of the number of transactions processed at each branch. 
In the MENA region, in United Arab Emirates (UAE), Al Shamsi et al. (2009) used newly 
collected data from a survey distributed to all banks to measure economic efficiency in the 
banking sector, namely allocative, technical, pure technical and scale efficiency. They 
employed DEA methodology to estimate the efficiency for a cross section of the UAE banks 
in 2004. The three inputs utilised by this study are labour, capital and deposits, and the two 
outputs are loans and investments. Results show that the main source of inefficiency in the 
UAE banks stems from allocative inefficiency rather than technical inefficiency, suggesting 
that the key source of the relatively small size, technical inefficiency in UAE banking sector 
is not the scale inefficiency but rather pure technical inefficiency. The results also confirm 
that the UAE banks are able to use their input resources more efficiently when they have 
more branches, and newer banks perform better than older banks on average. Finally, this 
study confirmed that efficiency is negatively influenced by the short experience of employees 
and state ownership negatively affects the bank efficiency (as the government shares increase 
in the bank, the efficiency scores go down). 
Liberalisation policies are essentially intended at promoting competition in the domestic 
market and enhance efficiency and productivity of financial firms by disciplining them in 
resource management and locating them in a position where their survival and success will 
rely on their ability to adapt and operate efficiently in the new liberalised market (Isik & 
Hassan, 2003). However, in the finance and banking literatures, there are several different 
techniques used to estimate productivity change such as the Fisher index, the Tornqvist index 
and the Malmquist index. The most common method for measuring productivity is (MPI) 
Malmquist Productivity Index (Fare et al. 1994). Studies on productivity using MPI indices 
have been carried out in a number of different industries in well-developed and developing 
139 
 
economies (Isik & Hassan, 2003; Jaffry et al. 2007; Gattoufi et al. 2009; Habibullah, 2013). 
Achieving productivity and efficiency of commercial banks leads to obtaining appropriate 
resource allocations, which in turns benefits the whole society by generating better 
innovations, enhancing profitability and prices, and creating suitable environment conditions 
of competition as well as safeguarding the stability of the financial sector. Nevertheless, the 
evidence of the effect of liberalisation on productivity of financial institutions and other 
industries are mixed. For instance, in well-developed economies, Fare et al. (1994) analysed 
productivity growth in seventeen OECD countries and suggested that US productivity growth 
is relatively higher than average. They argue that the growth has resulted from technological 
progress, whereas In Japan, productivity growth was due to efficiency change. In EU 
economies, Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1997) observed that commercial banks in Spain have 
had to some extent lower rate of productivity growth, but a slightly higher rate of potential 
productivity growth. Such development is linked to differences in both managerial efficiency 
and institutional efficiency, to differences in technological progress, and to the adverse effect 
of diseconomies of scale in the commercial banking industry.  
However, studies on emerging and developing markets have been looked at investigating 
banking productivity in Malaysia, India, Turkey and MENA countries. Isik and Hassan 
(2003) employed DEA using MPI to examine the effects that financial reforms on total factor 
productivity, efficiency and technology of Turkish commercial banks over the period 1981-
1990. Findings imply that performance of all types of banks exhibited major improvements 
after liberalisation and the productivity was mainly driven by increasing in technical 
efficiency attributed to improvements of management practices rather than technological 
progress. In the same context, in Malaysia, Krishnasamy et al. (2003) examined the nature 
and extent of the productivity change of ten commercial banks operating in Malaysia during 
the period 2000-2001 finding that the total factor productivity increased in but two banks 
140 
 
which showed a decline in productivity. Overall, the total factor productivity growth for 
Malaysian commercial banks was attributed to technological progress rather than technical 
efficiency change. On the other hand, Sufian and Habibullah (2013) provided empirical 
evidence about the impact of economic globalisation on total factor productivity in Malaysian 
banks. In the first stage, they employed the MPI to analyse the productivity of the Malaysian 
banking industry over the period 1998-2007. The empirical findings showed that banks have 
experienced productivity growth, mainly due to efficiency increases rather than progress in 
technology. The decomposition of the efficiency change index into pure technical and scale 
efficiency components suggests that the increase in efficiency of Malaysian banks was related 
to the rise in scale efficiency. The second stage of this study was to obtain empirical results 
from the panel regression analysis. Findings report that banks with higher amounts of income 
originating from non-interest income are more productive. In contrast, credit risk appears to 
exert deteriorating effects on a bank’s total productivity levels. 
In India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, there have been a number of studies focusing on the 
impact of deregulation on banking sector. Howcroft and Ataullah (2006) examined the 
productivity of commercial banks operating in India and Pakistan, and they found both 
countries have made improvements in total factor productivity which was higher when the 
government’s policy objective was used. In addition, they confirmed that state banks 
exhibited very little improvement in total factor productivity as a result of their inability to 
adopt new technology and the presence of high non-performing loans. In contrast, foreign 
banks showed the highest growth in productivity due to an improvement in their efficiency 
and technological innovation. Moreover, Jaffry et al. (2007) aimed at estimating changes in 
productivity and technical efficiency level within banking sectors of the Indian sub-continent: 
specifically India, Pakistan and Bangladesh for the period 1993-2001. This study was done in 
the context of a number of sweeping reforms across sub-continent in the early 1990s. They 
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found that technical efficiency both increases and converges across the Indian sub-continent. 
Also, it was observed that India and Bangladesh experienced an immediate and sustained 
increase in technical efficiency, while Pakistan suffered from a decline in efficiency over the 
years of the study.                                               
However, MENA economies have witnessed varying levels of economic development over 
the past few decades: from the 1970s to the present date, the economic performance of this 
region has experienced major developments due to changes in oil crude prices and other 
political factors. The banking sector in MENA economies is committed to sustainable 
development and is engaged in major economic reforms as required for the adhesion to the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). In addition, as previously mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter, stock exchange markets operating in the MENA economies are not highly 
efficient or well-developed, meaning that the banking system still plays a significant role in 
the intermediation between users and suppliers of funds. Therefore, the existence of 
productive and efficient banking sector and capital markets would ensure to maintain the 
stability of the financial system and improve the overall economic productivity and growth. 
In this regard, Ramanathan (2006) employed MPI to assess the comparative performance of 
selected MENA economies over the period 1980-1999, findings telling that technological 
progress contributed more to improvement of total factor productivity than changes in 
technical efficiency. Ramanathan (2007) also suggested that banks operating in four of the six 
GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE) experienced productivity growth 
during 2000-2004. The selected banks in Bahrain have revealed the highest productivity 
improvements during this period; whereas, the selected banks in Qatar have shown the 
highest decline in productivity during the study period.  
The impact of mergers and acquisitions on the efficiency of commercial banks in MENA 
countries is investigated by Gattoufi et al. (2008). To examine such development, the MPI 
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was utilised to analyse the evolution of efficiency over time. In this study, two inputs are 
considered to carry out the analysis, namely interest expenses and operating expenses. 
Outputs are interest income and operating income which makes this model in line with the 
intermediation approach. Findings of the study exhibited the positive impact that mergers and 
acquisitions had on the banking industry, particularly in the MENA economies.  
Another study (Gattoufi et al., 2009) examined the impact which change in ownership has 
had on the efficiency of commercial banks in MENA economies. This study considered two 
inputs, namely operating expense and interest expense. Outputs were considered to be interest 
income and operating income. To make this model consistent with the intermediation 
approach model deposits, interest expense, and non-interest expense were used as inputs, 
while loans, interest income and non-interest income were used as outputs. This study also 
used a second model which included an additional input, namely loan loss provisions which 
can be used as proxy for non-performing loans. Findings emphasise the positive impact, in 
spite of limited change. Regarding the decomposition of the MPI and the technical efficiency 
scores, one can indicate that the impact of change in ownership was affected in the scale 
efficiency rather than in pure technical efficiency. 
Ben Naceur et al. (2009) investigate the impact of deregulation policies on the performance 
of selected MENA commercial banks over the period 1993-2006. They assessed bank 
efficiency using a nonparametric model (DEA), then employed a second stage Tobit 
regression to examine the impact of institutional, financial and bank characteristics variables 
on banks’ efficiency. This study implemented the intermediation approach as inputs used are 
total costs (personnel expenses + other administrative expenses +interest paid + non-interest 
expenses), while outputs are total loans and non-lending activities (earning assets). In respect 
to the first stage, (DEA) results indicate that Morocco and Tunisia have demonstrated 
efficient banking systems when compared to other selected MENA countries. Banks in 
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Jordan, however, seem to catch up with best practice from 2003. For the second stage, the 
empirical findings present a robust relationship between some environmental measures and 
cost efficiency. In this regard, results indicate that well capitalised and liquid banks recorded 
higher efficiency scores. Additionally, results revealed that banking sector development, 
measured by credit provided by banks to the private sector in a low regulated business, is 
more likely to reduce bank efficiency. Further, highly concentrated banking sectors tends to 
decrease banks’ efficiency and financial reforms enhance efficiency of commercial banks in 
MENA, with Egyptian banks exhibiting the lowest efficiency in the region. 
The impact of the 2007-2008 financial crisis on Islamic financial Institutions (IFIs) in Gulf 
Countries Council (GCC) is examined by Al Hammadi (2013). This study investigated the 
differences between GCC and non-GCC IFIs’ efficiency and whether or not the IFIs’ 
efficiency was enhanced during the post and pre-financial crisis period. DEA and MPI were 
employed on a balanced panel of 22 GCC and 19 non-GCC IFIs to examine the link between 
IFI size (total assets) and annual total factor productivity change. This study selected total 
assets and total equity as inputs and return on average assets, return on average equity and net 
income as outputs. The results stated that generally, GCC and non-GCC IFIs’ efficiency was 
not significantly impacted by the financial crisis. Moreover, MPI results indicate that both 
GCC and non-GCC IFIs revealed a progress in efficiency during the study period, whereas 
scale efficiency was the least source of efficiency. The study also reports that efficiency and 
size of IFI is positively related but insignificant. Also, Al Hammadi suggested some policies 
and managerial implications as he pointed out that regulators and policymakers should pay 
more attention to bank efficiency when they pass new policies and regulations. Overall, 
according to the above arguments, the first hypothesis for this chapter can be formulated as 
follows:   
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Hypothesis 1 (H1): Banking productivity in MENA economies has improved during the 
study period. 
However, this thesis provides empirical evidence on the impact of financial liberalisation and 
determinants of total factor productivity in MENA banking economies. In the second stage of 
the analysis, the Tobit model is employed to investigate whether the financial liberalisation 
which has taken place in that period and other variables such as size of banks, risk, market 
structure and macroeconomic variables has had an effect on the productivity of commercial 
banks. In this matter, Rezitis (2004) investigated the productivity growth and technical 
efficiency in the Greek banking sector using MPI. The empirical results from the Tobit model 
reveal that size and specialisation have had positive impacts on both pure and scale 
efficiency. In other market, Das and Kumbhakar (2012) investigated the impact of banking 
deregulation on efficiency and productivity change in the Indian banking sector. Empirical 
findings suggest that banks experienced a growth in their efficiency (from 61% in 1996 to 
72% in 2005) during the post-deregulation period. 
Within the context of MENA banking sector, previous studies in developing economies (Isik 
and Hassan, 2003; Krishnasamy et al. 2003; Howcroft and Ataullah, 2006; Ben Naceur et al. 
2009; Das and Kumbhakar, 2012) have suggested that performance of all types of banks 
exhibited major improvements after liberalisation, and such improvements were attributed to 
improvements of management practices, more investment in technology and positive impact 
of mergers and acquisitions on the banking industry. Ben Naceur et al. (2009) examine the 
impact of deregulation policies on the performance of selected MENA commercial banks 
over the period 1993-2006, employing Tobit model to examine the impact of institutional, 
financial and bank characteristics variables on banks’ efficiency. The empirical findings 
present a robust relationship between some environmental measures and cost efficiency 
implying that well capitalised and liquid banks recorded higher efficiency scores. Results also 
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revealed that banking sector development, measured by credit provided by banks to the 
private sector in a low regulated business, is more likely to reduce bank efficiency. Further, 
highly concentrated banking sectors tends to decrease banks’ efficiency and financial reforms 
enhance efficiency of commercial banks in MENA, with Egyptian banks exhibiting the 
lowest efficiency in the region. Such literature and past studies in different emerging and 
developing economies lead me to introduce the second hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The productivity of banks in MENA economies is influenced by a 
range of bank, market structure and macroeconomic factors. 
The empirical findings of this chapter are interesting from the policy makers’ perception. 
They will be more motivated to find what factors to achieve the optimal utilisation of 
capacities and ensuring that they are being optimised over the production of banking products 
and services. Taking such factors into account, the empirical results of this chapter will 
demonstrate considerable policy implications.  
5.3 The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) Methodology 
The DEA approach was suggested by Charnes et al. (1978) in response to the needs for 
satisfactory procedures to measure the relative efficiency of multiple inputs-outputs 
production units. The DEA approach mainly aims at providing a methodology to create a set 
of comparable decision making units (DMUs) to identify those which have best practice and 
efficient frontier. Moreover, the level of efficiency of non-frontier units can be measured as 
well as identifying scales for such inefficient units (Cook & Seiford, 2009). The DEA 
approach is a liner programming formulation which outlines a nonparametric relationship 
between multiple outputs and multiple inputs (Luo, 2003). This model was employed in order 
to examine the efficiency of banks in terms of resources and banking services provided by 
those banks. In respect to production approach, banks are considered to be producers of their 
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services for their clients in relation to transformation of deposit accounts and loans. The 
methodology of this study encompasses measurements of the efficiency performance and 
productivity of MENA commercial banks for the period 1999-2012. 
5.3.1 Specification of DEA Inputs and Outputs 
Using DEA requires specifying inputs and outputs to estimate productivity and efficiency for 
banks under examination (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). In the banking literature, there are 
two different perspectives as they can be divided into two approaches (intermediation 
approach and production approach). With respect to intermediation approach, banks are 
considered to be financial intermediates that aim at converting financial resources between 
surplus firms to deficit firms. Based on this view, outputs can be loans and deposits, whereas 
inputs may comprise labour, fixed assets, and loanable funds. On the other hand, the 
production approach considers banks to be producers of financial services for their customers 
that seek to execute transactions on deposits accounts and process loans. Therefore, outputs 
under this view may consist of interest income and non-interest income, while, inputs can be 
physical capital and the number of employees (Luo, 2003). Accordingly, MENA commercial 
banks are treated as intermediaries between savers and borrowers, producing three outputs 
namely total loans (y1), interest income (y2) and non-interest income (y3), by using total 
deposits (x1), total fixed assets (x2), non-interest expense (x3) and non-interest expense (x4) 
see table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 Definition and explanation of inputs and outputs variables 
Variable  Definition    
Outputs: 
Y1 
Y2 
 
Total loans 
Interest income 
 
Y3 
Inputs: 
X1 
X2 
X3 
X4 
Non-interest income 
 
Total deposits 
Total fixed assets 
Total interest expense 
Total non-interest 
expense 
    
 
5.3.2 DEA using the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) 
This chapter examines the productivity and efficiency of MENA commercial banks using 
Malmquist DEA to estimate total factor productivity change (TFPCH), technological and 
technical efficiency, and to scale efficiency change in order to investigate first hypothesis. 
This index was primarily developed by Malmquist in 1953. The Malmquist productivity 
index (MPI) utilises panel data to compute indices of total factor productivity change and 
scale efficiency change (Krishnasamy et al., 2003; Coelli, 1996). Following Fare et al (1994) 
and Jaffry et al. (2007) the output orientation is more suitable given the objectives of 
developing economies’ banking industry. This approach measures how much units’ outputs 
can be regularly improved given the observed levels of inputs. However, the framework of 
the production technology is supposed to reveal constant return to scale (CRS) and the 
structure of production technology with the output distance is described as follows: 
𝑫𝒕(𝒙𝒋
𝒕 ,𝒚𝒋
𝒕) = 𝒎𝒊𝒏{∅| (𝒙𝒋
𝒕𝒚𝒋
𝒕/∅)∈  𝒑𝒕}    (5.2) 
Equation (5.2) measures the output technical efficiency of bank j at time t relative to the 
technology at time t (Sufian and Habibullah, 2013). As technical efficiency is measured 
relative to the contemporaneous technology, 𝐷𝑡(𝑥𝑗
𝑡,𝑦𝑗
𝑡) ≤ 1, and 𝐷𝑡(𝑥𝑗
𝑡 ,𝑦𝑗
𝑡) = 1 indicating 
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that bank j is on the production frontier and technically efficient, while 𝐷𝑡(𝑥𝑗
𝑡 ,𝑦𝑗
𝑡)< 1 
emphasising that bank is below the frontier and is technically inefficient.  
In order to run the MPI, distance functions have to be allocated regarding the two different 
periods. The efficiency of bank j at time t relative to the technology at time t+1 can be written 
as: 
𝑫𝒕+𝟏(𝒙𝒋
𝒕 ,𝒚𝒋
𝒕) = 𝒎𝒊𝒏{∅| (𝒙𝒋
𝒕𝒚𝒋
𝒕/∅)∈  𝒑𝒕+𝟏}    (5.3) 
Also, the efficiency of bank j at time t+1 relative to technology at time t can be represented 
by the distance function: 
𝑫𝒕(𝒙𝒋
𝒕+𝟏 ,𝒚𝒋
𝒕+𝟏) = 𝒎𝒊𝒏{∅| (𝒙𝒋
𝒕+𝟏𝒚𝒋
𝒕+𝟏/∅)∈  𝒑𝒕}    (5.4) 
Fare et al (1994) defines the MPI as: 
𝑴𝒕(𝒙𝒋
𝒕+𝟏 ,𝒚𝒋
𝒕+𝟏) =
𝑫𝒕 (𝒙𝒋
𝒕 +𝟏,𝒚𝒋
𝒕+𝟏)
𝑫𝒕(𝒙𝒋
𝒕 ,𝒚𝒋
𝒕)
   or        (5.5) 
 
𝑴𝒕+𝟏(𝒙𝒋
𝒕+𝟏 ,𝒚𝒋
𝒕+𝟏 ,𝒙𝒋
𝒕 ,𝒚𝒋
𝒕) =
𝑫𝒕 +𝟏(𝒙𝒋
𝒕 +𝟏,𝒚𝒋
𝒕+𝟏)
𝑫𝒕+𝟏(𝒙𝒋
𝒕 ,𝒚𝒋
𝒕)
          (5.6) 
A measure of productivity change (TFPCH) is provided by equation (5.6); it grows or 
declines due to changes in technical efficiency (Eff) and technological change (Tech) and 
decomposition of the technical efficiency index are pure technical efficiency (𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑓𝑓) and 
scale efficiency(𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒).  
 To avoid selecting an arbitrary benchmark, two continuous MPIs are integrated into a single 
index by calculating the geometric mean and then multiplicatively decomposed into sub-
indices measuring changes in technical efficiency and technology as follows (Fare et al., 
1989; Fare et al., 1994). 
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∆𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒕,𝒕+𝟏=
𝑫𝒄
𝒕+𝟏(𝒙𝒋
𝒕+𝟏,𝒚𝒋
𝒕+𝟏)
𝑫𝒄
𝒕 (𝒙𝒋
𝒕 ,𝒚𝒋
𝒕)
, and       (5.7) 
 
∆𝑻𝒆𝒄𝒉𝒕,𝒕+𝟏 = √
𝑫𝒄
𝒕 (𝒙𝒋
𝒕 +𝟏,𝒚𝒋
𝒕+𝟏)
𝑫𝒄
𝒕 +𝟏(𝒙𝒋
𝒕 +𝟏,𝒚𝒋
𝒕+𝟏)
×
𝑫𝒄
𝒕 (𝒙𝒋
𝒕 ,𝒚𝒋
𝒕)
𝑫𝒕+𝟏(𝒙𝒋
𝒕 ,𝒚𝒋
𝒕)
       (5.8) 
Equation (5.7) is an index of technical efficiency change between period t and t+1, as it 
measures whether bank j witnessed improvements or went away from best practices for the 
time period. The value of  ∆𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑡,𝑡+1  can be greater than, equal to, or less than based on 
whether the relative efficiency of bank j improved, unchanged, or decreased respectively 
through the period. Whereas,  ∆𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑡,𝑡+1 in equation (5.8) reflects technological change as it 
provides the geometric mean of two ratios. A value of ∆𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑡,𝑡+1  greater than 1 indicates 
progress, equal to 1 refers that there is no change and less than one indicates decline or 
regress in technology for the period t and t+1. 
𝑴𝒕,𝒕+𝟏 = ∆𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒕,𝒕+𝟏 × ∆𝑻𝒆𝒄𝒉𝒕,𝒕+𝟏          (5.9) 
Therefore, changes in productivity are the decomposition of changes in efficiency and 
technology as 𝑀𝑡,𝑡+1 can be greater than, equal to, or less than 1 reflecting progress, no 
change, regress in total factor productivity between periods t and t+1. Generally, equation 
(5.9) the MPI is computed relative to technology pattern. The previous analysis implemented 
the CRS technology in order to calculate the MPI and its two sub-indices as well.  
The ∆𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑡,𝑡+1  index is disaggregated into its mutually comprehensive components of pure 
technical efficiency change ∆𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑡,𝑡+1 computed relative to the variable returns to scale 
(VRS) technology as well as a component of scale efficiency change ∆𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡,𝑡+1 to calculate 
changes in the deviation between the VRS and CRS technologies as:  
∆𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒕,𝒕+𝟏 = ∆𝑷𝒖𝒓𝒆𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒕,𝒕+𝟏 × ∆𝒔𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒕,𝒕+𝟏       (5.10) 
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As  
∆𝑷𝒖𝒓𝒆𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒕,𝒕+𝟏 =
𝑫𝒗
𝒕 +𝟏(𝒙𝒋
𝒕 +𝟏,𝒚𝒋
𝒕+𝟏)
𝑫𝒗
𝒕 (𝒙𝒋
𝒕 ,𝒚𝒋
𝒕 )
          (5.11) 
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𝒕) 𝑫𝒗
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𝒕)⁄
          (5.12) 
The subscripts v and c represent VRS and CRS technologies. When ∆𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑡,𝑡+1 > 1 
implies that there is an increase in pure technical efficiency, while ∆𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑡,𝑡+1 < 1 
indicates decline or regress and ∆𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑡,𝑡+1 = 1 shows that there is no change in pure 
technical efficiency. Likewise, ∆𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡,𝑡+1 > 1 suggests that there is an increase in the most 
efficient scale and hence, scale efficiency is improving, whereas ∆𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡,𝑡+1 < 1 indicates a 
decline and ∆𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑡,𝑡+1 = 1 implies no change in scale efficiency.  
5.3.3 The determinants of banking productivity 
In the second stage of this methodology, this study uses the Tobit regression model to test 
Hypothesis 2 to obtain the impacts of bank-specific variables and macroeconomic variables 
on the total factor productivity of MENA commercial banks. Since total factor productivity 
indices obtained from the DEA, in this case, they are truncated data for which ordinary least 
squares (OLS) is not suitable for such purpose. In this model, the dependent variable is the 
total factor productivity (TFPCH) which is a measure of productivity growth calculated by 
MPI in the first stage (Fare et al., 1989; Fare et al., 1994; Rezitis, 2004). Table 5.2 
summarises the definitions of variables used in investigating the determinants of productivity 
of MENA commercial banks. 
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Table 5.2 Definitions of variables used in assessing productivity 
Variable  Descriptive  
TFPCH Total factor productivity change index derived from Malmquist Index (MPI) 
SIZE Total assets represents bank size including earning assets + cash and due from banks + 
foreclosed real estate + fixed assets +goodwill. 
EQAS Equity to total assets. This variable to measure capital adequacy, computed as equity to 
total assets. High capital-asset ratios indicate low leverage and therefore lower risks  
COST The cost to income ratio. 
LOANAST This is a measure of risk computed as loans to average total assets. Higher ratios imply 
lower liquidity and more interest revenues because of higher risks. However, loans also 
have higher operational costs due to monitoring, originating and serving of loans. 
INF The real inflation rate 
GDPGR The real gross domestic product (GDP) growth 
CR The Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is a measure of market concentration 
within the industry and is used as indicator of the market structure in MENA banking 
sector 
MS A measure calculated by dividing the assets of each bank with the assets of all banks 
operating in a country. 
FORE Dummy variable for foreign ownership 
STATE Dummy variable for state ownership 
COUN Country effects 
YEAR Year effects 
       Source: Bankscope and IMF     
In respect to independent variables, Bank size (SIZE) is measured by using average total 
assets (Smirlock, 1985; Lloyd-Williams, 1994; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Samad, 
2008; Tu and Yuan Chen, 2000; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014). The bank size variable 
takes into consideration differences derived by size in terms of economies of scale.  
Compared to smaller banks, larger banks are expected to experience economies of scale by 
having superior investments opportunities.  
The cost to income ratio (COST) is defined as operating costs (staff salaries, property costs, 
administrative expenditures) over total generated revenues. It measures the overheads or 
expenses required to run a bank or to measure the effect of efficiency in expenditures 
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(Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007; Kosimdou, 2008; Obamuyi, 2013; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 
2014). The key component of which wages and administrative expenses as percentage of 
income can provide information on variation of bank expenditures over banking system. 
Even though higher expenditures can positively affect productivity of a bank meaning that a 
higher cost leads to increase productivity. The equity to total assets (EQAS) variable is 
included in this model as a measure of capital strength. In line with previous studies 
(including Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007; Kosimdou, 
2008; Samad, 2008; Sufian, 2013; Obamuyi, 2014; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014), Sufian 
(2013) suggests that strong capital structure is vital for banks in developing economies 
because it provides additional strength to withstand financial crisis and increased safety for 
depositors during unstable economic conditions. Moreover, the bank with a higher capital 
ratio is regarded relatively safer and protected in the event of loss or liquidation, and lower 
risk increases a bank’s creditworthiness and therefore reduces costs of funding. Loans over 
assets ratio (LOANAST) representing the loans portfolio and the coefficient of this variable is 
expected to be positive as more loans indicate more productivity. 
In respect to macroeconomic and market structure variables, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) is used to denote market concentration (CR), which is employed by policymakers and 
regulators in the banking sector computing by squaring the market share of each bank 
competing in a defined geographic banking industry and then summing the squares. The 
second measure to estimate the impact of market structure is the market share (MS) as it takes 
the market share of each bank in a market measured by total assets. Given the fact that the 
economic condition of the country may affect the performance of banking industry, following 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007; Kosimdou, 2008; 
Samad, 2008; Sufian, 2013; Obamuyi, 2014; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014) the gross 
domestic product growth (GDPGR) is considered the most commonly macroeconomic factor 
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to measure the total economic activity within an economy. GDPGR is expected to have a 
positive effect on bank’s productivity. Another important factor that affects both costs and 
revenues of banks is inflation (INF). The relationship between inflation and bank productivity 
depends on whether inflation is anticipated or unanticipated. With respect to anticipated 
inflation, banks are able to adjust interest rates which will lead to increased revenue than 
costs (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999). Finally, to investigate whether ownership 
influences bank profitability, in this study I categorise a bank as state-owned bank if the 
government owns more than 50%. Foreign ownership is also regarded to exhibit an impact on 
productivity. A bank is considered to be a foreign bank if foreigners own more than 50% of 
its shares are owned by foreign investors. Earlier studies (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
1999; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007; Micooo et al. 2007; Kosimdou, 2008; Samad, 2008; 
Sufian, 2013; Obamuyi, 2014; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014). Finally, YEAR and COUN 
are used to capture the year and country effects respectively.  
In detail, the following regression model is estimated, the total factor productivity change 
(TFPCH) is used as dependent variable. Whilst, for independent variables, Size represents the 
bank size measured by total assets, equity to assets ratio (EQAS) is employed to capture 
capital adequacy and loans to assets ratio (LOANAST) to account for bank-specific risk. The 
cost to income ratio (COST) is the cost management efficiency in MENA banks (Pasiouras 
and Kosmidou, 2007; Kosimdou, 2008; Obamuyi, 2014; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014). 
𝑻𝑭𝑷𝑪𝑯𝒊𝒕 =  𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑶𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟏𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒋𝒕 +
𝜸𝟐𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒋𝒕 + 𝜸𝟑𝑪𝑹𝒋𝒕 + 𝜸𝟒𝑴𝑹𝒋𝒕 + 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 + 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹         (5.13) 
The gross domestic product (GDPGR) and the inflation rate (INF) are employed to control 
differences in macroeconomic; whilst FORE, STATE, COUN and YEAR are used in the 
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model to investigate the effect of foreign ownership, state control, country effects and year 
effects respectively on MENA banks productivity. 
5.4 DEA and the Malmquist Index (MPI) Findings  
In this section, DEA is employed to calculate the distance functions of (MPI) using DEAP 
version which is written to run DEA in order to obtain efficiency and productivity of firms. 
This software utilises panel data to compute indices of total factor productivity change, 
technological change, technical efficiency change, pure technical efficiency change and scale 
efficiency change. 
5.4.1 Empirical results of Malmquist Index in Saudi Arabia  
Estimates of MPI for commercial banks in Saudi Arabia are presented in table 5.3. Given that 
the total factor productivity is a multiplicative compound of technical efficiency change and 
technological change, productivity improvements are determined by comparing the values of 
efficiency change and technological change indices. In other words, productivity 
improvement is due to results of efficiency gains (loss), technological progress (decline) or 
both. The product of pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency is considered the main 
source of the overall efficiency for most of the banks. 
Table 5.3 Annual means of Malmquist Indices of Commercial banks in Saudi Arabia 
Year Technical 
efficiency 
change** 
Technological 
change 
Pure Technical 
Efficiency 
change 
Scale Efficiency 
Change 
Total Factor 
Productivity* 
2000 0.979    0.980    0.995    0.984    0.959 
2001 1.017    1.142    0.993    1.025    1.161 
2002 1.017    1.289    1.011    1.005    1.310 
2003 1.009    1.337    1.003    1.006    1.349 
2004 1.000    1.169    1.000    1.000    1.169 
2005 0.990    1.042    1.000    0.990    1.032 
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2006 0.999    1.013    1.000    0.999    1.012 
2007 0.994    0.821    1.000    0.994    0.816 
2008 1.013    0.971    1.000    1.013    0.984 
2009 0.989    1.212    1.000    0.989    1.199 
2010 0.976    1.296    1.000    0.976    1.264 
2011 1.020    0.971    1.000    1.020    0.990 
2012 1.000    0.946    1.000    1.000    0.946 
MEAN 1.000    1.081    1.000    1.000    1.081 
*Total factor productivity= technical efficiency change  × technological change 
**Technical efficiency change = pure technical efficiency × scale efficiency change  
 
As depicted in table 5.3 the annual means of MPI shows that over 14 years, there is an 
increase in total factor productivity for commercial banks operating in Saudi Arabia of 8.1%. 
Such results suggest that total factor productivity of the commercial banks in Saudi Arabia 
have regressed during the years 2000, 2007, 2008, 2011 and 2012, while years of 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009 and 2010 they have increased. The 8.1% increase in total 
factor productivity in Saudi commercial banks could be due to the 8.1% increase in 
technological progress or change. The results for this country are expected and support the 
hypothesis (1). It can be observed from the table in respect to technological change the 
overall rise in total factor productivity was mainly determined by technological progress 
rather than others. I can link this development with the fact that the Saudi banking sector has 
a share of foreign presence in its commercial banks which helps them to move much faster in 
terms of technological innovations. 
5.4.2 Empirical results of Malmquist Index in United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
Table 5.4 presents the results of total factor productivity for commercial banks operating in 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The annual means of MPI are presented in table 5.4. The 
results show that over the study period there was annual mean increase in total factor 
productivity for all banks of 4.4%. The commercial banks in the UAE have exhibited a rise in 
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total factor productivity during the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2008, 2011 and 2012. 
These results seem to suggest that the overall improvement in total factor productivity was 
attributed to technological progress (upward shift of frontier) of 3.9%. 
The major increase in total factor productivity was in 2011 of 68% attributed mainly to 
technological progress of 65.4% and then increase in technical efficiency of 1.7%. In respect 
to annual results of technological change, results show that over the study period there was a 
technological progress for years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2008, 2011 and 2012. On the other hand, 
it can be seen that there is no massive development in efficiency (technical efficiency) as the 
annual mean of efficiency was 4% which confirms that technological change has the more 
effect to improve productivity of commercial banks rather than technical efficiency. 
Table 5.4 Annual Means of Malmquist Indices of Commercial banks in United Arab 
Emirates 
Year Technical 
efficiency 
change** 
Technological 
change 
Pure Technical 
Efficiency 
change 
Scale Efficiency 
Change 
Total Factor 
Productivity* 
2000 0.952    0.961    0.962    0.990    0.915 
2001 1.045    1.029    1.022    1.023    1.076 
2002 1.013    1.365    1.008    1.004    1.382 
2003 0.959    1.201    0.986    0.972    1.152 
2004 1.052    0.999    1.039    1.012    1.050 
2005 0.981    0.889    0.975    1.006    0.872 
2006 0.907    0.970    0.914    0.993    0.880 
2007 1.181    0.731    1.163    1.016    0.863 
2008 0.997    1.189    1.000    0.997    1.186 
2009 1.007    0.803    1.000    1.007    0.808 
2010 0.987    0.942    0.987    1.000    0.930 
2011 1.017    1.654    1.014    1.004    1.682 
2012 0.989    1.089    1.000    0.989    1.077 
MEAN 1.005    1.039    1.004    1.001    1.044 
*Total factor productivity= technical efficiency change  × technological change 
**Technical efficiency change = pure technical efficiency × scale efficiency change  
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Overall, the total productivity changes for commercial banks in the UAE appear to be 
determined by technological progress rather than technical efficiency. Such findings indicate 
that most of the banks operating in the UAE tend to be investing more in retail banking 
technologies such as ATMs, internet banking, smart cards and wireless services confirming 
the first hypothesis. Since the advent of the global business, it has become imperative for the 
banking industry in the UAE to pursue technological progress leading domestic banks to 
benefit from ranges of technological items offered by foreign investment in order to avoid 
losing their customers due factors related to quality choices, easy access and competitive 
prices.         
5.4.3 Empirical results of Malmquist Index in Oman 
Results presented in table 5.5 show the MPI estimates for annual means of commercial banks 
operating in Oman. The annual total factor productivity exhibited an increase of 14.3%, 
which seems to suggest that commercial banks in Oman have shown improvements in total 
factor productivity during years 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008 and 2012. The 
14.3% increase in total factor productivity of the Omani commercial banking sector is related 
as shown to 14.2% increase in technological change (technological progress), which reflects 
that commercial banks have benefited from expending their capital investments on 
technology. 
Table 5.5 Annual Means of Malmquist Indices of Commercial banks in Oman 
Year Technical 
efficiency 
change** 
Technological 
change 
Pure Technical 
Efficiency 
change 
Scale Efficiency 
Change 
Total Factor 
Productivity* 
2000 1.008    1.017    1.000    1.008    1.025 
2001 1.000    1.010    1.000    1.000    1.010 
2002 1.000    1.333    1.000    1.000    1.333 
2003 0.988    1.064    1.000    0.988    1.051 
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2004 0.990    1.076    1.000    0.990    1.065 
2005 1.002    0.953    1.000    1.002    0.955 
2006 0.978    0.789    0.970    1.008    0.772 
2007 0.987    1.029    0.977    1.011    1.016 
2008 1.023    1.217    1.055    0.970    1.245 
2009 1.033    0.667    1.000    1.033    0.689 
2010 1.000    0.692    1.000    1.000    0.692 
2011 1.000    6.536    1.000    1.000    6.535 
2012 1.000    1.258    1.000    1.000    1.258 
Mean 1.001    1.142    1.000    1.001    1.143 
*Total factor productivity= technical efficiency change  × technological change **Technical efficiency change = 
pure technical efficiency × scale efficiency change  
 
Therefore, as noted earlier, the overall increase in total factor productivity was driven by 
technological progress rather than technical efficiency. The commercial banks have revealed 
progress in technology during years 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008 and 2012. 
Such figures reflect that commercial banks operating in Oman have invested more in better 
capabilities systems and equipment due to the financial liberalisation and financial reforms 
that have been taken place in that period.   
On the other hand, the annual efficiency of commercial banks seems to be increased only by 
1% as the highest increase of technical efficiency was 33% in 2009. The rise of efficiency as 
it shown in the table is mainly due to scale efficiency rather than pure technical efficiency, so 
that, Omani commercial banks are operating with efficient level of outputs (optimal scale of 
efficiency). Regional developments are highlighted as one of the objectives within Omani 
’Vision of 2020’ (Tarawenh, 2006). That vision seeking diversification of Oman’s economy, 
aims for a greater role of private sector, particularly the commercial banks. 
Based on the above discussion, the productivity growth in the commercial banking sector in 
Oman showed that for the study period, improvement in total factor productivity was 14.3%.  
Overall, the rise in total factor productivity was essentially determined by technological 
159 
 
change rather than technical efficiency which in line with hypothesis (1). This result implies 
that most banks tended to increase their spending on banking technology items such as 
ATMs, smart cards, internet banking to improve cost efficiency.  
5.4.4 Empirical results of Malmquist Index in Qatar 
In the State of Qatar, table 5.6 presents MPI annual results for commercial banks operating in 
Qatar. Results indicate that commercial banks in Qatar received on average total factor 
productivity of 7% increase for the study period. The overall improvement in productivity 
over the period was associated with technological progress of 7% and decline in technical 
efficiency (efficiency) of 1%. As previously discussed, the efficiency can be decomposed into 
pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. During the period of study pure technical 
efficiency remained unchanged while the decrease in technical efficiency was merely the 
product of scale efficiency deterioration of 1%, suggesting that commercial banks in Qatar 
have been operating at the operation optimal scale, but also that they have not been efficient 
in controlling their operating costs.  
In more details, total factor productivity revealed a rise during years 2001, 2002, 2006, 2008 
and 2011 as the most massive improvement was in 2011 of 88.1% as a result of increasing in 
technological change (technological progress) of 86% for the same year. Paying attention to 
technological change, commercial banks operating in Qatar have exhibited progress in years 
2001, 2002, 2006, 2008 and 2011. According to Qatar Central Bank, a plausible reason for 
the increase in the technological change is associated with continuing investment in 
technological banking items and human resources with strong capital base provides a solid 
foundation for further growth. 
Overall, the empirical findings indicate that the total factor productivity growth, which 
originates solely from the technological change, is higher in a number of years and is 
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attributed to the rapid adoption of new technology by commercial banks in Qatar. The 
deterioration in efficiency during the study period can be attributed to the presence of 
adjustments costs related to investing in new technology supporting hypothesis (1).          
Table 5.6 Annual Means of Malmquist Indices of Commercial banks in Qatar 
Year Technical 
efficiency 
change** 
Technological 
change 
Pure Technical 
Efficiency 
change 
Scale Efficiency 
Change 
Total Factor 
Productivity* 
2000 0.976    0.792    1.000    0.976    0.773 
2001 0.957    1.182    1.000    0.957    1.131 
2002 1.071    1.220    1.000    1.071    1.307 
2003 1.000    0.759    1.000    1.000    0.759 
2004 1.000    0.867    1.000    1.000    0.867 
2005 0.997    0.933    1.000    0.997    0.930 
2006 0.996    1.012    1.000    0.996    1.008 
2007 1.008    0.938    1.000    1.008    0.946 
2008 0.983    1.046    1.000    0.983    1.028 
2009 1.017    0.902    1.000    1.017    0.917 
2010 0.987    0.959    1.000    0.987    0.947 
2011 1.013    1.857    1.000    1.013    1.881 
2012 0.993    0.983    1.000    0.993    0.977 
Mean 0.999    1.007    1.000    0.999    1.007 
*Total factor productivity= technical efficiency change  × technological change 
**Technical efficiency change = pure technical efficiency × scale efficiency change  
 
5.4.5 Empirical results of Malmquist Index in Bahrain 
Table 5.7 shows the results of MPI for the year under this study. Given that the total 
productivity factor revealed an annual increase of 10%, the overall improvement in 
productivity for the study period was attributed to an average increase in technological 
change (upward shift of the frontier) of 10% while efficiency (technical efficiency) remained 
unchanged. Findings in this table suggest that Bahraini commercial banks have shown a rise 
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of productivity during years 2000, 2002, 2003, 2006 and 2007, and decrease during 2001, 
2004, 2005. 
Regarding technical efficiency (efficiency), it can be noted that the annual mean of efficiency 
is unchanged but yearly it observed a decline during 2000, 2004, 2005 and showed an 
increase in 2001, 2006, and 2007. The decline in efficiency in some years is related mainly to 
a decrease in scale efficiency rather than to pure technical efficiency. The results suggest that 
Bahraini commercial banks have been operating at optimal scale of operation. 
Table 5.7 Annual Means of Malmquist Indices of Commercial banks in Bahrain  
Year Technical 
efficiency 
change** 
Technological 
change 
Pure Technical 
Efficiency 
change 
Scale Efficiency 
Change 
Total Factor 
Productivity* 
2000 0.999    1.056    1.000    0.999    1.055 
2001 1.001    0.940    1.000    1.001    0.941 
2002 1.000    1.110    1.000    1.000    1.110 
2003 1.000    1.243    1.000    1.000    1.243 
2004 0.980    0.957    1.000    0.980    0.938 
2005 0.965    0.539    1.000    0.965    0.520 
2006 1.050    1.401    1.000    1.050    1.471 
2007 1.006    0.893    1.000    1.006    0.899 
2008 1.000    1.078    1.000    1.000    1.078 
2009 1.000    0.971    1.000    1.000    0.971 
2010 1.000    0.927    1.000    1.000    0.927 
2011 1.000    1.200    1.000    1.000    1.200 
2012 1.000    1.109    1.000    1.000    1.109 
Mean 1.000    1.010    1.000    1.000    1.010 
*Total factor productivity= technical efficiency change  × technological change 
**Technical efficiency change = pure technical efficiency × scale efficiency change  
 
The overall increase in total factor productivity was attributed solely to technological 
progress and hypothesis 1 is supported. This result implies that banks have not been operating 
at constant returns to scale. A possible reason for the increase in technological change may be 
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related to investment decisions in sophisticated systems and equipment as well as banking 
reforms and financial liberalisation which have been taking place for that period. Bahraini 
banking has witnessed a presence of foreign banks as those banks have a crucial effect on 
domestic banks to move further in investing in technological innovations.  
The Bahraini banking sector has shown a reaction to the changes in the global nature of 
business which leads banks operating in Bahrain to pursue technological progress and invest 
more in retail banking technologies such as internet banking (E-Banking), ATMs and 
wireless banking. Therefore, in order to maintain market share in the market, commercial 
banks should invest more in new technology to avoid losing customers because of some 
factors attributed to easy access and competitive prices.             
5.4.6 Empirical results of Malmquist Index in Kuwait 
Table 5.8 presents the annual means of MPI results for banks operating in the State of 
Kuwait. Findings show that over the study period there was a mean annual growth in total 
factor productivity for commercial banks of 50%. Such improvement in productivity during 
that period was attributed solely to an increase in technological change (progress) of 50%. 
The overall increase in factor productivity is driven by technological progress only, according 
to results year by year; it seems to indicate that Kuwaiti commercial banks have observed a 
growth in productivity during years 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2011 and 2012. The 
highest improvement in productivity was in 2011 of 40%, due to the highest technological 
change of 44%. A probable reason for the progress in technology during those years could be 
associated with financial reforms and deregulation that have occurred in the last two decades 
which led to growth of assets of commercial banks with more expertise to invest in 
sophisticated system and equipment. Such a growth continued rapidly as a result of adoption 
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of new information technology by Kuwaiti banking sector, and hence they moved faster for 
technological innovation. Such findings are in line with hypothesis (1).  
Table 5.8 Annual Means of Malmquist Indices of Commercial banks in Kuwait  
Year Technical 
efficiency 
change** 
Technological 
change 
Pure Technical 
Efficiency 
change 
Scale Efficiency 
Change 
Total Factor 
Productivity* 
2000 0.989    1.108    1.000    0.989    1.095 
2001 0.983    1.093    1.000    0.983    1.074 
2002 1.020    1.109    1.000    1.020    1.132 
2003 0.991    1.328    1.000    0.991    1.316 
2004 1.018    0.966    1.000    1.018    0.983 
2005 1.000    0.932    1.000    1.000    0.932 
2006 1.000    0.664    1.000    1.000    0.664 
2007 1.000    1.118    1.000    1.000    1.118 
2008 1.000    0.825    1.000    1.000    0.825 
2009 1.000    0.992    1.000    1.000    0.992 
2010 1.000    1.310    1.000    1.000    1.310 
2011 0.973    1.438    1.000    0.973    1.399 
2012 1.028    1.020    1.000    1.028    1.049 
Mean  1.000    1.050    1.000    1.000    1.050 
*Total factor productivity= technical efficiency change  × technological change 
**Technical efficiency change = pure technical efficiency × scale efficiency change 
 
5.4.7 Empirical results of Malmquist Index in Egypt 
As depicted in table 5.9, the MPI findings show that Egyptian commercial banks have 
observed a decrease in total factor productivity by 7.8%. In more details, the results appear to 
suggest that Egyptian commercial banks exhibited a total factor productivity decline during 
the years 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2012 which in turns 
does not support the hypothesis (1), whereas, total productivity was recorded to increase 
during the years 2003, 2005 and 2010. As discussed earlier, the total productivity can be 
decomposed into technical efficiency and technological change, over the study period 
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technical efficiency and technological change revealed an annual mean decline of 1.4% and 
6.6% respectively. On the other hand, it can be seen that technical efficiency (efficiency) of 
commercial banks operating in Egypt were observed to have a decrease by 1.4%. According 
to the results, this decline was attributed to regress in pure technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency as there is no significant difference between both of them (pure technical 
efficiency and scale efficiency). The results telling us that banks operating in Egypt have not 
been operating at optimal scale of operations and have been managerially inefficient in 
managing their operating expenditures. 
 
Table 5.9 Annual Means of Malmquist Indices of Commercial banks in Egypt 
Year Technical 
efficiency 
change** 
Technological 
change 
Pure Technical 
Efficiency 
change 
Scale Efficiency 
Change 
Total Factor 
Productivity* 
2000 1.017    0.898    1.011    1.006    0.913 
2001 0.972    0.955    0.979    0.994    0.928 
2002 0.996    0.973    0.999    0.998    0.970 
2003 0.959    1.186    0.985    0.973    1.137 
2004 1.002    0.954    1.003    0.999    0.956 
2005 1.068    0.941    1.036    1.030    1.005 
2006 1.006    0.974    1.000    1.006    0.980 
2007 0.967    0.941    0.979    0.987    0.910 
2008 0.945    1.018    0.976    0.968    0.961 
2009 1.062    0.928    1.038    1.023    0.985 
2010 0.887    1.214    0.946    0.937    1.076 
2011 1.025    0.586    1.002    1.023    0.601 
2012 0.934    0.756    0.948    0.985    0.706 
Mean 0.986    0.934    0.992    0.994    0.922 
*Total factor productivity= technical efficiency change  × technological change 
**Technical efficiency change = pure technical efficiency × scale efficiency change  
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Although the financial services and banking reforms have a critical element of economic 
reform presented in 1990s as the Egyptian banking sector observed a level of development, 
results for this case implies that regulators and the central bank in Egypt should pay more 
attention to technical efficiency (efficiency) of banks as results suggest that banks have not 
been operating with efficient level of operation and inefficient in controlling their operating 
costs. Furthermore, regulators should go further to invest in technology such as ATMs, 
interment banking and wireless in order to reach cost efficiency and to avoid losing 
customers. It can be argued that banks will be able to expand their productivity by investing 
more in advance technology.      
5.4.8 Empirical results of Malmquist Index in Jordan 
Estimation of annual mean of MPI results for commercial banks operating in Jordan are 
presented in table 5.10, below. Results for the study period imply that commercial banks in 
Jordan have revealed an average increase of total factor productivity of 5.6%. Findings seem 
to suggest that the overall improvement in total factor productivity was attributed to a 
technological change of 5.1% rather than technical efficiency of 0.5%. Jordanian commercial 
banks have exhibited productivity growth during the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2012 confirming hypothesis (1). 
According to the literature (Al-Fayoumi, 2009) the increased in technological change and its 
positive effects on productivity  are due to deregulation and the liberalisation of the banking 
system and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) signed by the Jordon 
government in 2001. Al-Fayomi (2009) highlighted that the banking sector in Jordan is 
introducing new banking products and investing more in technological banking items and 
human resources. Additionally, foreign banks that operate in Jordan have has put a pressure 
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on domestic banks to move much faster in investing in technological innovation to achieve 
the cost efficiency and gaining a competitive edge.  
It can be noted from the table that the technical efficiency (efficiency) of banks in Jordan has 
increased by 0.5%, but this is attributed mainly to scale efficiency rather than pure technical 
efficiency. The results of this case indicate that banks in Jordan have been operating at 
optimal scale or with efficient level of outputs, but that they did not do so efficiently by 
managing their operating costs. Generally, due to the (GATS), it is imperative for Jordanian 
banks to pursue technological progress as more domestic banks offer the products introduced 
by foreign investors. Results also suggest that commercial banks have been moving toward 
investing in retail banking technologies such as ATMs, software, internet banking.                            
Table 5.10 Annual Means of Malmquist Indices of Commercial banks in Jordan 
Year Technical 
efficiency 
change** 
Technological 
change 
Pure Technical 
Efficiency 
change 
Scale Efficiency 
Change 
Total Factor 
Productivity* 
2000 1.010    0.978    1.004    1.006    0.988 
2001 1.010    1.051    1.003    1.007    1.062 
2002 1.016    1.053    0.998    1.018    1.070 
2003 0.960    1.299    1.002    0.958    1.247 
2004 0.962    1.140    0.988    0.973    1.097 
2005 1.071    0.972    1.012    1.059    1.041 
2006 1.010    1.003    1.000    1.010    1.014 
2007 1.034    1.129    1.000    1.034    1.167 
2008 0.969    1.095    0.973    0.996    1.060 
2009 1.030    0.609    1.028    1.002    0.627 
2010 0.974    1.597    0.974    1.000    1.556 
2011 1.014    1.305    1.021    0.994    1.323 
2012 1.007    0.776    1.006    1.002    0.781 
Mean 1.005    1.051    1.001    1.004    1.056 
*Total factor productivity= technical efficiency change  × technological change 
**Technical efficiency change = pure technical efficiency × scale efficiency change  
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5.4.9 Empirical results of Malmquist Index in Lebanon 
The annual means of MPI of Lebanese banks are presented in table 5.11. The results indicate 
that over the study period, the annual mean of total factor productivity for commercial banks 
operating in Lebanon have experienced regressed by 2% and therefore hypothesis (1) is not 
supported. Findings suggest that commercial banks operating in Lebanon have regressed in 
total productivity during the years 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2008 and 2011 while total 
productivity increased during the years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2012. According to the 
table, the growth in productivity can be attributed to technological change rather than 
technical efficiency (efficiency). These results are supported by previous research. Turk-Ariss 
(2008), for instance, highlighted that the government of Lebanon plans to join the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) which justifies the need for an efficient and more competitive 
banking sector. As a result of such matter, Lebanon has made a heavy investment in 
information technology and technological innovations. 
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Table 5.11 Annual Means of Malmquist Indices of Commercial banks in Lebanon  
Year Technical 
efficiency 
change** 
Technological 
change 
Pure Technical 
Efficiency 
change 
Scale Efficiency 
Change 
Total Factor 
Productivity* 
2000 0.992    0.965    1.007    0.985    0.957 
2001 1.007    0.918    1.000    1.007    0.924 
2002 1.021    0.920    1.003    1.018    0.939 
2003 0.989    0.976    1.000    0.989    0.965 
2004 1.006    0.910    0.998    1.008    0.916 
2005 1.011    1.013    1.001    1.010    1.024 
2006 1.000    1.044    1.001    0.999    1.044 
2007 0.980    1.054    0.979    1.000    1.032 
2008 0.975    1.014    0.994    0.981    0.989 
2009 0.976    1.063    1.027    0.950    1.037 
2010 0.949    1.137    0.998    0.951    1.078 
2011 0.997    0.865    0.930    1.072    0.862 
2012 1.005    1.003    1.031    0.975    1.008 
Mean 0.993    0.988    0.997    0.995    0.981 
*Total factor productivity= technical efficiency change  × technological change 
**Technical efficiency change = pure technical efficiency × scale efficiency change 
However, as discussed earlier, the technical efficiency change can be decomposed into its 
pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. For the study period, efficiency of commercial 
banks in Lebanon have decreased for mean annual of banks by 7%, which can be attributed to 
a decrease in the annual mean of pure technical efficiency of 3% and scale efficiency of 5%. 
Results suggest that commercial banks operating in Lebanon have not been working at the 
optimal scale of operation and controlling their operating expenses. Overall, the previous 
results show that the monetary authority and regulators should pay more consideration to 
efficiency of banks in terms of operating at optimal outputs and controlling their operating 
expenses efficiently.   
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5.4.10 Empirical results of Malmquist Index in Morocco 
As introduced in table 5.12, the MPI results show that commercial banks operating in 
Morocco have, on average, revealed a growth in total factor productivity of 4% to confirm 
hypothesis (1). This growth resulted from the increase in technological change (upward shift 
of the frontier) of 4% and annual technical efficiency remained unchanged. This result 
suggests that banks operating in Morocco have not operated at constant return to scale and 
they have not efficiently selected their inputs combinations.  
However, technological change which is the main source of productivity growth of 4%  rose 
during the years 2001, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2011. The plausible reason 
for the increase in technological change could be related to a mega-merger programme which 
has led to large banks with good abilities to improve their productivity through capital 
investment in information technology. Furthermore, Morocco witnessed a comprehensive 
financial reform, particularly in the banking industry before 1990s, as the state owns merely 
29% of banking assets (Ben Naceur, 2011).              
Table 5.12 Annual Means of Malmquist Indices of Commercial banks in Morocco 
Year Technical 
efficiency 
change** 
Technological 
change 
Pure Technical 
Efficiency 
change 
Scale Efficiency 
Change 
Total Factor 
Productivity* 
2000 0.820    0.814    1.000    0.820    0.668 
2001 1.165    1.019    1.000    1.165    1.187 
2002 0.920    1.088    1.000    0.920    1.001 
2003 1.002    0.995    1.000    1.002    0.997 
2004 1.135    1.099    1.000    1.135    1.247 
2005 0.961    0.913    1.000    0.961    0.878 
2006 1.007    1.094    1.000    1.007    1.102 
2007 1.033    1.299    1.000    1.033    1.341 
2008 0.993    1.125    1.000    0.993    1.117 
2009 1.007    1.018    1.000    1.007    1.025 
2010 0.998    1.000    1.000    0.998    0.999 
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2011 1.002    1.198    1.000    1.002    1.200 
2012 1.000    0.953    1.000    1.000    0.953 
Mean 1.000    1.040    1.000    1.000    1.040 
*Total factor productivity= technical efficiency change  × technological change 
**Technical efficiency change = pure technical efficiency × scale efficiency change  
 
5.4.11 Empirical results of Malmquist Index in Tunisia 
The results of the annual means of MPI for commercial banks operating in Tunisia are 
reported in table 5.13. According to the results, commercial banks operating in Tunisia have 
an average record growth in total factor productivity of 1.4% and this result supports 
hypothesis (1). The overall improvement for the whole period was attributed to a rise in 
technological change of 0.8% and technical efficiency increase of 0.6%. 
Table 5.13 Annual Means of Malmquist Indices of Commercial banks in Tunisia  
Year Technical 
efficiency 
change** 
Technological 
change 
Pure Technical 
Efficiency 
change 
Scale Efficiency 
Change 
Total Factor 
Productivity* 
2000 0.980 1.045 1.002    0.978    1.024 
2001 1.027 0.797 1.003    1.024    0.819 
2002 1.032 1.037 1.002    1.030    1.070 
2003 1.000 1.024 0.983    1.017    1.023 
2004 1.000 1.024 0.983    1.017    1.023 
2005 1.032 1.037 1.002    1.030    1.070 
2006 0.945 1.213 0.973    0.971    1.146 
2007 1.027 0.797 1.003    1.024    0.819 
2008 0.980 1.045 1.002    0.978    1.024 
2009 1.036 0.925 1.039    0.997    0.958 
2010 1.013 1.130 0.992    1.020    1.144 
2011 1.007 1.042 0.995    1.013    1.050 
2012 1.017 0.921 1.010    1.006    0.937 
Mean 1.006 1.008 1.000    1.006    1.014 
*Total factor productivity= technical efficiency change  × technological change 
**Technical efficiency change = pure technical efficiency × scale efficiency change  
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Findings suggest that commercial banks in Tunisia have observed total productivity growth 
during the years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2011, whereas productivity is shown to 
have decreased during the years 2007, 2009 and 2012. It can be noted from the table that 
efficiency of banks has obtained an annual mean growth of 0.6%, attributed mainly to scale 
efficiency rather than to pure technical efficiency, indicating that commercial banks operating 
in Tunisia have been operating at optimal level of outputs but have not been efficient in 
managing their operating expenses.  
5.5 Total Factor Productivity Tobit Regression Findings 
In the second stage of this methodology, this chapter uses the Tobit regression model to 
obtain the impacts of bank-specific and macroeconomic variables on the total factor 
productivity of MENA commercial banks. Since total factor productivity results obtained 
from the DEA, in this case, they are truncated data for which ordinary least squares (OLS) is 
not appropriate for such purpose. 
With respect to the variable measuring bank risk (LOANAST) net loans to total assets, it 
exhibits a negative relationship and statistically significant at 10% level in tables 5.14 and 
5.15. Also recorded negative and significantly relationship at 5% level in table 5.16. Such 
results are in line with Sufian and Habibullah (2013) who indicate a positive relationship 
between the productivity of banks and the level of liquidity held by banks. The ratio is 
considered high if banks are less liquid, so that results emphasise the more productive banks 
are the more likely they are to be more liquid. One reason which could explain why banks 
with higher liquidity are more productive is related to monitoring cost increases for higher 
amounts of loans in terms of originated, serviced and monitored as suggested by Ben Naceur 
(2011). The negative impact of liquidity risk on bank productivity is explained by the fact 
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that less liquid banks are more involved in financing risky loans which in turns lead to have 
nonperforming loans.  
Table 5.14 Tobit regression analysis to investigate determinants of banking productivity 
(TFPCH) 
𝑻𝑭𝑷𝑪𝑯𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝒐𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟏𝑪𝑹𝒋𝒕 + 𝜸𝟐 𝑴𝑹𝒋𝒕 + 𝜸𝟑𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒋𝒕
+ 𝜸𝟒𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒋𝒕 + 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕 + 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹  
TFPCH Tobit One  Tobit Two Tobit Three Tobit Four 
C 
 
0.749*** 
(3.135) 
0.749*** 
(3.233) 
0.732*** 
(3.172) 
0.726*** 
(3.160) 
SIZE 
 
-1.07 
(-0.829) 
-1.07 
(-0.833) 
  
EQAS 
 
-1.71 
(-8.23)  
  
LOANAST 
 
-0.001* 
(-1.792) 
-0.001* 
(-1.830) 
-0.001* 
(-1.818) 
-0.001* 
(-1.820) 
COST 
 
0.070* 
(1.678) 
0.070* 
(1.722) 
0.074* 
(1.825) 
0.075* 
(1.833) 
CR 
 
0.419 
(0.936) 
0.419 
(0.940) 
0.417 
(0.934) 
0.416 
(0.932) 
MS 
 
0.000 
(0.019) 
0.000 
(0.019) 
-0.013 
(-0.276) 
 
GDPGR 
 
-0.002 
(-0.461) 
-0.002 
(-0.463) 
-0.001 
(-0.441) 
-0.002 
(-0.466) 
INF 
 
-0.002*** 
(-2.891) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.891) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.895) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.882) 
FORE 
 
0.027 
(0.848) 
0.027 
(0.849) 
0.028 
(0.896) 
0.028 
(0.907) 
STATE 
 
0.010 
(0.326) 
0.010 
(0.326) 
0.005 
(0.183) 
0.004 
(0.141) 
Kuwait  
 
0.167** 
(2.068) 
0.167** 
(2.068) 
0.169** 
(2.096) 
0.169* 
(2.089) 
Oman 
 
0.530*** 
(6.288) 
0.530*** 
(6.316) 
0.540*** 
(6.504) 
0.540*** 
(6.504) 
Qatar 
 
0.239** 
(1.982) 
0.239** 
(1.982) 
0.242** 
(2.007) 
0.241** 
(1.999) 
Saudi Arabia 
 
0.184** 
(2.152) 
0.184** 
(2.165) 
0.172** 
(2.058) 
0.173** 
(2.067) 
United Arab UAE 
 
0.394*** 
(3.678) 
0.394*** 
(3.725) 
0.397*** 
(3.753) 
0.397*** 
(3.752) 
YEAR=2001 
 
0.119* 
(1.800) 
0.119* 
(1.802) 
0.115* 
(1.746) 
0.118* 
(1.815) 
YEAR=2002 
 
0.121* 
(1.846) 
0.121* 
(1.849) 
0.117* 
(1.788) 
0.120* 
(1.858) 
YEAR=2006 
 
0.155** 
(2.124) 
0.155** 
(2.125) 
0.147** 
(2.029) 
0.150** 
(2.105) 
YEAR=2007 
 
0.187** 
(2.484) 
0.187** 
(2.487) 
0.176** 
(2.377) 
0.180** 
(2.452) 
YEAR=2008 
 
0.167** 
(2.105) 
0.167** 
(2.106) 
0.154** 
(1.983) 
0.157** 
(2.044) 
YEAR=2009 
 
0.250*** 
(3.217) 
0.250*** 
(3.217) 
0.237*** 
(3.112) 
0.240*** 
(3.171) 
173 
 
YEAR=2010 
 
0.611*** 
(7.512) 
0.611*** 
(7.513) 
0.597*** 
(7.498) 
0.600*** 
(7.586) 
YEAR=2011 
 
0.171** 
(2.026) 
0.171** 
(2.026) 
0.155* 
(1.888) 
0.158* 
(1.924) 
YEAR=2012 
 
0.250*** 
(2.821) 
0.250*** 
(2.822) 
0.233*** 
(2.701) 
0.235*** 
(2.735) 
 Dependent variable TFPCH= Total factor productivity change. Independent variables: SIZE =average total assets, 
EQAS= equity to average total assets, LOANAST= net loans to average total assets, NIE/TA =non -interest 
expense to average total assets CR= the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI), MS= Market share, GDPGR= real gross 
domestic growth, INF = real inflation rate, FORE= dummy for foreign ownership, STATE= dummy for state ownership.  
*significant at the 10% level 
**significant at the 5% level 
***significant at 1% level 
 
Regarding the effect of banks size (size) measured by total assets, the empirical results show 
a negative coefficient of the size variable but insignificant. Such a finding is supported by 
Kosmidou (2008) and Sufian and Habibullah (2013) as they pointed out that growing in size 
could have a negative impact on the performance of a bank, as a result of more bureaucratic 
procedures. Concerning the level of capitalisation (EQAS), results are mixed as some 
regressions exhibited a negative relationship and were statistically insignificant with total 
factor productivity of banks. Based on these results there is no evidence for the relationship 
between productivity of MENA banks and their capital adequate.     
In respect to the impact of market concentration and market share on banking productivity, 
results show a positive but insignificant sign: the empirical findings of this variable do not 
support the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis. On the other hand, using 
market share as the market power indicator exhibited negative a value but also insignificant, 
so that the results do not provide strong evidence that the larger banks are less or more 
productive. Turning to the effect of a bank’s cost on its productivity; it is interesting to 
observe that the coefficients of COST revealed a positive and significant effect on banks’ 
total productivity at the 5% and 10% level in all regressions. Findings indicate that an 
increase (decrease) in costs improves (reduce) productivity of commercial banks operating in 
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MENA economies. It seems to suggest that expenses preference behaviour in this case leads 
banks to be more productive. A reasonable justification is that more highly qualified and 
professional management may require a higher remuneration package as well as employees 
incentives programmes which can encourage or promote a bank’s employees to produce 
measureable outcomes, and therefore a positive relationship with productivity of banks 
(Sathye, 2003).     
Table 5.15 Tobit regression analysis to investigate determinants of banking productivity 
(TFPCH) 
𝑻𝑭𝑷𝑪𝑯𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝒐𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟏𝑪𝑹𝒋𝒕 + 𝜸𝟐𝑴𝑹𝒋𝒕 + 𝜸𝟑𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒋𝒕
+ 𝜸𝟒𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒋𝒕 + 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕 + 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹  
TFPCH Tobit One Tobit Two Tobit Three  Tobit Four 
C 
 
0.963*** 
(5.444) 
0.956*** 
(5.409) 
0.950*** 
(5.414) 
0.944*** 
(5.422) 
SIZE 
 
-1.11 
(-0.867) 
   
EQAS 
 
-0.000 
(-0.375) 
-0.000 
(-0.305) 
  
LOANAST 
 
-0.001* 
(-1.762) 
-0.001* 
(-1.732) 
-0.001* 
(-1.705) 
-0.001* 
(-1.707) 
COST 
 
0.001** 
(1.920) 
0.001** 
(2.016) 
0.001** 
(2.028) 
0.001** 
(2.039) 
CR 
 
0.444 
(0.992) 
0.439 
(0.980) 
0.426 
(0.956) 
0.425 
(0.954) 
MS 
 
0.001 
(0.032) 
-0.012 
(-0.269) 
-0.011 
(-0.250) 
 
GDPGR 
 
-0.002 
(-0.526) 
-0.002 
(-0.513) 
-0.002 
(-0.533) 
-0.002 
(-0.556) 
INF 
 
-0.002*** 
(-2.939) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.945) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.942) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.931) 
FORE 
 
0.027 
(0.854) 
0.029 
(0.909) 
0.029 
(0.927) 
0.029 
(0.937) 
STATE 
 
0.009 
(0.298) 
0.004 
(0.149) 
0.004 
(0.161) 
0.003 
(0.124) 
Kuwait 
 
0.153* 
(1.929) 
0.154* 
(1.942) 
0.153* 
(1.935) 
0.153* 
(1.927) 
Oman 
 
0.527*** 
(6.260) 
0.537*** 
(6.432) 
0.535*** 
(6.428) 
0.535*** 
(6.428) 
Qatar 
 
0.228* 
(1.897) 
0.230* 
(1.916) 
0.230* 
(1.921) 
0.229* 
(1.913) 
Saudi Arabia 
 
0.179** 
(2.092) 
0.166** 
(1.972) 
0.164** 
(1.955) 
0.165** 
(1.962) 
UAE 
 
0.390*** 
(3.649) 
0.391*** 
(3.656) 
0.386*** 
(3.655) 
0.386*** 
(3.654) 
YEAR=2000 
 
0.042 
(0.631) 
0.038 
(0.577) 
0.039 
(0.591) 
0.042 
(0.645) 
YEAR=2001 0.120* 0.116* 0.117* 0.120* 
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 (1.814) (1.762) (1.779) (1.845) 
YEAR=2002 
 
0.121* 
(1.849) 
0.117* 
(1.791) 
0.119* 
(1.816) 
0.121* 
(1.882) 
YEAR=2006 
 
0.152** 
(2.083) 
0.144** 
(1.983) 
0.145** 
(2.000) 
0.148** 
(2.071) 
YEAR=2007 
 
0.185*** 
(2.457) 
0.174*** 
(2.342) 
0.176*** 
(2.368) 
0.179*** 
(2.439) 
YEAR=2008 
 
0.164** 
(2.074) 
0.151** 
(1.944) 
0.152** 
(1.957) 
0.155** 
(2.014) 
YEAR=2009 
 
0.252*** 
(3.243) 
0.238*** 
(3.132) 
0.238*** 
(3.129) 
0.241*** 
(3.185) 
YEAR=2010 
 
0.615*** 
(7.552) 
0.601*** 
(7.530) 
0.601*** 
(7.527) 
0.603*** 
(7.613) 
YEAR=2011 
 
0.175** 
(2.072) 
0.159** 
(1.929) 
0.159** 
(1.933) 
0.161** 
(1.967) 
YEAR=2012 
 
0.254*** 
(2.861) 
0.236*** 
(2.733) 
0.235*** 
(2.728) 
0.237*** 
(2.761) 
Dependent variable TFPCH= Total factor productivity change. Independent variables: SIZE =average total assets, 
EQAS= equity to average total assets, LOANAST= net loans to average total assets, NIE/TA =non -interest 
expense to average total assets CR= the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI), MS= Market share, GDPGR= real gross 
domestic growth, INF = real inflation rate, FORE= dummy for foreign ownership, STATE= dummy for state ownership  
*significant at the 10% level 
**significant at the 5% level 
***significant at 1% level  
   
Referring to the impact of macroeconomic indicators on the productivity of banks, results of 
(GDPGR) growth in gross domestic product are not consistent with the theory that banks tend 
to be more productive in a growing economy, since all results in all regressions are negative 
and insignificant as well. In respect to inflation (INF), results show that the inflation variable 
has a negative and significant relationship with the productivity of commercial banks. It 
could be explained that banks during the study period, have not anticipated a level of inflation 
which allowed them to adjust interests rates and consequently improve productivity. Also, 
during times of growth, banks are more encouraged to provide loans which in turns require 
additional costs to monitor and screen. Therefore higher proportions of loans are observed 
highest operational costs. 
Finally, to account market changes, financial reforms and technological changes on 
productivity of commercial banks operating in the MENA region, year and country effects 
have been introduced in the models for this study. All years in those models are compared to 
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the basic year 1999, and all countries are compared to Bahrain. The general findings from the 
table below indicate that total factor productivity of commercial banks are mostly higher than 
those of the basic year implying that productivity has improved during the period of the 
study. These improvements could be linked to the fact that banking industry in the MENA 
countries have engaged in updating technologies, more capital investment in technology 
including ATMs and internet banking services, and increasing the availability of debt and 
credit cards. Furthermore, banking systems in the MENA markets have witnessed strong 
financial reforms programmes during this period. 
Table 5.16 Tobit regression analysis to investigate determinants of banking productivity 
(TFPCH) 
𝑻𝑭𝑷𝑪𝑯𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑳𝒐𝒂𝒏𝒂𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟏𝑪𝑹𝒋𝒕 + 𝜸𝟐 𝑴𝑹𝒋𝒕 + 𝜸𝟑𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑮𝑹𝒋𝒕
+ 𝜸𝟒𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒋𝒕 + 𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕 + 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵 + 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹  
TFPCH Tobit One  Tobit Two Tobit Three  Tobit Four 
C 
 
0.965*** 
(5.453) 
1.018 
(6.037) 
0.796*** 
(9.111) 
0.862*** 
(11.20) 
SIZE 
 
-1.11 
(-0.865) 
2.65 
(0.206) 
-3.85 
-0.336150 
9.15 
(0.818) 
EQAS 
 
-0.00 
(-0.068) 
0.000 
(0.082) 
0.003* 
(1.795) 
0.002 
(1.468) 
LOANAST 
 
-0.001* 
(-1.736) 
-0.001 
(-1.295) 
0.001** 
(2.468) 
0.001** 
(2.324) 
COST 
 
0.001* 
(1.822) 
0.000 
(1.503) 
0.000 
(1.008) 
0.000 
(1.200) 
CR 
 
0.432 
(0.966) 
-0.096 
(-0.227) 
0.490*** 
(3.182) 
0.367** 
(2.404) 
MS 
 
0.002 
(0.042) 
-0.024 
(-0.490) 
-0.012 
(-0.245) 
-0.053 
(-1.058) 
GDPGR 
 
-0.002 
(-0.494) 
-0.000 
(-0.121) 
-0.004 
(-1.015) 
-0.003 
(-0.851) 
INF 
 
-0.002*** 
(-2.924) 
0.000 
(0.545) 
-0.000*** 
(-2.277) 
-0.000 
(-0.486) 
FORE 
 
0.028 
(0.885) 
0.033 
(1.014) 
0.009 
(0.309) 
0.015 
(0.501) 
STATE 
 
0.009 
(0.312) 
0.003 
(0.105) 
-0.010 
(-0.331) 
-0.007 
(-0.243) 
Kuwait 
 
0.154* 
(1.941) 
0.092 
(1.138) 
  
Oman 
 
0.529*** 
(6.287) 
0.481*** 
(5.594) 
  
Qatar 
 
0.230* 
(1.920) 
0.065 
(0.563) 
  
Saudi Arabia 
 
0.181** 
(2.117) 
0.080 
(0.958) 
  
United Arab UAE 
 
0.389*** 
(3.635) 
0.101 
(1.178) 
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YEAR=2001 
 
0.120* 
(1.816) 
 0.133** 
(1.958) 
 
YEAR=2002 
 
0.122* 
(1.852) 
 0.131** 
(1.945) 
 
YEAR=2006 
 
0.154** 
(2.112) 
 0.136* 
(1.929) 
 
YEAR=2007 
 
0.187** 
(2.477) 
 0.160** 
(2.246) 
 
YEAR=2008 
 
0.164** 
(2.070) 
 0.105 
(1.448) 
 
YEAR=2009 
 
0.250*** 
(3.224) 
 0.177** 
(2.516) 
 
YEAR=2010 
 
0.612*** 
(7.523) 
 0.532*** 
(7.397) 
 
YEAR=2011 
 
0.173** 
(2.051) 
 0.072 
(0.986) 
 
YEAR=2012 
 
0.252*** 
(2.844) 
 0.131 
(1.731) 
 
Dependent variable TFPCH= Total factor productivity change. Independent variables: SIZE =average total assets, 
EQAS= equity to average total assets, LOANAST= net loans to average total assets, NIE/TA =non -interest 
expense to average total assets CR= the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI), MS= Market share, GDPGR= real gross 
domestic growth, INF = real inflation rate, FORE= dummy for foreign ownership, STATE= dummy for state ownership  
*significant at the 10% level 
**significant at the 5% level 
***significant at 1% level 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provides empirical evidence on the impact of financial liberalisation and 
determinants of total factor productivity in MENA banking economies. I employed the non-
parametric frontier MPI to estimate the total factor productivity of commercial banks 
operating in eleven MENA countries over the period 1999-2012. Using the MPI allows the 
determination not only the total factor productivity of banks, but also the frontier growth 
(technological change) and the optimal resource utilisation (technical efficiency change). The 
MPI results suggest that commercial banks operating in the Gulf countries, namely Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and United Arab Emirates have exhibited productivity 
progress mainly due to the technological progress rather than efficiency change confirming 
what past studies found in the MENA and other emerging economies (Ramanathan, 2006; 
Gattoufi et al. 2009; Al Hammadi (2013); Krishnasamy et al. (2013). Such findings imply 
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that commercial banks operating in these countries are still moving toward spending huge 
investments on retail banking technologies such as ATMs, internet banking, wireless banking 
and smart cards. However, other MENA countries have also experienced productivity 
progress, due to technological changes and efficiency for Jordanian commercial banks and 
from technological changes alone for Moroccan commercial banks. The source of increase in 
the technical efficiency of the Jordanian banks was generally related to scale rather than pure 
technical efficiency, suggesting that Jordanian banks have been operating at relatively 
optimal scale of operations.  On the other hand, commercial banks in Egypt and Lebanon 
have observed decline in their productivity as a result of regress in technological changes and 
efficiency. This might highlighted the relative ineffectiveness of social and economic policies 
which were not well directed in those countries, and thus appropriate actions would be 
necessary to reverse such a trend. 
However, in the second stage of this analysis, the Tobit model is employed to investigate 
whether the financial liberalisation which has taken place in that period and other factors such 
as size of banks, risk, market structure and macroeconomic factors has had an effect on the 
productivity of commercial banks. The empirical results from the Tobit model suggest that 
the financial liberalisation and consolidation enable MENA commercial banks to be more 
productive for the period 1999-2012. Within the context of MENA banking sector, previous 
studies in emerging markets (Isik and Hassan, 2003; Krishnasamy et al. 2003; Howcroft and 
Ataullah, 2006; Ben Naceur et al. 2009; Das and Kumbhakar, 2012) have suggested that 
performance of all types of banks exhibited major improvements after liberalisation, and such 
improvements were attributed to improvements of management practices, more investment in 
technology and positive impact of mergers and acquisitions on the banking industry. 
In respect to bank-specific factors, size of commercial banks and their liquidity measures 
seem to exert a regressive impact on total factor productivity. Earlier study by Eichengreen 
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and Gibson (2001) argue that impact of a bank’s growth on its productivity and profitability 
can be beneficial up to a certain limit and exceeding this limit may lead to have a negative 
effect. Whilst, other scholars Kosmidou (2008) and Sufian et la. (2013) pointed out that 
growing in size could have a negative impact on the performance of a bank, as a result of 
bureaucratic procedures. Regarding the liquidity risk variable (loanast) also has a negative 
relationship with total factor productivity of commercial banks and a plausible reason for 
such a matter can be found in the increased costs of monitoring required by a higher 
proportion of loans (Ben Naceur and Omran, 2011). However, the impact of a bank’s cost 
(COST/INCOME) on its productivity, it is interesting to observe that the coefficients of 
COST revealed a positive and significant effect on banks’ total productivity. Such finding 
seems to suggest that expenses preference behaviour leads banks to be more productive. A 
reasonable justification is that more highly qualified and professional management may 
require a higher remuneration package as well as employees incentives programmes which 
can encourage or promote a bank’s employees to produce measureable outcomes 
The empirical findings of this chapter are interesting from the policy makers’ perception. 
Despite improvements in productivity in banks operating in Gulf countries, Morocco, Jordan 
and Tunisia, my findings suggest that further reforms may be desired in order to obtain the 
optimal utilisation of capacities as well as making the greatest use of resources. Overall, 
different mix of policy should be adopted depending on the characteristics of the banking 
system on the examined countries.  
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion and Policy Implication 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis has been to investigate the market structure, financial performance, 
competitiveness and productivity of commercial banks operating in the MENA economies for 
the period 1999-2012. The thesis first measures whether the banking industry in MENA 
economies has been concentrated or not, and aims to investigate the relationship between 
market structure and banks’ profitability; then examines whether a bank’s performance can 
be better explained by the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis, that claims that 
a highly concentrated market leads to collusive behaviour among larger banks, resulting in 
superior performance hypothesis or by the efficient hypothesis (EH) that claims that the 
positive association of market share of a bank and higher performance is caused by the 
bank’s superior efficiency. Then, I apply the Panzar-Rosse model to investigate the degree of 
competition in MENA commercial banks which can be beneficial to policy makers, by 
illustrating how to shape policies which positively affect the market competition and 
safeguard stability of the financial sector. Finally, the study assesses changes in banking 
productivity by employing Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and to examine the 
determinants of MENA banks’ productivity. The importance of examining all of these issues 
of MENA banks can be augmented by the fact that capital markets in these countries are 
neither efficient nor well-developed and in many cases are almost non-existent, whilst their 
financial sector is still dominated by the banking industry (Turk-Ariss, 2009; Abuzayed et al., 
2012). Therefore, in this matter, commercial banks play a leading role in these economies, by 
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providing funds to private and public investment projects and by financing government 
deficits and the existence of well-performed, competitive and productive commercial banks 
can maintain the stability of the financial system and improve its overall economic 
productivity and growth.  
The next section presents findings of this study that can be beneficial to policy makers, 
illustrating how to shape policies which positively affect the bank performance, competition, 
productivity and stability of the financial sector in the region.  
6.2 The Key Findings 
The objectives and contributions that have been achieved are shown by the following 
empirical findings:  
6.2.1 Estimation of Market Structure in MENA Economies 
In chapter two, the degree of market concentration is measured by using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). My findings revealed that some MENA economies can be described 
as less concentrated, while others have a high and medium degree of bank market 
concentration. In two Gulf countries, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the banking sector operates 
under a medium degree of concentration whilst in other Gulf countries namely Qatar, 
Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait is found to be very concentred. Such outcomes can be explained 
by the fact that the size of the banking industry in GCC countries, in absolute terms, is 
relatively small compared to that of other developed economies. Additionally, the political 
systems in those countries are dominated by royal families as well as the GCC are considered 
to be oil rich producers and their banking sector is relatively young with most banks only 
being established since the 1970s. Finally, the banking industry in other countries, such as 
Egypt and Tunisia, is shown to be a moderately concentrated, and the banking market in 
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Lebanon could be described as a competitive market. The substantial market structure in the 
MENA banking sector raised the essential concern that banks which operate in concentrated 
markets are more profitable and gain market power. Therefore, such circumstances will 
enable them to charge their customers higher than competitive prices for their banking 
products, which in turns affect their welfare costs. 
6.2.2 Market structure, determinants of MENA commercial bank profitability  
One of the objectives of this study was to examine determinants of MENA banks’ 
profitability in the context of SCP and EH hypotheses over the period 1999-2012. This thesis 
used return on average assets (ROA) and return on average equity (ROE) to represent 
profitability and net interest margins to total assets (NIM) to represent bank operational 
performance. However, Results confirm that the capital adequacy which is represented as 
total equity to total assets (EQAS) is positively related to profitability of MENA banks 
(ROA) and bank operational performance represented by (NIM), suggesting that commercial 
banks in MENA economies tend to rely on higher capital to be away from risks being related 
to leverages (Beger, 1995b; Demirgue-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 
2007; Kosmidou, 2008; Sufian, 2012; Trulillo-Ponce, 2013; and Delis, 2012). The positive 
relationship between capital and profitability is in line with signalling theory (Berger, 1995) 
which argues that higher capital reveals a positive signal to the market value of a bank. As 
Berger (1995) pointed out that the management of bank signals private information that 
future prospects will be better by increasing capital. A lower leverage implies that banks 
perform much better than those which rely on greater leverage and supports (Demirgue-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 1999; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007; Kosmidou, 2008) and emphasises the 
importance of higher capitalisation of the MENA banking sector in regulatory framework, to 
safeguard the stability of the financial system in case of systemic liquidity risks as well as 
enable commercial banks to advance more loans to a market.       
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In respect to a bank’s portfolio using securities to average total assets (SECAST), there is no 
strong evidence to support an increase of profitability. But, the operational performance of 
banks, measured by net interest margins to total assets, is positive and statistically significant 
confirming that MENA banks are still conservative and tend to invest in less risky 
investments.  
The spending on fixed assets is found to have a positive impact on profitability of banks, 
implying that spending on fixed assets contributes in making banks more profitable. I argue 
that the foreign ownership and financial deregulations which have taken place over this 
period may force commercial banks to increase their investments in fixed assets and superior 
banking techniques. Previous literatures such as Chelo and Manlagnit (2011), Chen and Liao 
(2011), Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) pointed out that foreign ownership has led to the 
spillover effects on the banking sector through their ownership-specific advantages and 
possession of technology, and through increased competition. Additionally, financial 
liberalisation and reforms has contributed in facilitating development of the banking industry 
in terms of human capital, reduced overheads, better allocative efficiency, and technology 
transfer and diffusion.   
The relationship between risk measured as net loans to deposits (LONFUND) and 
profitability of MENA banks are mixed and statistically insignificant in some cases. But, the 
ratio of net loans to total deposits reveals a positive coefficient and is statistically significant 
when the net interest margin and return on assets are used, suggesting that illiquid assets 
(loans) can positively affect the profitability of commercial banks which is in line with Chen 
and Liao(2011); Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007); Trujillo-Ponce (2013); Sufian and 
Habibullah (2009) and Sufian (2012) and can be interpreted by that as the net loan to deposit 
ratio increases and liquidity falls, banks become unwilling to lend. In this regard, Trujillo-
Ponce (2013) argues that the larger the bank’s loans portfolio is on its balance sheet, the 
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higher is its profitability. However, in such cases, I have observed that loans lent by 
commercial banks in MENA economies tend to be more highly valued than alternative 
investment opportunities such as securities confirming that MENA commercial banks are still 
focusing on traditional lending activities. Such activities can be justified by the fact that 
banking system in this region is still functioning under political and social purposes, leading 
to have bad debts and nonperforming loans, which in turn would affect the stability of 
financial systems and the economy as a whole. Furthermore, this case confirms my 
suspicions that there is unwillingness on the part of commercial bank management to create 
new investment opportunities, indicating that management either remains conservative in its 
outlook or that it lacks the experience and skills in such matters. In order to resolve or 
overcome this issue, this study would suggest that commercial banks in MENA economies 
need to have skilful management to ensure sufficient levels of liquidity without negatively 
affecting performance of banks. 
Regarding the Credit quality and credit allocation as measured by loan loss reserves to gross 
loans, is found to have a statistically significant negative and rather robust impact on 
profitability of commercial banks. Confirming findings in Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014; 
Ahmad et al., 2012; Bejaoui and Bouzgarrou, 2014; Trujillo-Ponce, 2013; Alper and Anbar, 
2011.  
Bank Size is found to be negatively related to profitability of banks and operational 
performance, indicating that larger banks are likely to generate fewer profits when compared 
to small banks, probably due to the fact that larger and diversified banks are more likely to 
exhibit poor performance, while smaller banks can be more efficient by reducing asymmetric 
information issues associated with lending activities as suggested by Trujillo-Ponce (2013) 
and Obamuyi (2014). This assertion supports the argument of diseconomies of scale, which is 
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different from studies in other markets governed by European and American regulations that 
verified the existence of economies of scale.  
To investigate the argument that efficient cost management represented by cost to income 
(COST) as a key mechanism to enhance profitability of banks, poor cost management is 
found to be one of the main contributors to poor performance for commercial banks in the 
MENA countries as the relatively high coefficient is negative and significant for all 
regressions confirming what other studies in emerging markets have found.  This is in line 
with findings from Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007); Kosmidou (2008); and Trujillo-Ponce; 
Obamuyi (2013); Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014) 
who documented that poor cost management is one of the key contributors to poor 
profitability of commercial banks in various economies.  
Macroeconomic factors also contribute to bank performance. The study found that the 
inflation effect (INF) affects positively net interest margin (NIM) indicating that bank 
revenues increase more with inflation than costs, even when inflation levels were anticipated 
by commercial banks within the study period. 
However, investigating the relationship between market structure and banks’ profitability can 
be better explained by the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis that claims that 
a highly concentrated market leads to collusive behaviour among larger banks, or by the 
efficient hypothesis (EH) that claims that the positive association of market share of a bank 
and higher performance is caused by the bank’s superior efficiency. In this respect, market 
concentration (CR), measured by HHI, is found to be positive but insignificant except for 
affecting profitability (ROA). The positive sign of CR implies that the structure-conduct-
performance (SCP) hypothesis is not rejected, emphasising that increased market power 
yields monopoly profits. The fact that the impact of market concentration is positive in 
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MENA economies is vital evidence, at least to a certain extent, and is consistent with 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999); Flamini et al. (2009); and Dietrich and Wanzenried 
(2014). Whilst, market share (MS) is found in most regressions to be positive and highly 
significantly different from zero, whilst market concentration is equal to zero, supporting the 
argument that if a bank enjoys a higher degree of efficiency in respect to good management 
and technology than its competitors, it can easily gain a larger market share by lowering its 
prices and earning economic profits. These results are consistent findings to those of Simrlok 
(1985), Tu and Yuan Chen (2000), and Samad (2008). The study finds mixed results except 
for NIM which is affected by MC negatively and statistically significant in some regressions. 
International ownership revealed a significant impact on the profitability of banks, suggesting 
that banks with foreign ownership are more profitable and perform better than domestic 
banks. Such findings confirm what other researchers have found about the foreign ownership 
in other developing economies (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 1999; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014; 
and Farazi el al., 2011). This good performance suggests that a foreign banks’ technological 
advantage can be strong enough to overcome any informational disadvantages in lending or 
raising funds locally, as well as that foreign banks are exempted from unfavourable domestic 
banking regulations. Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014) pointed out that foreign banks in 
developing economies are likely to overcome any informational disadvantage relative to 
domestic banks through superior banking techniques.  
The study finds that year effects are significant in all basic regressions used; either for the 
profitability or market conditions. It can be observed that 2002 has negative and significant 
relationship with profitability of banks and this finding is due to the collapse in economic 
activity in developed economies. Economies in the European Union for the period 2000-2001 
and the United States in 2002 and 2003 are influenced by that recession and thereby affected 
their investments in MENA economies. Also, the Global Financial Crisis and 2008 financial 
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crisis are negative but not statistically significant with profitability in terms of ROA. Two 
years, 2011 and 2012, are negatively related and significant to ROA in all cases as countries 
such Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain have experienced deterioration in their financial and 
economic systems which in turn influence other countries in the same region. 
6.2.2.1 Contribution and policy implications of assessing  performance of MENA Banks 
in the context of SCP and EH hypotheses  
There are several policy implications.  
First, my findings can be used by policy makers and bank managers to reassess expenditures 
of banks by reviewing their number of staff and personnel expenses as well as administrative 
cost, which in turns enable them to improve efficiency and profitability as well. Second,  
monetary authorities represented by central banks in MENA countries and the management 
of commercial banks need to recognise whether investments portfolio play a major role in 
making revenues for a bank or not. According to empirical findings, this thesis found that 
MENA commercial banks maintain a conservative attitude to riskier investments and they are 
more likely to focus on safer investments such as government bonds, treasury bills, and 
deposits in local and overseas banks. The banking sector in MENA economies does not have 
expertise and skilful people who are qualified to overcome this issue, and create new growth 
in banking investments. In order to surmount these challenges, central banks and regulators 
should eliminate restrictions being related to investments portfolios and create better skilled 
staff by implementing training courses for management of portfolios and risk, and even 
introducing postgraduate studies. 
Also, my findings documented that larger banks are likely to generate lower profits as 
compared to smaller banks; this is an interesting finding and does not support merger activity. 
The impact of size can be negative due to increased bureaucratic procedures and other factors 
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relating to an increase in the number of employees, departmental expenditures and appointing 
of unskilled staff. 
Besides, this thesis found that risks represented by loans are positively related to the 
profitability of commercial banks. In other words, higher figures of net loans to deposits and 
short term funding means lower liquidity; therefore, less liquid banks in the MENA 
economies are able to generate more profits and confirming that MENA commercial banks is 
heavily dependent on traditional lending activities, showing an unwillingness or inability by 
management of commercial banks to create new investment opportunities. This reluctance to 
develop new financial opportunities indicates that management either remains conservative in 
its outlook or that it lacks the experience and skills in such matters, Also may due to the fact 
that the banking system in MENA economies still operates under political and social 
purposes, so a possible suggestion is that commercial banks in MENA economies need to 
have skilful management to ensure sufficient levels of liquidity without negatively affecting 
performance of banks. 
Also the empirical analysis that investigated the impact of market structure on financial 
performance shows collusive power in some cases of the banking industry, which asserts that 
increased market power yields monopoly profits and supporting the SCP hypothesis. 
Therefore, the high profits were the consequence of higher market concentration and 
collusion, the provision of financial services would hinder potential development of the 
MENA economy. This finding has important implications for the MENA banking industry. 
The positive relationship between market concentration and profitability would influence 
regulatory decision in terms of mergers which can be used by regulators and policymakers to 
reassess the market structure and performance so as to decide whether they should intervene 
to change market structure so as to enhance competition and quality of banking services and 
to deter insolvency.  
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Moreover, our findings supported the competing hypothesis (EH) that if a bank enjoys a 
higher degree of efficiency in respect of good management and technology than its 
competitors, the bank can easily gain a larger market share by lowering its prices and earning 
economic profits. I also found that facilitation of foreign bank entry can achieve sustained 
improvement in the performance of commercial banks by not only liberalising the presence 
of foreign banks, but also by strengthening domestic regulations and supervision of the 
commercial banking sector. 
Spending fixed assets is revealed to have a positive effect on profitability and performance of 
banks. Based on such evidence, the researcher believes that foreign ownership and financial 
liberalisation which have taken place over this period maybe forced commercial banks to 
increase their investments in better banking techniques. This suggestion is supported by 
previous studies which have emphasised that foreign ownership leads to spillover effects on 
the banking sector through their ownership-specific advantages, possession of technology and 
through increased competition. Further, policy makers should go further for financial 
liberalisation and reforms to facilitate the development of the banking industry in terms of 
human capital, reduced overheads, efficient allocation of funds, and technology transfer and 
diffusion. Also, prospective investors can use this fact to assist them to make investments 
decisions in banks with those characteristics. It is vital for the banking industry in MENA to 
pursue technological progress. Therefore, based on positive relationships between spending 
on fixed assets and technological items, the regulators and banks management should go 
further to introduce more technology as they can keep their customers by facilitating access, 
quality choices and competitive prices. 
A significant finding is also that the government policies in MENA should encourage 
commercial banks to raise their capital to safeguard the stability of the financial system in 
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case of systemic liquidity risks as well as enable commercial banks to advance more loans to 
a market and this way to provide an environment which will accelerate economic growth  
6.2.3 Assessing the competitive conditions of MENA banking market 
This thesis is aimed at investigating the competitive conditions for commercial banks in 
MENA economies. Using unbalanced panel data for 149 commercial banks over fourteen 
years (1999-2012) calculating Panzar and Rosse H-statistic and evaluate the monopoly power 
of commercial banks found that commercial banks operating in the MENA economies were 
earning their revenues (total revenue to total assets, non-interest income and net interest 
margin to total assets) under monopolistic competition for the period of the study, and in 
equilibrium state as MENA commercial banks are operating under long run equilibrium. 
Such findings confirm what earlier studies found (Aktan and Masood, 2011; Gunalp and 
Celik, 2006; Hauner and Peiris, 2008; Turk-Ariss, 2009; Abuzayed et al., 2012; Mensi, 2010; 
Mkrtchyan, 2005; Prasad and Ghosh, 2007). Findings of this study provide strong evidence 
that monopolistic competition exists among MENA commercial banks, which demand more 
improvement of regulatory frameworks to eliminate market entry barriers and further 
development of economic reforms to stimulate commercial banks to be more competitive. 
However, for prospective investors, it would be in their interests to acknowledge that banks 
with more capital base can operate better in a monopolistic competitive market (Kunt and 
Huizinga, 1999; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007), supporting the argument that better 
capitalised banks face lower costs of going bankrupt; therefore, their cost of funding results 
in higher profitability. 
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6.2.3.1 Contribution and Policy implications of assessing Competitive Conditions of 
MENA Banks 
The empirical investigations of this study found that commercial banks in MENA operate in a 
monopolistic competition environment. Such findings are regarded to be helpful for 
policymakers in MENA economies. It gives an indicator to policymakers to review and revise 
their policies in respect to market structure of the banking sector as well as considering 
whether consolidation of banks leads to increased concentration. 
Capital adequacy is very important for commercial banks operating in this market in order to 
make higher revenues. This supports the argument that well capitalised banks face lower 
costs of going bankrupt; therefore, their funding results in higher revenues. For this purpose, 
the examination of the impact of capital adequacy on bank’s performance can be beneficial to 
policy makers, Banks’ mangers and regulators by illustrating how to shape policies which 
positively affect the market competition and safeguard stability of the financial sector. 
Bank size in terms of total assets in MENA economies contributed in reducing revenues 
suggesting that larger banks were less efficient than small banks. Such a fact is considered to 
be important to regulators, policymakers and bank managers, and prospective investors at the 
MENA economies as to highlight that growing in total assets by acquisition or mergers may 
not be appropriate and effective in MENA economies. Finally, the positive relationship 
between loans and total revenues and interest revenues implying that commercial banks in the 
MENA economies tend to concentrate on traditional sources of revenue, which is not 
appropriate as there is a growing role for Islamic banks in MENA region. My findings overall 
suggest increase of competition, by encouraging a larger role for foreign banks. However, as 
stated by (Claessens, 2009), that in order for foreign banks to enter the domestic market, the 
banking system in the region needs to become more open and contestable. Therefore, it needs 
to introduce better banking supervision, eliminate of entry restrictions, corporate governance, 
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accounting and reporting standards, and auditing procedures need to be implemented and 
enforced in line with best practices. Finally, market discipline and private monitoring need to 
be strengthened and in order to improve information symmetry in the financial system, more 
robust private governance and risk management are necessary. 
6.2.4 Measuring technical efficiency and banking productivity 
Chapter seven of this thesis addressed one of the study’s objectives which intended to 
measure banks’ productivity and technical efficiency using Malmquist Productivity Index 
(MPI) within the framework of DEA approach. The empirical findings of this methodology 
suggest that commercial banks operating in the Gulf countries, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, have exhibited productivity growth 
mainly due to technological progress rather than to efficiency changes. Such results confirm 
that commercial banks operating in those markets are moving toward making very substantial 
investments in retail banking technologies such as ATMs, internet banking, wireless banking 
and smart cards. However, progress in productivity has been demonstrated through 
technological changes and technical efficiency in Jordanian commercial banks and simply 
from technological changes in Moroccan commercial banks. In contrast, Commercial banks 
in Egypt and Lebanon have observed a decline in their productivity as a result of regression 
in technological change and technical efficiency. It can be concluded that the banking sector 
in Jordan and Morocco has benefited from financial reforms and the introduction of advanced 
technology, whereas banking sectors in Egypt and Lebanon need to pay more attention to 
technological items and go further to revaluate their financial policies.    
6.2.5 Determinants of banking productivity in MENA banking economies  
Investigating the determinants of productivity of commercial banks in MENA was another 
objective of this study, for which the Tobit regression model was used as it is supported by 
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recent developments. The empirical results from the panel regression analysis suggest that the 
size of commercial banks and their liquidity measures exert a regressive impact on total 
factor productivity. It can be observed from this and previous chapters which suggest that the 
impact of growth in a bank’s size on its productivity and profitability could be helpful up to a 
certain limit. Excesses of this limit can result in a negative effect because of bureaucratic and 
other reasons. In respect to risk measures (loans to assets), it is also negatively influence 
productivity of commercial banks and a plausible reason for this can be shown by the 
increased costs for monitoring required by higher proportions of loans. However, expenses 
preference behaviour in this case leads to making banks more productive. A reasonable 
justification is that more highly qualified and professional management may require higher 
remuneration packages, as well as employee incentive programmes which can encourage or 
promote a bank’s employees to produce measureable outcomes. 
Finally, banking productivity was enhanced by the financial reforms and technological 
progress which took place over the period of the study. Findings suggest that total factor 
productivity of commercial banks in Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates are more productive than those in Bahrain. Overall, despite 
improvements in productivity in Gulf countries, Morocco and Tunisia, this study 
recommends that further reforms may be desired in order to improve productivity for these 
banks. With regards to Egypt and Lebanon, regulators, policymakers and central banks in 
particular should pay close attention to productivity and efficiency.  
6.2.5.1 Contribution and Policy Implications for Banking Productivity 
Findings of the DEA approach found that most productivity of banks was attributed to 
technological progress, not to technical efficiency (producing the maximum output from the 
minimum input), and such outputs were observed in commercial banks operating in Gulf 
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countries. Hence, policymakers and bank managers need to take the necessary actions to 
achieve more efficient cost control by implementing policies which strengthen the 
operational efficiency. They should assess whether they have too many employees, reduce 
unnecessary administrative expenditures, and enhance internal control systems and corporate 
governance mechanisms. However, in Egypt and Lebanon, the banking sector in those 
countries maybe moved away from developments in international banking industry. 
Additionally, recorded low productivity and unused capacity of banks may result in 
increasing operational costs and huge interest rates. 
Overall, policymakers and central banks in particular should give more attention to 
developing policies and strategies which improve productivity and efficiency. Regulators 
should encourage commercial banks to invest in cutting-edge technology and management 
systems as well as increasing the share of foreign presence. Foreign ownership or partnership 
helps commercial banks in the MENA economies to move much faster in terms of 
technological innovations and management systems. 
In the second stage to find the determinants of banking productivity, it is interesting to 
observe that cost/income revealed a positive and significant effect on banks’ total 
productivity, implying that an increase (decrease) in costs improve (reduce) productivity of 
commercial banks operating in MENA economies. It can be seen that increased expenses in 
this case leads banks to be more productive. A reasonable justification is that more highly 
qualified and professional management may require a higher remuneration package, as well 
as employee incentive programmes which encourage employees to produce measureable 
outcomes and therefore create a positive relationship with productivity of banks (Sathye, 
2003). 
With respect to bank liquidity (LOANAST) net loans to total assets, it revealed a negative 
relationship and statistically significant showing a positive relationship between productivity 
195 
 
of banks and liquidity. The ratio is considered high if banks are less liquid, which means that 
the more productive banks are, the more likely to have a higher level of liquidity. A reason 
that could identify why more liquid banks are more productive is related to monitoring costs 
for an increased amount of loans in terms of originated, serviced and monitored as suggested 
by Ben Naceur  (2011). The negative impact of liquidity risk on bank productivity is 
essentially explained by the fact that less liquid banks are more involved in financing risky 
loans which in turn leads to have nonperforming loans.         
6.3 Limitations of the study 
This study used secondary data, primarily collected from banks’ financial statements; 
therefore, this kind of data may be subjected to measurement and allocation errors which are 
common to traditional accounting reports. Furthermore, some financial data were not 
provided by commercial banks in MENA such as non-performing loans and number of 
ATMs.  In addition, this study covers only a limited period, 1999-2012, as financial data 
before this period were unreliable and/or unavailable. 
6.4 Future studies 
Investigating performance, market structure, competition and productivity of banks is very 
important for both well-developed and emerging markets. This study only covered these 
topics for conventional banks operating in MENA economies. Accordingly, it is 
recommended that future researchers carry out similar investigations with regards to Islamic 
banks in MENA, and to identify whether there are differences in productivity, profitability 
and revenues when compared to conventional banks. In addition, the period of study can be 
extended, and future studies can also include a number of other variables which have not yet 
been investigated. Finally, this study can be further expanded to incorporate a comparison 
with other emerging markets in order to see whether or not there are important similarities or 
differences which could prove useful for the banking industry.  
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Appendixes  
Appendix 1 Descriptive statistics of Total factor productivity variables 
 
 
 TFPCH SIZE EQAS LOANAST COST CR MS GDPGR LINF 
 Mean  1.060708  9207749.  11.28687  46.75003  48.45524  0.196778  0.128072  4.920030  4.772243 
 Median  1.013000  3779750.  10.63000  47.53500  45.74500  0.164396  0.078016  4.686000  4.683057 
 Maximum  8.133000  1.01E+08  59.10000  95.46000  439.3400  0.490415  6.160601  26.17000  5.551668 
 Minimum  0.124000  42555.00 -95.94000  1.600000  9.770000  0.088315  0.002717 -7.076000  2.060896 
 Std. Dev.  0.448677  12835211  6.718748  17.50309  22.35383  0.090323  0.273325  3.634695  0.349361 
 Skewness  8.483391  2.574924 -3.130201 -0.072944  5.542847  0.984430  14.73341  1.076446 -1.159755 
 Kurtosis  111.3991  11.58696  67.45927  2.480032  82.57326  3.116554  286.2793  8.143913  16.93763 
          
 Jarque-
Bera  606927.6  5054.617  211457.1  14.70402  325429.3  196.1207  4089571.  1567.695  10065.06 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000641  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
          
 Sum  1283.457  1.11E+10  13657.11  56567.54  58630.84  238.1010  154.9676  5953.236  5774.415 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev.  243.3853  1.99E+17  54576.16  370386.9  604129.7  9.863348  90.32053  15972.11  147.5625 
          
 Observatio
ns  1210  1210  1210  1210  1210  1210  1210  1210  1210 
 
 
Appendix 2 Correlation Matrix of Total factor productivity variables 
 
 TFPCH SIZE EQAS LOANAST COST CR MS GDPGR LINF 
TFPCH 1 0.009 0.045 0.073 0.001 0.073 -0.017 -0.002 0.02 
SIZE 0.009 1 -0.013 0.113 -0.244 0.036 0.288 0.068 0.1425 
EQAS 0.045 -0.013 1 0.091 -0.257 0.124 -0.041 0.112 0.1690 
LOANAST 0.073 0.113 0.091 1 -0.229 0.176 0.061 0.066 0.243 
COST 0.001 -0.244 -0.257 -0.229 1 -0.159 -0.069 -0.112 -0.189 
CR 0.073 0.036 0.124 0.176 -0.159 1 0.150 0.267 0.028 
MS -0.017 0.288 -0.041 0.061 -0.069 0.150 1 0.071 -0.054 
GDPGR -0.002 0.068 0.112 0.066 -0.112 0.267 0.071 1 0.077 
LINF 0.0248 0.142 0.169 0.243 -0.189 0.028 -0.054 0.077 1 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3 Descriptive statistics of MENA banking sector competition using log of total 
revenue to total assets 
 
 
 
 LOGTR/TA LPF LPL LOGPK LSIZE LSECAST LEQAS LLOANAST 
 Mean -3.060722 -3.442567 -4.606303  0.335775  14.99242 -1.886141  2.338414  3.741649 
 Median -2.979468 -3.327538 -4.631571  0.337502  15.03569 -1.561471  2.377229  3.863568 
 Maximum  1.266352 -0.919617  0.758099  3.183728  18.42849 -0.010156  3.908417  4.558707 
 Minimum -7.109062 -6.726533 -8.204809 -2.811473  9.875551 -8.864733 -4.605170  0.470004 
 Std. Dev.  0.636812  0.645940  0.551988  0.620986  1.544781  1.144899  0.521447  0.516852 
 Skewness -0.660411 -0.978114  0.101045  0.054410 -0.209402 -1.901222 -2.413626 -1.785762 
 Kurtosis  6.942614  4.668336  13.56211  4.495312  2.482707  7.771500  26.99357  8.848052 
         
224 
 
 Jarque-Bera  1038.767  397.1611  6705.244  135.0553  26.61621  2236.650  35989.53  2821.243 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000002  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
         
 Sum -4413.561 -4964.182 -6642.289  484.1878  21619.07 -2719.816  3371.992  5395.458 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev.  584.3678  601.2406  439.0592  555.6835  3438.727  1888.853  391.8175  384.9426 
         
 Observation
s  1442  1442  1442  1442  1442  1442  1442  1442 
 
 
Appendix 4 Correlation matrix of Panzar- Rosse  MENA banking sector competition 
 
 
LOGTR/T
A LPF LPL LOGPK LSIZE LSECAST LEQAS 
LLOANAS
T 
LOGTR/T
A 1 0.392 0.383 0.007 -0.219 0.023 0.022 0.053 
LPF 0.391 1 0.270 -0.019 -0.300 0.109 -0.282 -0.102 
LPL 0.383 0.270 1 0.119 -0.423 -0.088 0.039 0.090 
LOGPK 0.007 -0.019 0.119 1 0.155 -0.029 -0.0536 0.073 
LSIZE -0.219 -0.300 -0.423 0.155 1 0.167 -0.0318 0.240 
LSECAST 0.023 0.109 -0.088 -0.029 0.167 1 -0.138 -0.352 
LEQAS 0.022 -0.282 0.039 -0.053 -0.031 -0.138 1 0.170 
LLOANAS
T 0.053 -0.102 0.090 0.0739 0.240 -0.352 0.170 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5 Descriptive statistics of MENA Panzar-rosse banking sector competition using 
log of interest income to total assets 
 
 LII_TA LPF LPL LOGPK LSIZE LSECAST LEQAS LLOANAST 
 Mean -3.464178 -3.441568 -4.604151  0.337043  14.98322 -1.889439  2.338547  3.741293 
 Median -3.240697 -3.323875 -4.628552  0.339347  15.02363 -1.564244  2.376764  3.865141 
 Maximum  1.266352 -0.919617  0.758099  3.183728  18.42849 -0.010156  3.908417  4.558707 
 Minimum -7.780482 -6.726533 -8.204809 -2.811473  9.875551 -8.864733 -4.605170  0.470004 
 Std. Dev.  0.923211  0.646510  0.552677  0.621863  1.544120  1.147549  0.522644  0.518374 
 Skewness -1.060181 -0.981036  0.093898  0.053071 -0.201944 -1.892389 -2.412292 -1.779270 
 Kurtosis  4.993458  4.676575  13.57269  4.489077  2.486340  7.725830  26.91683  8.794655 
         
 Jarque-Bera  505.7181  397.6951  6676.404  133.0670  25.49378  2188.789  35543.86  2760.987 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000003  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
         
 Sum -4964.167 -4931.768 -6597.748  482.9828  21470.95 -2707.567  3351.138  5361.273 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev.  1220.521  598.5413  437.4063  553.7740  3414.326  1885.755  391.1602  384.7945 
         
 Observation
s  1433  1433  1433  1433  1433  1433  1433  1433 
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Appendix 6 Descriptive statistics of MENA banking sector Equilibrium test using log of 
return on total assets  
 
 LROA LPF LPL LOGPK LSIZE LSECAST LEQAS LLOANAST 
 Mean  0.151896 -3.470438 -4.637294  0.350615  15.09692 -1.875439  2.367768  3.737343 
 Median  0.322083 -3.357696 -4.661808  0.343583  15.13177 -1.546803  2.404690  3.863568 
 Maximum  2.580217 -0.919617  0.758099  3.183728  18.42849 -0.010156  3.908417  4.558707 
 Minimum -4.605170 -6.726533 -8.204809 -2.811473  9.875551 -8.864733 -0.385662  0.470004 
 Std. Dev.  0.928800  0.652191  0.546202  0.617145  1.510883  1.148452  0.476910  0.522055 
 Skewness -1.475019 -0.945784  0.141218  0.065784 -0.253585 -1.889184 -0.942503 -1.823823 
 Kurtosis  6.464796  4.595785  15.06473  4.614465  2.542404  7.631252  6.511163  9.019587 
         
 Jarque-Bera  1144.091  338.3819  8046.469  144.9653  25.78051  1973.782  877.4536  2737.126 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000003  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
         
 Sum  201.4137 -4601.801 -6149.052  464.9161  20018.51 -2486.832  3139.660  4955.716 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev.  1143.036  563.5928  395.2958  504.6503  3024.668  1747.599  301.3625  361.1176 
         
 Observation
s  1326  1326  1326  1326  1326  1326  1326  1326 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7 Descriptive statistics of MENA banking Profitability using SCP hypothesis  
 
 LROA LCOST LEQAS LSECAST LSIZE LLOFUND 
LLOAREA
SG LEXPTEC CR MS LGDPGR LINF 
 Mean  0.231121  3.760406  2.396979 -1.806615  15.13727  3.943750 1.767705  0.388432  0.199284 0.125066  1.456855  4.804348 
 Median  0.405465  3.784871  2.433613 -1.536045  15.11223  4.045329 1.752672  0.371198  0.165703 0.065759  1.580009  4.721770 
 Maximum 2.580217  4.738739  3.908417 -0.010156  18.42849  5.050945 4.376511  3.183728  0.470716 6.160601  3.264614  5.551668 
 Minimum -4.605170  2.279316 -0.385662 -8.864733  9.875551  1.481605 -1.609438 -2.166688  0.088315 0.000709 -1.565421  2.060896 
 Std. Dev.  0.892771  0.367348  0.438569 1.028037  1.489283  0.490303 0.880469  0.611365  0.091168 0.283063  0.772657  0.371222 
 Skewnes
s -1.406226 -0.220238 -0.571494 -1.929141 -0.148021 -0.960014 -0.251531  0.198269  0.900402 14.27412 -1.155864 -1.530564 
 Kurtosis  6.004432  3.040338  5.087668 8.630575  2.400591  4.126829 3.533221  4.172161  2.852762 267.8356  5.286844  17.40943 
             
 Jarque-
Bera  795.3096  9.187215  266.0086 2187.775  20.98723  232.7372 25.23522  71.90281  153.2991 3331831.  496.5255  10190.06 
 Probabilit
y  0.000000  0.010116  0.000000 0.000000  0.000028  0.000000 0.000003  0.000000  0.000000 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
             
 Sum  260.4731  4237.978  2701.395 -2036.055  17059.70  4444.606 1992.203  437.7627  224.5933 140.9499  1641.876  5414.500 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev.  897.4681  151.9477  216.5783 1190.025  2497.427  270.6866 872.9036  420.8614  9.358914 90.22058  672.2199  155.1691 
             
 Observati  1127  1127  1127  1127  1127  1127  1127  1127  1127  1127  1127  1127 
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Appendix 8 Correlation matrix of SCP hypothesis variables  
 
 LROA LCOST LEQAS 
LSECAS
T LSIZE 
LLOFUN
D 
LLOARE
ASG 
LEXPTE
C CR MS 
LGDPG
R LINF 
LROA 1 -0.643 
0.47599
3433504
3627 
-
0.12370
6046256
415 
0.15944
7694147
2851 
0.35834
2314583
3287 
-
0.27202
9144665
9505 
0.02803
7386334
44936 
0.23572
8466788
8741 
-
0.01109
7378097
4786 
0.18880
5009824
5571 
0.17942
3238445
9123 
LCOST 
-
0.64314
6298390
7881 1 
-
0.40643
5608394
1249 
0.12884
8210922
9468 
-
0.34648
9901330
8824 
-
0.40808
0992214
7128 
0.27870
5868380
9748 
-
0.02507
8333710
0234 
-
0.25477
7800415
421 
-
0.05796
2249324
18466 
-
0.19267
9193985
2713 
-
0.30822
1179214
6335 
LEQAS 
0.47599
3433504
3627 
-
0.40643
5608394
1249 1 
-
0.24386
4389605
6572 
-
0.12742
8086576
4339 
0.38087
8970968
873 
-
0.09789
5468121
31894 
-
0.13929
2739844
546 
0.22407
3457540
1894 
-
0.11507
9519167
7867 
0.14359
6076881
1018 
0.24151
2706321
0746 
LSECAS
T 
-
0.12370
6046256
415 
0.12884
8210922
9468 
-
0.24386
4389605
6572 1 
0.19451
2971887
4677 
-
0.39944
6882826
9985 
-
0.00503
1462880
153706 
0.01430
0341884
43533 
-
0.03026
7882220
51681 
0.05081
9581712
2609 
-
0.10907
1738048
1995 
-
0.20126
5162999
8713 
LSIZE 
0.15944
7694147
2851 
-
0.34648
9901330
8824 
-
0.12742
8086576
4339 
0.19451
2971887
4677 1 
0.24050
5209939
88 
-
0.39965
2759585
7622 
0.16965
1145886
5903 
0.09773
2034816
46862 
0.31488
7118146
2145 
0.07678
9863055
16572 
0.17573
5072054
2085 
LLOFUN
D 
0.35834
2314583
3287 
-
0.40808
0992214
7128 
0.38087
8970968
873 
-
0.39944
6882826
9985 
0.24050
5209939
88 1 
-
0.39358
5852542
2698 
0.08730
7098035
93808 
0.32902
5724150
5015 
0.09235
8160714
75582 
0.17095
1586490
1421 
0.28748
7692095
7249 
LLOARE
ASG 
-
0.27202
9144665
9505 
0.27870
5868380
9748 
-
0.09789
5468121
31894 
-
0.00503
1462880
153706 
-
0.39965
2759585
7622 
-
0.39358
5852542
2698 1 
-
0.03408
6080908
85417 
-
0.15149
7480110
6998 
-
0.04211
7346396
29901 
-
0.16616
8360504
5702 
-
0.14480
3028841
1391 
LEXPTE
C 
0.02803
7386334
44936 
-
0.02507
8333710
0234 
-
0.13929
2739844
546 
0.01430
0341884
43533 
0.16965
1145886
5903 
0.08730
7098035
93808 
-
0.03408
6080908
85417 1 
0.16410
5590763
2795 
0.13353
7482158
3781 
0.09195
0721563
87622 
0.06122
9193191
31522 
CR 
0.23572
8466788
8741 
-
0.25477
7800415
421 
0.22407
3457540
1894 
-
0.03026
7882220
51681 
0.09773
2034816
46862 
0.32902
5724150
5015 
-
0.15149
7480110
6998 
0.16410
5590763
2795 1 
0.15865
3972913
8703 
0.27527
7980797
551 
0.04903
8095455
53275 
MS 
-
0.01109
7378097
4786 
-
0.05796
2249324
18466 
-
0.11507
9519167
7867 
0.05081
9581712
2609 
0.31488
7118146
2145 
0.09235
8160714
75582 
-
0.04211
7346396
29901 
0.13353
7482158
3781 
0.15865
3972913
8703 1 
0.07067
6106372
19534 
-
0.04735
0083748
75931 
LGDPG
R 
0.18880
5009824
5571 
-
0.19267
9193985
2713 
0.14359
6076881
1018 
-
0.10907
1738048
1995 
0.07678
9863055
16572 
0.17095
1586490
1421 
-
0.16616
8360504
5702 
0.09195
0721563
87622 
0.27527
7980797
551 
0.07067
6106372
19534 1 
0.07983
3044260
96871 
LINF 
0.17942
3238445
9123 
-
0.30822
1179214
6335 
0.24151
2706321
0746 
-
0.20126
5162999
8713 
0.17573
5072054
2085 
0.28748
7692095
7249 
-
0.14480
3028841
1391 
0.06122
9193191
31522 
0.04903
8095455
53275 
-
0.04735
0083748
75931 
0.07983
3044260
96871 1 
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Appendix 9 Commercial banks In Bahrain  
 
Arab Banking Corporation BSC-Bank ABC 
Gulf International Bank BSC 
Ahli United Bank BSC 
Awal Bank 
BBK B.S.C. 
National Bank of Bahrain 
International Banking Corporation BSC 
Future Bank B.S.C. 
Bahrain Commercial Facilities Company BSc 
Alubaf Arab International Bank 
Addax Bank BSC 
 
Appendix 10 Commercial banks in Egypt 
National Bank of Egypt 
Banque Misr SAE 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 
QNB Al Ahli 
Banque du Caire SAE 
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 
Arab African International Bank 
Bank of Alexandria 
Credit Agricole Egypt SAE 
Arab International Bank 
Bank Audi SAE 
The National Bank of Kuwait - Egypt SAE-NBK 
Barclays Bank - Egypt S.A.E. 
Suez Canal Bank 
Emirates National Bank of Dubai SAE 
United Bank (The) 
Société Arabe Internationale de Banque-SAIB 
Ahli United Bank (Egypt) SAE 
BLOM Bank Egypt SAE 
Nasser Social Bank 
Egyptian Gulf Bank SAE 
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt (SAE) 
Union National Bank - Egypt SAE 
Piraeus Bank Egypt SAE 
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Appendix 11Commercial banks in Jordan 
Arab Bank Group (Combined) 
Arab Bank Plc 
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 
Jordan Ahli Bank Plc 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 
Cairo Amman Bank 
Bank of Jordan Plc 
Capital Bank of Jordan 
Jordan Commercial Bank 
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 
Société générale de Banque-Jordanie 
 
Appendix 12 Commercial banks in Kuwait 
National Bank of Kuwait S.A.K. 
Burgan Bank KPSC 
Gulf Bank KSC (The) 
Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait (KSC) 
Commercial Bank of Kuwait 
K.P.S.C. (The) 
 
Appendix 13 Commercial banks in Lebanon 
Bank Audi SAL 
BLOM Bank s.a.l. 
Byblos Bank S.A.L. 
Fransabank sal 
Bankmed, sal 
Bank of Beirut S.A.L. 
Société Générale de Banque au Liban - SGBL 
Banque Libano-Francaise 
Crédit Libanais S.A.L. 
B.L.C. Bank S.A.L 
BBAC sal 
IBL Bank sal 
First National Bank SAL 
Lebanon & Gulf Bank S.A.L. 
CreditBank SAL 
Bank Audi Private Bank 
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Banque BEMO Sal 
MEAB SAL 
Al-Mawarid Bank S.A.L 
Emirates Lebanon Bank SAL 
Lebanese Swiss Bank SAL (The) 
Fenicia Bank SAL 
Banque Misr Liban 
BSL Bank SAL 
Federal Bank of Lebanon SAL 
Ahli International Bank SAL 
Banque de l'Industrie et du Travail SAL 
Jammal Trust Bank SAL 
Saradar Bank SAL 
National Bank of Kuwait (Lebanon) SAL 
Banque Pharaon & Chiha SAL 
CSCBank SAL 
Banque de Crédit National 
Cedrus Bank SAL 
Blom Development Bank SAL 
 
Appendix 14 Commercial banks in Morocco 
Attijariwafa Bank 
Attijariwafa Bank (Combined) 
Banque Marocaine du Commerce Extérieur-
BMCE Bank 
Banque Centrale Populaire SA 
Société Générale Marocaine de Banques 
Banque Marocaine pour le Commerce et 
l'Industrie BMCI 
Crédit du Maroc 
Al Barid Bank 
Banque Populaire De Rabat 
Banque Populaire d'El Jadida-Safi 
Chaabi International Bank Offshore 
Citibank-Maghreb SA 
 
Appendix 15 Commercial banks in Oman 
Bank Muscat SAOG 
National Bank of Oman 
(SAOG) 
HSBC Bank Oman 
Bank Dhofar SAOG 
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Bank Sohar SAOG 
Oman Arab Bank SAOC 
 
 
Appendix 16 Commercial banks in Qatar 
Qatar National Bank 
The Commercial Bank (QSC) 
Doha Bank 
Al Khalij Commercial Bank 
International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C. 
Ahli Bank QSC 
HSBC Bank Middle East Limited 
 
 
Appendix 17 Commercial banks in Saudi Arabia 
Arab .tio.l Bank 
Bank Al-Jazira 
Banque Saudi Fransi 
.tio.l Commercial Bank (The) 
Riyad Bank 
Samba Fi.ncial Group 
Saudi British Bank (The) 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 
 
Appendix 18 Commercial banks in Tunisia  
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie - BIAT 
Société Tunisienne de Banque 
Banque Nationale Agricole 
Banque de l'Habitat 
Amen Bank 
Arab Tunisian Bank 
Attijari Bank 
Banque de Tunisie 
Union Internationale de Banques 
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Union Bancaire pour le Commerce et l'Industrie 
SA UBCI 
Banque Tunisienne de Solidarité 
North Africa International Bank - NAIB 
Alubaf International Bank 
Banque Franco-Tunisienne 
Arab Banking Corporation - Tunisie 
 
 
Appendix 19 Commercial banks in United Arab Emirates  
Emirates NBD PJSC 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi 
HSBC Bank Middle East 
Limited 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 
First Gulf Bank 
Union National Bank 
Mashreqbank PSC 
Commercial Bank of Dubai 
P.S.C. 
National Bank of Ras Al-
Khaimah (P.S.C.) (The)-
RAKBANK 
Bank of Sharjah 
National Bank of Fujairah PJSC 
United Arab Bank PJSC 
Commercial Bank International 
P.S.C. 
Arab Bank for Investment & 
Foreign Trade-Al Masraf 
National Bank of Umm Al-
Qaiwain PSC 
Invest Bank P.S.C. 
Al khaliji France SA 
Credit Europe Bank (Dubai) Ltd 
 
